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Introduction 
Applying Shari῾a in the West
Maurits S. Berger
How can we make sense of the new phenomenon of shari῾a in the 
West? In 2003, a respectable institution such as the European Court 
of Human Rights ruled that ‘sharia clearly diverges from [the Euro-
pean] Convention [of Human Rights] values’.1 But equally respect-
able authorities, such as the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Lord 
Chief Justice of England and Wales, argued in 2008 that shari῾a does 
not necessarily have to contradict Western legal and political values.2 
Clearly, the presence of shari῾a in Western societies is of increasing 
concern among Europeans, North Americans and Australians. Crucial 
questions remain unanswered, however: what is shari῾a, especially in 
a Western context, and what are these Western values it is diverging 
from, and why is that so? Is shari῾a indeed applied in the West, and by 
whom? And if so, is shari῾a a static notion or does it adapt to Western 
values or structures?
A body of literature on the issue of shari῾a in the West is gradu-
ally emerging, focusing primarily on the ways private international 
law deals with shari῾a and on the compatibility (or lack of compati-
bility) between shari῾a and Western legal concepts.3 This volume will 
contribute to this academic discussion by taking the practice of shari῾a 
by Muslims in the Western legal context as the basis for analysis. Two 
assumptions underlie this approach. First, it is futile to study shari῾a in 
the West as an autonomous and holistic notion, because this overlooks 
the realities of its practice on the ground. The fact is that while shari῾a 
as a concept of divine rules has developed over centuries of scholarship 
into an autonomous ‘Islamic’ legal system, the practice of this system 
has become fragmented in the Western context, and perhaps even dis-
torted, because it has had to accommodate the dominant Western legal 
system. Second, we can only understand the interaction between these 
two legal systems if the notion of a Western ‘legal system’ is seen in the 
much wider context of the social, political and cultural values upheld 
by Western societies. These values, together with preconceived Western 
notions of shari῾a (the ‘fears’ mentioned in the subtitle of this volume) 
have an impact on the practice of shari῾a.
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Based on these premises, the discussion in this volume is divided 
into three sections. The first section contains descriptions and analy-
ses of, on the one hand, the practice of shari῾a and in particular that of 
Islamic family law within the legal frameworks of a selection of Western 
countries; and, on the other hand, national responses to these particular 
forms of shari῾a. In the second section, a number of thematic issues that 
recur in the country studies will be addressed. The third section con-
tains contributions on the need and modalities for adaptation by either 
Western or Muslim legal systems, so as to accommodate each other.
Before we discuss these sections in more detail, however, we must 
first address a fundamental question: what do we mean by shari῾a?
What do Western Muslims Mean by Shari῾a?
Rather than defining shari῾a as a legal discipline of Islam,4 or as a set 
of practices and laws applied in foreign countries,5 our interest is pri-
marily in what Muslims in the West mean and want in terms of rules 
prescribed by Islam. This starting point warrants two remarks. First, it 
explains why we prefer to use the term ‘shari῾a’, not ‘Islamic law’, in this 
volume: while the latter is confined to the domain of ‘law’ in the legal 
sense, which concerns certain relationships between people or between 
people and the state, ‘shari῾a’ denotes the much wider domain of rules 
pertaining to all relationships between people (including those of a so-
cial and moral nature), as well as the rules governing the relationship 
between man and God (such as prayer, burial, slaughter, and so forth). 
As we will see below, only by taking this wider perspective on ‘shari῾a’ 
can we obtain a clear view of what Muslims in the West do and want in 
terms of religious rules.
The second remark concerns the approach taken to assessing the 
nature and scope of shari῾a in the West. By posing the question, ‘What 
do Muslims do in terms of shari῾a?’ rather than ‘What is shari῾a?’, we 
adopt a legal-anthropological approach that takes Muslims as its refer-
ence point, rather than an abstract notion of shari῾a.6 Such an approach 
is necessary if we want to develop a proper understanding of shari῾a in 
the West. To reflect upon whether shari῾a is a violation of European 
Convention principles or might be in compliance with English law 
may lead us into an empty academic discussion if the specific rules of 
shari῾a that are being discussed are not actually adhered to by Mus-
lims in the West. It is clear that shari῾a punishments are contrary to 
Western values, as is the notion of a theocracy, but what is the use of 
discussing these legal notions if they deviate from what Muslims in the 
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West are striving for? We must therefore move away from shari῾a as a 
form of theological-legal scholarship, and first determine what rules are 
adhered to by, or otherwise relevant for, Muslims in the West.
From this perspective, it is striking that so little is known about what 
Muslims in the West mean by shari῾a. To my knowledge, only three 
surveys have been conducted among Muslims in European countries, 
and one among Muslims worldwide, in which Muslims were asked for 
their opinion on ‘shari῾a’. The latter survey was a 2008 Gallup poll rep-
resenting 90 per cent of Muslims worldwide, in which ‘shari῾a’ ranked 
highest – together with ‘democracy’, one should add – on the list of 
what Muslims wanted.7 Of the other two surveys, one was conducted 
in 2004 in the Netherlands, and found that 51 per cent of the Dutch 
Muslims interviewed favoured a Muslim political party, and 29.5 per 
cent thought that its political programme should be based on shari῾a.8 
(The subsequent newspaper headlines that ‘one third of Dutch Mus-
lims favour sharia’ were therefore entirely wrong). A British poll of 
2006 found that 40 per cent of British Muslims support shari῾a law 
being introduced in pre-dominantly Muslim areas in Britain,9 while a 
British study of 2007 found that 28 per cent of British Muslims would 
prefer to live under shari῾a law.10 What is of interest to us here is that 
none of these surveys defined shari῾a, nor asked their respondents to 
do so, therefore leaving us ignorant of what Western Muslims mean by 
shari῾a. However, based on what we know from existing studies and 
from the following chapters, we can deduce three possible answers to 
this question, each leading us in a different direction:
Shari῾a: a virtuous abstraction
The first answer to what Muslims might mean by ‘shari῾a’ in a Western 
context is shari῾a as a slogan or an abstraction with a virtuous connota-
tion. Shari῾a stands for ‘the law of God’, or ‘all that Muslims need’, and, 
effectively, for everything that is ‘good’ for Muslims. We might compare 
the use of this abstraction with that of ‘justice’: it is perceived as virtuous 
and necessary, but few people will be able to provide a full definition of 
the concept, particularly when it comes to putting it into practice. We 
can observe a similar attitude among devout Muslims towards shari῾a: 
it is something virtuous and they want it to be applied in their lives, 
even though they do not know exactly what shari῾a means in practice. 
Although this notion of shari῾a is thus of little use to those who want 
to define it as a set of rules, it is precisely this notion that makes shari῾a 
such a powerful force in the minds of many Western Muslims. Indeed, 
it might explain the high percentages in the abovementioned surveys: 
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when asked about shari῾a, what devout Muslim would give a negative 
response?
Shari῾a: foreign national laws
Muslims living in the West who are also nationals of their country of 
origin sometimes have the national family law of this latter country ap-
plied to them as a matter of private international law: a Pakistani couple 
in England might be divorced in accordance with Pakistani (Muslim) 
family law, a divorce pronounced in Iran in accordance with Iranian 
(Muslim) family law might be recognized in Germany, and a polyga-
mous marriage that is legally concluded in Morocco might be recog-
nized (but not enforced) in the Netherlands. While national Western 
courts are less and less inclined to apply foreign national laws to resi-
dents with a foreign nationality, these residents continue to navigate 
their way through a legal labyrinth for the practical reason that they 
often retain strong ties with their countries of origin.
Therefore, the Western Muslims who maintain that Western courts 
should apply ‘shari῾a’ or ‘Islamic law’ in their case are in fact referring 
to the Islamic nature of their national law, rather than to the complex 
system of Islamic scholarly jurisprudence. Strictly speaking, this is not 
‘shari῾a’ as described in the vast corpus of Islamic legal jurisprudence, 
but national laws that have drawn upon that corpus and modelled the 
selected rules into a format – a legal code – that is unknown in shari῾a. 
Several of the following chapters will touch upon this particular appli-
cation of shari῾a. However, our interest in this volume is not in shari῾a 
as foreign national law being applied in Western courts by virtue of pri-
vate international law. Our focus is on indigenous practices of shari῾a 
in the West: what is it that Western Muslims do and want in terms of 
shari῾a? And that is the third notion of shari῾a, as we will see below.
Shari῾a: the practices and desires of Western Muslims
Only limited research has been undertaken into manifestations of 
shari῾a in the West, and that research which does exist mostly follows 
the conventions of the respective academic discipline: social scientists 
tend to look at social factors, including radicalization and religious 
ritual; lawyers tend to examine family law;11 and Islamic finance has 
been the domain of practising lawyers and bankers, rather than schol-
ars.12 The study of fatwas and the ‘fiqh for minorities’ (fiqh al-‘aqalliyat) 
might yield novel insights into changing concepts in Islamic jurispru-
dence,13 but research has hitherto failed to indicate the extent to which 
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these changes are actually embraced by Muslims in the West. The over-
all picture of shari῾a in the West is therefore fragmented in qualita-
tive terms (the interpretation and manifestations of shari῾a) and almost 
non-existent in quantitative terms (the actual practice of shari῾a and 
how many Muslims adhere to this).
However, based on the research that has been done so far, and as is 
confirmed in the following chapters, we may build up a general picture 
of shari῾a as practised in the West. Devout Muslims in the West are 
indeed committed to living in accordance with shari῾a, but this is lim-
ited to the following domains:
– religious rules, such as those pertaining to prayer, fasting, burial, 
and dress code;
– rules relating to family law, in particular those pertaining to mar-
riage and divorce;
– rules relating to financial transactions, in particular the ban on in-
terest or usury;
– social relations, in particular gender relations and relations with the 
non-Islamic environment.
Three observations can be made with regard to these four domains of 
shari῾a rules. First, this collection of rules appears quite haphazard, 
both in scope and in content. From an Islamic legal-theological per-
spective, however, this set of rules has an internal logic, because all of 
these rules share a high ranking in the hierarchy of Islamic rules pre-
scribed by classical orthodoxy: they are explicitly mentioned in the 
Qur’an, by the Prophet, or by scholarly consensus, and are therefore the 
first to be followed by any devout Muslim.
The second observation is that of the abovementioned rules, only 
those related to family law and the prohibition of usury or interest can 
be considered ‘law’ or ‘legal rules’, according to modern standards. The 
other rules pertain to religious rituals or social conduct and, as such, 
are mostly outside the scope of legislation in Western countries (except, 
for instance, when national burial or slaughter laws seek to accommo-
date religious practices).
Finally, these domains of shari῾a pertain to Muslims’ daily lives, 
and appear to have little to do with political views on the need for an 
Islamic restructuring of Western societies. Of course, such views do 
exist among some radical Muslims, just as there are Muslim extrem-
ists who interpret shari῾a as a call for militant action against alleged 
Western injustices. We must emphasize, however, that our goal here is 
to gain a general impression of what the majority of devout Muslims in 
the West desires and practises in terms of shari῾a.
AUP_Berger_vierde.indd   11 19-4-2013   12:25:29
12 applying shari῾a in the west
Shari῾a Practices in a Western Legal Framework
We now come to the next step in our discussion, which is how West-
ern legal systems respond to these shari῾a practices. This is the start-
ing point of this volume. In the first chapter, Mathias Rohe provides 
the scope of the discussion by presenting a comprehensive overview 
of all the reasons that give rise to a need or obligation to apply rules of 
shari῾a. He distinguishes between the ‘external reasons’ produced by 
Western legal systems, such as private international law or the English 
legal accommodation of Islamic finance, and the ‘internal reasons’ pro-
duced by Muslims themselves, such as a religious, legal or cultural need 
to have shari῾a applied. We will see this dual perspective recurring in 
the subsequent country studies.
The next six chapters are country studies that give an impression of 
the scope and modalities of the religious legal needs of Muslims in the 
West, and Western legal possibilities and responses to these needs. The 
six studies demonstrate that we may, for a variety of reasons, divide 
what we have so far called ‘the West’ in three regions, namely America 
and Australia, North Western Europe, and South Eastern Europe. Each 
of these regions has a different historical, social-economical and legal 
relation with Islam and Muslims.
Three Western regions
Among the Western legal systems, those of America and Australia 
perhaps allow Muslims the most freedom to apply forms of shari῾a, 
particularly in family law. This can be partly attributed to the fact that 
the Muslim communities in these countries are often middle or upper 
class, and are therefore more prone to taking an intellectual and activist 
position regarding shari῾a. The responses, however, are quite different. 
In their chapter on America, Bryan S. Turner and James T. Richardson 
conclude that regardless of ‘liberal’ problems with religion and pub-
lic concern vis-à-vis potential radicalism among Muslims in America, 
the vast majority of Muslims in America are finding ways to adjust to 
American secularism, while also expressing their religious identity in 
various ways. In the chapter on Australia, on the other hand, Jamila 
Hussain and Adam Possamai reflect on ‘the new Australian conserva-
tive modernity,’ which is a combination of resurgent social values of 
Christian conservatism, active government priorities of disengagement 
and a rapidly expanding culture of surveillance and obedience. In this 
new phase of modernity, the authors argue, a process of de-legitimiza-
tion of diversity is occurring, especially with regard to Muslims.
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The chapters on the North Western European countries of the Neth-
erlands and the United Kingdom illustrate how different the circum-
stances of the Muslim communities in these countries are from those 
in America and Australia. While they all are migrants or of migrant 
origin, the Muslim communities in the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom are mostly lower-class, and lack political or religious unity 
and leadership. In his chapter on the United Kingdom, Jørgen Nielsen 
describes how in their need for unified regulation of family law, Muslim 
communities in the United Kingdom have been hindered by internal 
divisions and disagreements on the interpretation of that law, resulting 
in the emergence of various ‘Sharia councils.’ Nielsen argues that these 
tensions among Muslims living in Europe can be attributed to Europe’s 
imperial past, and that the arguments about the place of shari῾a in 
Europe therefore have a deep symbolic meaning that is associated with 
minority identity, and which can only be overcome after a long period 
of negotiation and trial and error. While this process has been going on 
in the United Kingdom for at least three decades, the development of 
any form of unified Islamic family law or of councils that might provide 
guidance or rulings on shari῾a is still in its infancy in the Netherlands, 
as becomes clear in Susan Rutten’s chapter. Moreover, the Dutch politi-
cal climate has become such in the past decade that any initiative is met 
with hostility and political, as well as legal, objections. Insofar as Dutch 
Muslims want to undertake initiatives in this direction, they will there-
fore do so mostly within the context of the Dutch legal system, which, 
according to Rutten, may be well equipped to cope with legal and reli-
gious pluralism and consequently with shari῾a, although some human 
rights issues remain to be resolved.
The chapters on the South East European countries of Albania, Kos-
ovo and Greece bring us into an entirely different context. First and 
foremost, the Muslim communities in these countries have been living 
there for more than five centuries and have a long history of institu-
tionalization. This history was cut short with the implementation of 
communist rule after 1945, but it has gradually re-emerged since the 
fall of communism and the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s. Remarkable in 
this respect are the cases of Albania and Kosovo, the only countries in 
the West with Muslim majority populations. Besnik Senani describes 
how these countries are struggling to accommodate secularism to 
Islamic identity, with the clear aim of being as ‘European’ as possible. 
In doing so, some political leaders in Kosovo and Albania have gone 
so far as to distance their national culture from Islam, sometimes even 
claiming more proximity to Christianity than to Islam. Angeliki Ziaki 
describes a very different situation in Greece, even though this coun-
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try shares a historical Ottoman legacy with Albania and Kosovo. The 
Muslim minority lives in the most eastern part of Greece, where, as 
enshrined in the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, it has historically been allowed 
a high degree of religious autonomy. This includes having its own muf-
tis, who preside over shari῾a courts that have exclusive jurisdiction in 
family law matters. Although some observers criticize this situation as 
‘neo-milletism’, alluding to the millet system under Ottoman rule, Ziaki 
argues that it is possible to achieve a symbiosis between Greek secular 
and Islamic law.
Shari῾a in the West
When surveying these studies, one of the most noticeable findings is 
that practices of shari῾a are adapted to the legal, social, political and 
historical contexts of each Western country, creating a diverse picture 
of ‘shari῾a in the West.’ For example, the strict distinction between a 
civil and religious marriage, as is legally prescribed in most Western 
countries, can create a legal social and political grey zone where choices 
between the two are made: are the two marriages to be conducted sepa-
rately and if so, in what order, and what is the status of a civil or reli-
gious marriage if only one has been concluded and not the other? These 
questions are not pertinent to Muslims, but to people of all faiths who 
want to marry religiously. In countries like the United States, Australia, 
United Kingdom, Spain or Sweden the conflict has been resolved by 
allowing the two ceremonies to converge. In countries like the Nether-
lands, France and Germany, on the other hand, the distinction between 
religious and civil marriage is strictly adhered to as a principal matter 
of separation of state and religion.
Another example where national context and history make a differ-
ence in the reception of shari῾a is that of the Islamic institutions where 
decisions regarding shari῾a are taken, in particular regarding family 
law matters. These institutions, known as Sharia boards, courts, coun-
cils or tribunals, may be integrated into the formal judiciary system 
(as is the case in Greece), or may operate in an informal manner (as 
is already the case in many Western countries with regard to Jewish 
and Catholic ‘courts’), or may operate between formal and informal 
domains by means of arbitration (as in the United Kingdom and, until 
2007, in Ontario, Canada).
And, as a final example, we might mention the allowances made for 
social conduct, in particular the use of religious dress. Here we see an 
interesting difference between the United States and Western European 
countries: while both regions adhere to similar notions of secularism 
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and liberty, the manifestation of religion – including that of Islam – in 
the public and political domain is much more accepted in American 
society than in European society. This particular form of secularism 
is clearly much stronger in Western Europe and consequently has its 
effects on the public manifestations of Islam. We will return to this sub-
ject below.
When we turn our view to the Muslims in the West, perhaps the most 
conspicuous commonality that emerges from the six chapters is that 
there is no enforcing agency with respect to shari῾a other than Muslims 
themselves. Applying and enforcing shari῾a is mostly a matter of volun-
tary willingness to submit to these rules, whereby social actors – one’s 
peers, family, or the Muslim community – may add a degree of pres-
sure or coercion. Enforcement of shari῾a may also result from Muslim 
communities having organized themselves, either to coordinate certain 
services for their community or to act as intermediates with the govern-
ment. In the case of America and Australia, Muslims have established 
organizations that act as lobby groups, scholarly councils or advisory 
boards. Efforts to create similar unified initiatives have failed in the 
United Kingdom, resulting in a large number of councils that act pri-
marily as tribunals aimed at solving marital and other disputes among 
Muslims. If we move to the European continent, the Netherlands serves 
as an example of a Western European country where such councils do 
not exist (and are considered undesirable from a political perspective), 
but where the government has been active in coaxing the Muslim com-
munity to organize itself as a representative community. This govern-
mental engagement is representative for most North Western European 
countries where Muslim communities, until now, are still divided and 
therefore relatively powerless and without much of a representative con-
stituency. In South East Europe, we see yet another form of organiza-
tion: here, the Muslim community has historically been granted specific 
autonomous privileges by the state to regulate certain affairs internally, 
such as religious education, mosque construction, and family law, and 
often receives financial support by the state to do so. If we juxtapose all 
these Western practices of shari῾a in the West we may conclude that 
shari῾a mainly manifests itself within the boundaries set by the freedom 
of religion, and the state’s involvement is therefore limited accordingly.
This brief overview might prompt the conclusion that there are many 
different forms of shari῾a in the West, due to the differences in Western 
legal systems. This is not entirely correct. In the first place, there are no 
different ‘forms of shari῾a’; instead, within a single concept of shari῾a, 
we have identified four domains of rules practised by devout Muslims, 
and within each of these domains we observe modalities in the ways 
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they are practised. These modalities may be the result of internal differ-
ences regarding interpretations of shari῾a, or the consequence of what 
a national legal system allows or disallows with respect to a particular 
Islamic practice. In the latter case, there may be differences between 
Western legal systems, but these differences lie in the details. In terms 
of legal principles, Western countries’ legal systems hold a majority of 
their principles in common. The overriding principle is that of the free-
dom of religion, even though Western states may differ as to how they 
regulate their involvement with these institutions. Therefore it is not 
necessarily the principles of legal systems that have created the diversity 
of shari῾a in Western countries, but the cultural and social context in 
which these principles are embedded. This is the subject of the second 
section of this volume.
Western Responses: Law Versus Culture
The country studies clearly show that the conflicts arising vis-à-vis 
practices of shari῾a in the West are not only legal in nature. On the 
contrary, very few shari῾a practices are a violation of the law; they are 
more often a violation of what we suggest to call ‘culture’, which we 
define as all norms relating to political, cultural, social or other nor-
mativity shared by the majority of society. While the legal response to 
shari῾a practices is simply ‘this is (not) allowed under law’, the cultural 
response can be summarized with the maxim, ‘this is (not) the way we 
do things here’.
Most cultural contestation occurs in the domain of religious behav-
iour, particularly in Western European countries. Examples include the 
headscarf, the face veil (burqa or niqab), religious dress, and the refusal 
to shake hands with the opposite sex. Sometimes such responses are 
brought to court or to the legislature and may, when accepted, then 
become part of the legal response: a behaviour that is considered ‘not 
the way we do things here’ is then turned into ‘this is not allowed under 
law.’ In the particular case of Islamic rules, however, the prohibition of 
a certain dress or behaviour that is culturally deemed undesirable may 
contradict fundamental legal freedoms. The French law of 2011 ban-
ning the face veil illustrates this dilemma: on the one hand, the State 
Council, adhering to the legal response, advised against such a ban on 
the basis of the principle of personal autonomy, which allows a woman 
to freely wear what she wishes;14 and, on the other hand, the legislature, 
adhering to the cultural response, deemed open-faced encounters in 
public a matter of ‘social contract’ that warranted legislation.15
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Another issue that gives rise to public indignation is that of Islamic 
family law. In her chapter on Islamic marriage in the Netherlands, 
Annelies Moors provides an interesting insight into how religious mar-
riage – which is allowed in Western legal systems as a matter of personal 
freedom – has come under scrutiny for political and security reasons, 
because it has become associated with a deliberate attempt on the part 
of Muslims not to participate in Dutch society. On the other hand, in 
chapter 9, Nadjma Yassari demonstrates how and why German courts 
have been quite willing to hear cases on the issue of the bridal gift 
(mahr), which is one of the conditional elements of Islamic marriage.
All of the country studies provide additional examples of this dichot-
omy between ‘bad shari῾a’ and ‘good shari῾a.’ While Islamic dress, the 
building of mosques and the use of Islamic family law tend to give rise 
to controversy, Muslim initiatives to construct Islam-compliant finan-
cial instruments (banks, mortgages and insurance) are often applauded. 
The United Kingdom has been a European frontrunner in adapting 
national fiscal and financial laws to facilitate these new developments, 
partly to meet the needs of British Muslims, but also to remain com-
patible with the expanding international market of Islamic finance. 
To refer again to the ruling by the European Court of Human Rights: 
clearly not all ‘shari῾a’ conflicts with European human rights values, 
just as not all ‘shari῾a’ is considered undesirable in a Western context.
It is clear that a large part of the discussion on shari῾a is fuelled 
by pre-conceived notions about its nature and what Muslims might 
(secretly) want. The cultural bias vis-à-vis Muslim practices is high-
lighted in the contribution by Fournier and Reyes on honour crimes in 
Canada. Although honour crimes are not specifically ‘Islamic’ – a point 
frequently made by Muslim scholars – it is a practice that tends to take 
place among certain ethnic communities from Muslim countries and as 
such presents an interesting case study. Just like shari῾a, honour crimes 
are branded in the West as foreign and therefore different. While this 
may indeed be the case in quite some aspects, the authors point at the 
a priori rejection of these institutions as alien practices. The authors 
argue that the rulings by Canadian courts in honour crime cases focus 
on the cultural “Other” but fail – or refuse – to see the similarities, not 
only between these crimes and those committed in Canada with simi-
lar honour intentions, but also in the legal origins of these crimes in the 
national laws of both Western and Muslim countries.
The legal – cultural dichotomy perhaps provides the key to under-
standing the conflicting reactions to ‘shari῾a’: the West has produced 
legal systems that may allow for certain practices, Islamic practices 
included, but at the same time, the West has preserved a cultural her-
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itage that may conflict strongly with these very same practices. This 
explains much of the confusion arising in discussions on shari῾a. For 
instance, the law may explicitly allow the building of mosques, even 
though there is nationwide opposition. Similarly, the law may protect 
people’s freedom to meet and greet each other how they wish, but not 
joining mixed-gender social gatherings or refusing to shake hands may 
be considered an insult by local custom. On the other hand, legal and 
cultural responses may also concur: Western laws allow interest-free 
finance, and its Islamic version is accepted in most Western countries. 
No wonder that Muslims in the West are often bewildered about what 
they are allowed to do, and what not. Which brings us to the third sec-
tion of this volume: do Muslims adapt their interpretations of shari῾a 
to the many Western legal and cultural responses, or is perhaps adapta-
tion needed from the part of the Western legal systems?
Adaptation in Western or Muslim Legal Systems?
Some of the country studies in this volume touch upon the issue of 
Muslims adapting their Islamic rules to Western legal requirements, or 
the necessity of adapting Western legal systems to the needs of Mus-
lims. In this third section of the volume, Marie-Claire Foblets explores 
the need for and potential of Western legal systems to accommodate 
Islamic rules: should Western legal systems do so and, if so, can they do 
so? She answers both questions with a cautious affirmative (compare 
Mathias Rohe in chapter 1, who holds the opposite view). Given the fact 
that religious demands are an emerging societal phenomenon in the 
West, Foblets argues, it is the state’s duty to offer adequate responses. 
These responses should preferably embrace diversity from the perspec-
tive of freedom of religion or of thought, guaranteed as a fundamental 
right of individuals. Moreover, since these religious demands are very 
often visibly connected to those of identity, they must therefore be han-
dled sympathetically and with respect for their significance to those 
concerned. In order for a Western legal system to make the necessary 
accommodation to religious diversity, the principle of the autonomy 
of the will should be taken as the starting point. This will allow for the 
incorporation of religious rules in civil law, more freedom of choice in 
private international law, and religious arbitration.
The two other contributions to the third section discuss the reverse 
situation, that is, the need for and potential of Islamic legal practices 
to adapt to the Western legal systems in which they operate. The two 
contributions take different positions. Zainab Alwani and Celene Ayat 
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Lizzio argue against providing a singular, comprehensive model for 
the integration of Islamic values within largely secular systems, but 
instead advocate the need to look for similarities in the aims of both 
(Islamic) religious and (Western) civil law. According to these authors, 
it is entirely counterproductive to advocate norms drawn directly from 
pre-modern Muslim legal discourses without a full consideration of 
their outcomes and effects in specific European contexts.
Abdullah Saeed continues this latter argument with his discussion of 
the novel development of shari῾a rules that are adapted to their West-
ern context, the so-called ‘fiqh for minorities’. This new discipline of 
Islamic legal scholarship is based on the argument that living in accord-
ance with shari῾a should improve a Muslim’s life. If the strict applica-
tion of shari῾a rules makes his life harder – for example, if the Mus-
lim had to fast for a disproportionally long time somewhere in the far 
North of Europe, or was prevented from rising up the social ladder due 
to the prohibition of a mortgage, preventing him from buying a house – 
then, according to minority fiqh, shari῾a itself demands that its rules be 
adapted. Saeed argues that this new scholarship must be repositioned 
within the broader debate on the reform of classical Islamic law that 
applies to all Muslims, not only those in the West. According to Saeed, 
such repositioning requires that temporary and ad hoc solutions be 
replaced with a more principled discourse of reform, leading to real 
change and new understandings of how Muslims should practise Islam 
in today’s world, regardless of where they are located.
Conclusion
This volume does not only provide new insights in the concept of 
shari῾a in the West, but also provides a framework of how shari῾a in 
the West can be studied. The premise of this volume is that one needs 
to focus on the question ‘What do Muslims do in terms of shari῾a?’ 
rather than ‘What is shari῾a?’ Taking this perspective provides us with 
two insights: first, the practice of shari῾a is limited to a limited set of 
rules (mainly related to religious rituals, family law and social interac-
tion) and, second, most of these rules do not pertain to the Western 
definition of ‘law.’ The framework of this volume then continues to ex-
plore two more interactions: the Western responses to these practices 
of shari῾a and, in turn, the Muslim legal reaction to these responses.
On the Western side we see that there is unity on matters of legal 
principle but quite some diversity on the interpretation of these prin-
ciples. This interpretation can be partly attributed to historical, social-
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economical and legal differences among Western countries, whereby 
we might observe a general division into three Western regions: Amer-
ica and Australia, North Western Europe and South Western Europe. 
The diversity of Western responses to shari῾a can be further explained 
by distinguishing between legal responses, on the one hand, and what 
we suggest to call the ‘cultural response’: while Western laws might pro-
vide general (religious) freedoms that allow Muslims to practise their 
shari῾a rules, Western public and political discourse may oppose these 
practices because they allegedly contravene with cultural identity.
Muslims, in turn, react to the Western responses to the Muslim 
practices of shari῾a rules. Some may stubbornly adhere to these rules as 
a matter of religious freedom, others may abandon them to avoid too 
much confrontation, and yet others may seek to find common ground 
between their religious rules and the rules of the Western societies 
where they live.
The framework and rich material provided in this volume will con-
tribute to our understanding of shari῾a in the West. It is a phenomenon 
that is relatively new and therefore still in flux. Developments succeed 
each other in rapid order, often highlighted by shrill debates in the pub-
lic and political domain, whereby action and reaction are often hard to 
separate. In this respect it is important to note that much is still to be 
known about the actual practices and intentions of Muslims in the West 
with regard to shari῾a before we can make final judgements about the 
(in)admissibility of shari῾a in the West.
Notes
1 echr, Refah vs Turkey, 13 February 2003, Nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 
41344/98. See for commentaries: D. McGoldrick, ‘Accommodating Muslims in 
Europe: From Adopting shari῾a Law to Religiously Based Opt Outs from Gen-
erally Applicable Laws’, Human Rights Law Review, 2009 (Vol. 9, No. 4).
2 ‘Islam in Civil and Religious Law in England’, lecture by the Archbishop of 
Canterbury, Dr Rowan Williams, Lambeth Palace, 7 February 2008; ‘Equality 
before the Law’, speech by Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, East Lon-
don Muslim Centre, 3 July 2008. See for commentaries: Rex Ahdar and Nicho-
las Aroney (eds.), Shari’a in the West, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
3 Ahdar and Aroney (eds.), Shari’a in the West; Andrea Büchler, Islamic Law in 
Europe? Legal Pluralism and its Limits in European Family Laws, Burlington: 
Ashgate, 2011; Samia Bano, Islamic Dispute Resolution and Family Law, Lon-
don: Palgrave, 2011; Robin Griffith-Jones (ed.), Islam and English Law: Rights, 
Responsibilities and the Place of Shari’a, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013; Mark E. Hanshaw, The Unfamiliar Abode: Islamic Law in the United 
AUP_Berger_vierde.indd   20 19-4-2013   12:25:29
introduction 21
States and Britain, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010; Julie MacFarlane, 
Islamic Divorce in North America: A Sharia Path in a Secular Society, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012; Jørgen Nielsen and Lisbet Christiffersen (eds.), 
Shari’a as a Discourse: Legal Traditions and the Encounter with Europe, Burling-
ton: Ashgate, 2010; Matthias Rohe, Muslim Minorities and the Law in Europe: 
Chances and Challenges, Global Media Publications, 2007.
4 See for recent publications, e.g. Wael B. Hallaq, Shari’a: Theory, Practice, Trans-
formations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009; Muhammad 
Hashim Kamali, Shari’ah Law: An Introduction, Oxford: Oneworld Publica-
tions, 2008.
5 See, e.g. the twelve country studies in Jan-Michiel Otto, Sharia Incorporated. A 
Comparative Overview of the Legal Systems of Twelve Muslim Countries in Past 
and Present, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011.
6 This legal-anthropological approach has been advocated by a few scholars, 
and mostly when discussing shari῾a in Muslim-majority countries – see, e.g., 
Baudouin Dupret, 1996 ‘La sharî’a comme référent legislative. Du droit positif à 
l’anthropologie du droit,’ Egypte Monde Arabe (25), pp. 121-175.
7 John L. Esposito and Dalia Mogahed, Who speaks for Islam? What a Billion 
Muslims Really Think, New York: Gallup Press, 2008.
8 To be more exact: to the question ‘should the programme of this [Muslim] 
party be based on shari῾a?’, 10.2% answered ‘Yes, entirely’ and 19.3% ‘Yes, to 
some extent’ (Foquz Etnomarketing, Onderzoeksresultaten ‘Politieke Voorkeu-
ren Moslims’ t.b.v. Redactie Nova, Nieuwegein: Foquz Etnomarketing, Decem-
ber 2004, pp. 10-12).
9 icm Research, ‘Muslim Poll – February 2006’, prepared for the Sunday Tele-
graph, available on www.icmresearch.com.
10 There was a difference in age: 37% of 16-24 year olds preferred shari῾a com-
pared to 17% of 55+ year olds. See Munira Mirza et al., Living Apart Together. 
British Muslims and the Paradox of Multiculturalism, London: Policy Ex- 
change, 2007.
11 E.g., Natasha Bakht, ‘Family Arbitration Using shari῾a Law: Examining Ontario’s 
Arbitration Act and its Impact on Women,’ in Muslim World Journal of Human 
Rights, 2004 (Vol. 1, Issue 1); Samia Bano, ‘Cultural Translations and Legal Con-
flict: Muslim Women and the shari῾ah Councils in Britain’ in A. Hellum, S. Ali 
and A. Griffiths (eds.), Transnational Law and Transnational Relations, Ash-
gate Publishing, 2011; Maurits S. Berger, ‘Sharia in Canada. An example for the 
Netherlands?’ in: Crossing Borders, The Hague: Kluwer Rechtswetenschappe- 
lijke Publicaties, 2005; John R. Bowen, ‘How Could English Courts Recognize 
shari῾ah?’ University of St. Thomas Law Journal, 2010 (Vol. 7, No. 3), pp. 411-435.
12 E.g., Kilian Bälz, ‘Islamic Finance for European Muslims: The Diversity Man-
agement of Shari’ah-Compliant Transactions’, Chicago Journal of International 
Law, 2006 (Vol. 7).
13 E.g. Alexandre Caeiro, Fatwas for European Muslims: The Minority Fiqh Project 
and the Integration of Islam in Europe (PhD thesis), Utrecht: Utrecht University 
Press, 2011; Dilwar Hussain, ‘Muslim Political Participation in Britain and the 
“Europeanisation” of Fiqh,’ Die Welt des Islams 2004 (Vol. 44, No. 3), pp. 376-
AUP_Berger_vierde.indd   21 19-4-2013   12:25:29
22 applying shari῾a in the west
40; Fiqh Council of the Muslim World League, ‘A message from Muslim schol-
ars to Muslim Minorities in the West’, Daawah, 2002, (No. 4); Shammai Fish-
man, ‘Fiqh al-Aqalliyyat: A Legal Theory for Muslim Minorities’, Center on 
Islam, Democracy, and the Future of the Muslim World, Research Monograph, 
2006 (No. 2).
14 Conseil d’Etat, Etude relative aux possibilités juridiques d’interdiction du port 
du voile intégral, 25 March 2010 (available online at: www.conseil-etat.fr/cde/
media/document/avis/etude_vi_30032010.pdf.).
15 See the explanations of their respective law proposals by the Cabinet (Projet de 
loi interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l’espace public (No. 2520, 19 May 
2010)) and by the Socialist Party (Proposition de loi visant à fixer le champ des 
interdictions de dissimuler son visage liées aux exigences des services publics, à la 
prévention des atteintes à l’ordre public (No. 2544, 20 May 2010)).
AUP_Berger_vierde.indd   22 19-4-2013   12:25:29
section i
country studies
AUP_Berger_vierde.indd   23 19-4-2013   12:25:29
AUP_Berger_vierde.indd   24 19-4-2013   12:25:29
1 Reasons for the Application of Shari῾a 
in the West1
Mathias Rohe
Introduction
Shari῾a – or ‘Islamic law’,2 in the narrow understanding – is broadly 
perceived to be the opposite of a secular legal order. The heated debate 
that took place in the aftermath of the Archbishop of Canterbury’s fa-
mous speech about the possible introduction of some parts of shari῾a 
law into the English legal system is but one example of this.3 On the 
other hand, some of the small extremist groups that promote shari῾a 
in the West, which bluntly reject the ruling secular legal order, such as 
‘shari῾a4Belgium’ and ‘shari῾a4Holland’, seem to justify such prejudice 
against shari῾a. Very often, the fact that there is little information about 
the meaning of shari῾a and about the scope and limits of its application 
in the West leads to simplistic debates on all sides. The public climate 
has become unfavourable even for an academic debate on these issues. 
I myself was repeatedly denounced for promoting the replacement of 
the German legal order by shari῾a, simply because I wanted to inform 
the public about the existing German legal order with respect to the 
treatment of Islamic norms.4 This has convinced me all the more that it 
is necessary to address such issues, since they are real phenomena con-
cerning a considerable number of people living in Western countries.
This chapter is confined to the legal provisions of shari῾a, which only 
constitute a part of shari῾a. While religious provisions, such as those on 
ritual prayer, fasting, and so forth, fall under the freedom of religion 
according to international and Western constitutional law, the appli-
cation of foreign legal rules is an exception in legal orders all over the 
world. This is due to the now ruling principle of territoriality of legal 
orders, which replaced personal law systems in Western states centuries 
ago. The system of territoriality creates unified legal orders that grant 
internal plurality, thus retaining the right to make a final decision on 
whether foreign laws can apply or not.
With regard to the application of shari῾a in Western secular states, 
the reasons for this are twofold. They are ‘external’ insofar as the law 
of the land simply prescribes the application of such norms in a given 
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case, more or less irrespective of the intention of the parties involved. 
‘Internal’ reasons are those rooted in the desires of the parties them-
selves. The latter can be sub-divided into technical/institutional, cul-
tural and religious reasons. In some cases, external and internal rea-
sons may meet where the law of the land creates spaces for the optional 
application of such norms, should the parties choose to do so. In addi-
tion, there is a difference between formal and informal application of 
these rules: whereas formal application requires recognition by the law 
of the land and enforcement by its institutions, informal application 
only depends on the free will and consent of the persons involved. We 
will discuss those categories in which shari῾a may be applied below.
External Reasons for the Formal or Informal Application of Shari῾a 
in the West
There are four fields of law where Islamic norms may be applicable or 
recognized for mainly external reasons. First, private international law 
may lead to the application of shari῾a within the limits of public pol-
icy; second, in some states Islamic norms have been integrated into the 
existing law of the land; third, given legal facts created under shari῾a 
may be recognized under Western laws for social reasons; and lastly, 
there are cases of maintaining personal law systems, including shari῾a 
for Muslims, for historical reasons. We will elaborate on these reasons 
below. The possibilities for applying shari῾a in the West are clearly re-
stricted to the field of private law. Public law, and penal law in particu-
lar, are necessarily homogeneous in every country according to com-
mon international standards; thus, in these fields, the law of the land 
alone can and has to be applied.5
Private international law
Private international law (the rules regulating the conflict of laws in 
matters concerning civil law6) is a possible level of direct application 
of shari῾a legal rules. To be precise, shari῾a as such cannot be applied 
here, but only state laws based on shari῾a rules. In the area of civil law, 
the welfare of autonomously acting private persons is of prime impor-
tance. If someone has organized his or her life in accordance with a 
certain legal system, this deserves protection when the person crosses 
the border. However, it is also within the interest of the legal com-
munity that in certain matters, the same law should be applicable to 
everyone who is resident in a particular country. This is especially the 
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case in matters touching the roots of legal and societal common sense, 
like the legal relations between the sexes or between adherents of dif-
ferent religions.
When it comes to the areas of family law and the law of succession, 
the application of legal norms in European countries is often deter-
mined on the basis of the nationality of the persons involved, rather 
than by their domicile.7 Other than in Canada, the United States,8 or 
Switzerland, many European courts, such as those in Germany, France 
and Austria, are therefore often obliged to apply Islamic legal rules 
when these are the national law of the persons involved. In this respect 
it may generally be stated that until now, shari῾a has had a particu-
lar strong position in family law and the law of succession. This can 
be explained by the fact that shari῾a in these areas has a multiplicity 
of regulations derived from authoritative sources (Qur’an and sunna). 
Furthermore, a powerful lobby is obviously trying to preserve this area 
as a stronghold due to religious convictions, as well as for reasons of 
income and the exercise of power (which is very similar to the situation 
in Christian Europe in the past). The Tunisian lawyer Ali Mezghani 
states that ‘[i]n Islamic countries, it is difficult to deny that family law is 
the site of conservation.’9 This is true despite the fact that reforms have 
taken place in several Islamic countries, and still are in progress.10
However, the application of such provisions must comply with the 
rules of public policy. If the application of legislation influenced by 
shari῾a leads to a result that is obviously incompatible with, for exam-
ple, the main principles of German law, including constitutional civil 
rights, the provisions in question cannot be applied. In family law, the 
main conflicts between ‘Islamic’ and European legal thinking concern 
the constitutional (and human) rights such as equality of the sexes and 
of religious beliefs and the freedom of religion, including the right 
not to believe. Conflicts mainly arise from provisions reflecting classi-
cal shari῾a, which preserve a strict separation between the sexes with 
respect to their social roles and tasks (for example, in marriage and 
divorce laws, and in matters of guardianship, custody and inherit-
ance), as well as the far-reaching legal segregation of religions under 
the supremacy of Islam.11
Introduction of Islamic legal provisions
In addition to general rules of private international law, a few European 
states have introduced legal provisions concerning family and succes-
sion matters to be applied in general, or to the Muslim population in 
particular, allowing a de facto application of shari῾a rules.
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In the United Kingdom, Muslims may apply to have their mar-
riage registered. Furthermore, according to the Divorce (Religious 
marriages) Act 2002, courts are enabled to require the dissolution of a 
religious marriage before granting a civil divorce.12 The Adoption and 
Children Act 2002 amended the Children Act 1989 by provisions (Sect. 
14 A) introducing ‘special guardianship’ as a legal means of parental 
responsibility besides adoption, which is forbidden by shari῾a.13 This 
institution may have been aimed at accommodating Muslims in par-
ticular, but it is open to everyone, thus bridging the borders between 
separate legal systems.
In Spain, it has been possible to apply Islamic rules regulating the 
contracting of marriages to Muslims since 1992.14 In order to ensure the 
necessary legal security, there are compulsory provisions for the regis-
tration of these marriages.15 This kind of legal segregation is very lim-
ited, concerning mere formal regulations without any relevant material 
quality. Interestingly, the legislator in Spain has also amended Article 
107 of the Código Civil regulating the right to divorce. The amendment 
enables women resident in Spain to get divorced even if the law of ori-
gin or of their matrimonial home prevents them from doing so. The 
legislator stated expressly that this amendment was intended to solve 
problems in this respect, especially regarding Muslim women.16
Recognition of legal facts created under foreign shari῾a laws
The third legal reason for the applicability of shari῾a is the legal recog-
nition of facts created under shari῾a, such as polygamous marriages. 
This must be distinguished from the aforementioned implementation 
of foreign norms under international private law. German social se-
curity laws treat polygamous marriages as legally valid, provided that 
the marriage contracts are valid under laws applicable to them at the 
place of their formation.17 (Of course, polygamy fundamentally contra-
dicts German and other European legal standards; therefore it cannot 
be contracted legally in Europe and is even punishable under German 
law, Par. 172 Penal Code.) The legal reasoning behind the recognition of 
these polygamous marriages is to avoid depriving these women of their 
marital rights, including maintenance. Thus, according to German so-
cial security law,18 widow pensions are divided among widows who were 
living in polygamous marriages. However, German law differentiates 
between mainly private aspects of marriage and predominantly pub-
lic ones, especially those relating to immigration law. Law governing 
the latter aspects provides only the first wife in polygamous marriages 
with marital privileges within its scope of application, such as residence 
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permits.19 The treatment of polygamous marriages in Germany differs 
from that in other European countries. In the United Kingdom, the 
courts rejected the claim to a widow’s pension by a woman who was 
engaged in a polygamous marriage, resulting in none of the wives in the 
marriage receiving a payment.20
Personal law systems
The fourth reason why shari῾a can be applicable is in the case of a sys-
tem of personal law that has remained in existence due to historical 
reasons. Thus, in Greece, the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) contained rules, 
which are still in force, leading to the application of traditional shari῾a 
law on Muslims of Turkish origin (see chapter 7 in this volume),21 while 
the Turkish Republic has continuously reformed its civil laws and in-
troduced legal equality of the sexes in family law in 2002. This can 
hardly serve as a model for Western secular states. Despite widespread 
efforts in the Islamic world to improve women’s rights, many legal or-
ders in this region are still far from the legal standard of equality of the 
sexes achieved in the West. It would simply be unacceptable to imple-
ment such rules in the existing systems, and – apart from the United 
Kingdom (see chapter 4 in this volume) – it is highly unlikely that any 
European public or legal order would be ready to concede legal plural-
ism in family matters at the expense of current public policy.
In Britain, the Union of Muslim Organisations of the United King-
dom and Eire has formulated a resolution demanding the establish-
ment of a separate Muslim family and inheritance law that is automati-
cally applicable to all Muslims in Britain,22 without any effect so far. 
Some developments in recent years suggest that a considerable number 
of Muslims in the United Kingdom do indeed desire the application 
of shari῾a rules in these fields. According to a poll taken of 500 British 
Muslims in 2006, 40 per cent supported the introduction of shari῾a law 
in predominantly Muslim areas of Britain.23 The underlying idea might 
be found in the legal situation on the Indian subcontinent – being the 
prevailing region of origin of Muslims in Britain – which was and still 
is ruled by a system of religious separation in matters of family law.24 
The same is true for most Muslim states in the past and present. But 
introducing religiously or ethnically-orientated multiple legal systems 
in Europe does not represent a realistic or even desirable option.25 Such 
systems may have been helpful and even exemplary in the past, when 
they granted rights and freedoms to minorities that would otherwise 
have been disregarded. However, this will always result in problems in 
the form of inter-religious conflict over laws, as can be seen in Egypt, 
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for example.26 Besides that, freedom of religion contains the freedom 
to change one’s religion or not to belong to any religion. This freedom 
would be unduly constrained by forcing people into a legal regime 
defined by religion. Furthermore, there is no uniform Islamic legal sys-
tem of substantial rules to be identified. In addition to that, the for-
mer Ottoman territories in the Balkans, as well as the Turkish Republic, 
abolished shari῾a law a long time ago. Most of the Muslims who are 
natives of these states – constituting the vast majority of Muslims in a 
considerable number of European states, such as Austria, Germany and 
Switzerland – would reject the re-introduction of such rules in Euro-
pean countries. In France, such issues are not even debated publicly.
Instead of such institutionalized forms of religious-based family law 
systems, Muslims are entitled to create legal relations according to their 
religious intentions within the framework of optional civil law (see 
further below). This system reflects the emergence of relatively strong 
states claiming to regulate or at least supervise family matters according 
to legally consented principles.
Internal Reasons for the Formal or Informal Application of Shari῾a 
in the West
In addition to the external reasons that may lead to the application of 
shari῾a in the West, there are also internal reasons. These fall into four 
categories:
Technical/Institutional reasons
In cases of intermarriage and the conduct of ‘international’ lives, the 
persons involved may have a mere ‘technical’ interest in creating le-
gal relations that are recognized in all of the countries involved, irre-
spective of the specific content or the religious connotation of the law. 
Problems arise when some religiously-founded foreign state laws refuse 
to recognize decisions by secular states (administrations or courts) in 
matters of family law, while they would recognize informal acts by re-
ligious personnel or alternative dispute resolution (adr) decisions on 
the basis of their religiously-orientated laws. This is the case not only 
with respect to some Muslim states, but also to the state of Israel regard-
ing Jews.27 In these cases, the resort to such informal bodies is likely to 
be based on the technical aspect of recognition rather than on personal 
affiliation to religious law. In this regard, international efforts to im-
prove mutual recognition of state decisions are urgently needed if state 
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institutions want to preserve their prerogative. As long as recognition is 
in doubt, improvised solutions can be found even in state courts or ad-
ministrations. For example, in cases of divorce, courts might mention 
that the husband has agreed to the procedures followed in Western law, 
which could be then recognized as a talaq (repudiation) under shari῾a 
law. In addition, Muslim witnesses could be invited to document this.28
In other cases, mere formal reasons such as the lack of documents 
required for marriages under the law of the land might draw immi-
grants to enter into informal religious marriages in order to create a 
socially accepted fundament for living together. Iraqi refugees in Ger-
many who were willing to marry under German law are currently fac-
ing this problem with regard to documents proving their capability to 
marry under Iraqi law (which in this case is applicable according to 
German private international law: Art. 13 egbgb). So far as these mar-
riages are not recognized by state law – as is usually the case – conflicts 
including ‘divorces’ can only be resolved under the informal mecha-
nisms provided, such as through mosques or Muslim organizations by 
applying shari῾a, often in hybrid forms rather than according to a par-
ticular Islamic state law.
Cultural reasons
When it comes to Muslim immigrants, various research projects in Eu-
rope in recent years have clearly demonstrated that considerable num-
bers of them maintain the structures of family life that they had in their 
countries of origin.29 Some of them are reluctant to use the legal rem-
edies provided by the law of the state of their new domicile, because 
they believe that they are bound to legal orders other than the law of the 
land. Others are simply unaware of the fact that in certain matters, in-
cluding family law (for example, with respect to contracting marriages 
and divorce), the formal legal rules of the state of domicile have to be 
observed; otherwise, the intentions and acts of the parties involved are 
not legally enforceable.
Thus, a marriage that is contracted solely according to traditional 
Islamic rules may be socially accepted within a community, but it 
deprives the spouses of legally enforceable rights in the state of domi-
cile with respect to the maintenance or inheritance usually connected 
to marriages. On the other hand, these women cannot obtain a divorce 
in state courts because they are not regarded as married according to 
the law of the land. Therefore they seek ‘internal’ solutions within their 
community.30 Here, accessible information about the rules of the law of 
the land for immigrants is needed.
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Furthermore, the socio-legal orders in many of the persons’ coun-
tries of origin tend to perceive family matters as private matters, except 
for extreme cases of violence or other conflicts. This can lead to the 
avoidance of ‘intervention’ or conflict resolution on the part of the 
state, and for groups of immigrants to opt for merely informal, socially-
accepted solutions. Again, there is a need for information about the 
protective function of state law for weaker parts of the family.
In addition, a lack of cultural sensitivity in some state institutions, 
including courts, may lead to distrust and reluctance. Evidence such as 
that from Canada31 supports this view. To this respect, courses or other 
means of information for state officials should become more estab-
lished. The aim is certainly not to change the applicable law. Neverthe-
less, in my experience as a judge for several years, the feeling of being 
personally understood is in many cases crucial for sustainable conflict 
resolution, particularly in matters open to settlement.
Last but not least, new forms of socio-legal navigating are emerg-
ing, in particular among younger Muslim couples. They deliberately 
use the lack of legal validity of mere ‘religious’ marriages. By this, they 
can combine social acceptance of their relationship within the family 
and the community with avoiding the legal consequences of a valid 
civil marriage. Evidence from Denmark,32 for example, shows that such 
couples marry validly under the law of the land when children are born 
or when they decide to purchase real property. Apart from the reli-
gious legitimization aiming at the social environment, this behaviour 
very much reflects common usage in contemporary Western societies. 
Chapter 8 of this volume elaborates these cultural strategies in detail 
with respect to the Netherlands.
Religious reasons
With regard to religious reasons, we have to make a fundamental dis-
tinction between the case of using the law of the land under religious 
auspices on the one hand, and the rejection of that law by consequently 
applying shari῾a in an informal way on the other.
Islamic norms may be applied within the existing framework of 
the law of the land as far as this law is dispositive for the parties in- 
volved. This is the case, for instance, in vast parts of contract law. As 
an example we may note the fact that various methods of investment 
are offered, which do not violate the Islamic prohibition of usury (riba, 
which according to traditional views means the general prohibition of 
accepting and paying interest).33 Concerning project finance, Islamic 
legal institutions such as the murabaha or the mudaraba can be used.34 
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These are certain forms of partnership intending to attract capital own-
ers to participate instead of merely granting credit, the latter bearing 
the risk of contradicting the riba-rules. Commerce and trade have 
already responded to the economic and legal needs of traditional Mus-
lims. German and Swiss banks, for instance, have issued ‘Islamic’ shares 
for investment purposes; that is to say, share packages that avoid com-
panies whose business involves gambling, alcohol, tobacco, interest-
yielding credit, insurance or the sex industry, all of which are illegiti-
mate in shari῾a.35
In the United Kingdom, a special concept of ‘Islamic’ mortgages has 
been developed, which allows Muslims willing to purchase real estate to 
avoid conflicts with provisions concerning riba (when paying interest 
on ‘normal’ mortgages).36 An Islamic mortgage consists of two separate 
transactions aiming at one single result. Until recently, each transac-
tion was subject to taxation. Now the double ‘stamp duty’ has effectively 
been abolished, because it had been preventing Muslims from success-
fully engaging in the real property market due to the formal system of 
taxation without sufficient reason. Even the German state of Saxony-
Anhalt placed an Islamic bond (ṣukuk,37 100 million euros as a start) 
based on a Dutch foundation a few years ago.38 For traditional Muslims, 
the availability of such forms of investment in Europe is of considerable 
importance. To my knowledge, many of them lost huge sums of money 
in the past to doubtful organizations from the Islamic world bearing a 
‘religious’ veil, or to similar organizations based in Europe.39
In the field of matrimonial law, the tendency of implementing 
Islamic norms in optional law can also be identified in Germany in 
connection with matrimonial contracts.40 Thus, in Germany contrac-
tual conditions regulating the payment of the ‘Islamic’ dower (mahr or 
sadaq) are possible and generally accepted by the courts (see chapter 9 
in this volume).41 Other contractual regulations, especially those dis-
criminating against women, could be void according to Paragraph 138 
of the German Civil Code on the protection of good morals.42 So far 
there have been no court decisions on such issues, published or known. 
However, to my knowledge some German notaries refuse to assist in 
formulating wills43 containing the classical Islamic regulation on half-
shares for female heirs.
The second case – fundamentally different from the one above – is 
the informal application of Islamic norms for reasons of religiously 
driven rejection of ‘worldly’ laws given by ‘infidels’.44 ‘Eternal god-given 
law’ is then (wrongly45) opposed to ‘weak man made law’.46 In Ger-
many, one of the few voices publicly demanding the introduction of 
shari῾a and Muslim arbitration to avoid any application of ‘infidel’ laws 
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is the extremist founder of an Islamic centre in Berlin. In a book on 
‘The Rules of Personal Status of Muslims in the West’,47 he repeatedly 
declares non-Muslims to be infidels and rejects German legal rules and 
judgments as ‘rules of the infidel’.48 Consequently, he urges Muslims in 
Germany to maintain the rules of traditional Islamic family law. Incred-
ibly, he even argues that the traditional punishment for adultery – flog-
ging or stoning to death – should be applied to Muslim women in Ger-
many who are married to non-Muslims, even if they are unaware of the 
‘applicability’ of these rules in their cases.49 He denounces the German 
system of social security as evil, because it grants wives independence 
from their husbands’ maintenance payments and thus enables them to 
‘disobey’ their husbands.50
Some other religious extremists and traditionalists also argue that 
Muslims should not accept the legal norms and judgments of ‘infidels’. 
They should instead establish their own bodies of dispute resolution 
and elect their own judges.51 But would extra-judicial dispute resolu-
tion then create a viable solution for weighing up the relevant interests 
of the parties involved in a manner consistent with the community’s 
standards, as well as with the indispensable principles of the law of the 
land (see the next section below)?
These two different situations illustrate the possible conflicts between 
the law of the land and a parallel normative order: it is up to the law of 
the land – representing the community of citizens and inhabitants of a 
country – to decide on the space and limits of optional law. Liberal legal 
orders tend to open up a broad space for individual choice for good 
reason. Nevertheless, there are sensitive areas of legal relations where 
typically parties with different kinds of bargaining power meet. The 
family and its legal interrelations is such a case in many respects. Here, 
the need for state protection for the weaker parties is obvious. In gen-
eral, compulsory norms in all spheres of law are justified by this pro-
tective goal. In addition to this, they grant necessary common stand-
ards defined by legislation and thus peace in society. These standards 
are obviously subjected to changing social convictions and lifestyles; 
legislation will react to such changes sooner or later, legally protected 
same-sex relations being only one striking example of this. In any case, 
it is up to the law of the land given by the sovereign to define the limits 
of normative plurality. Thus, the establishment of informal structures 
opposing the principles of the law of the land is certainly a threat to the 
latter – and to the individuals protected by it.
AUP_Berger_vierde.indd   34 19-4-2013   12:25:30
reasons for the application of shari῾a in the west 35
Alternative Dispute Resolution (adr) and Shari῾a
Within the scope of private autonomy, the parties concerned are free 
to create legal relations within the limits of public policy and to agree 
on the ways and results of non-judicial dispute resolution. In matters 
of family law, relatives will often be consulted first. Should that fail, in-
formal or existing formal dispute resolution bodies might be involved, 
as well as state courts. Certain decisions, such as officially recognized 
divorces, are restricted to state courts in Europe. Others might be open 
to adr mechanisms. Some of the reasons for choosing adr may par-
ticularly apply to family disputes: confidentiality and the choice of ar-
bitrators on the basis of personal trust can be even more attractive than 
in other adr cases, such as those concerning economic claims. Besides 
that, the specific reasons for preferring adr are threefold: institutional, 
cultural and religious, as suggested above.
With regard to adr in family matters, we can discern both a major 
advantage and a disadvantage. The advantage is that the official accept-
ance of adr, which allows for freedom in choosing the rules applicable 
to the case at hand, might create a feeling of religio-cultural accept-
ance among those interested in preserving religiously based laws and 
conflict resolution mechanisms. On the other hand, there is a danger 
that the institutional homogenization of conflict resolution within a 
community such as the Muslim community may neglect existing inter-
nal diversity within that community, and may even increase internal 
pressure on ‘weak’ members of the community (‘the paradox of mul-
ticultural vulnerability’ according to Ayalet Shachar52) to make use of 
the adr mechanisms against their interest and will. This danger is real, 
since religiously based family laws tend to treat the sexes and religions 
unequally according to the patriarchal structures underlying these laws. 
Thus, in opting for adr, one has to decide which interests are to prevail: 
those of religious communities as a whole (which means mainly the 
interests of their leaders) or the interests of individuals.
When it comes to the present situation in Europe, we find an extraor-
dinary example of law and adr influenced by Islam in the United King-
dom, where an ‘angrezi shariat’ (English shari῾a) appears to be develop-
ing.53 This seems to be due to the fact that many Muslims in Britain still 
have strong family ties to their respective native countries on the Indian 
subcontinent, governed by religiously orientated laws in matters of per-
sonal status.54 In some cases, mainly those concerning family relations, 
they seek socially acceptable solutions for legal problems within the 
Muslim community through the aid of accepted mediators. The Islamic 
Sharia Councils in England, which were established in 1980-82, seem 
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to be examples of such a kind of mediation.55 The Councils do not have 
an official function, but they focus in particular on mediation in the 
area of the law of personal status. There are frequently cases in which 
a Muslim wife has obtained an English divorce that she subsequently 
wants confirmed according to shari῾a by the pronouncement of talaq 
(divorce) by the husband, so that the divorce will be accepted in the 
social environment within or outside the country. Similarly, it is very 
often the case that a husband refuses to divorce, and that while the wife 
wishes to do so, she is reluctant to start divorce proceedings in the civil 
courts.56 Even if the matter does not go to the civil court, the Council’s 
decision may become important; it is not legally enforceable in Eng-
land, but it seems to be recognized in the state of origin as well as within 
the religious community.57 Convincing the husband to pay the mahr 
(dower) constitutes a further possible task for the Council.
While the decisions of the Sharia Councils appear to be based on a 
relatively reform-oriented approach to the legal sources, they maintain 
the traditional framework of shari῾a, including unequal treatment of 
the sexes and religions in general. Thus, the English legal system does 
not remain untouched by such proceedings, since they differ consider-
ably from basic decisions in English family law. For example, the coun-
cils use the instruments given in some Islamic states for wives to obtain 
a divorce in court on the basis of the so-called khul‘, which is a con-
tractual or statutory right.58 The wife, however, must then pay back the 
dower, which will very often have been intended to serve as an old-age 
pension. This somehow rewards the husband’s persistence in refusing a 
divorce, which is not acceptable according to the standard of the law of 
the land. Certainly, an individual’s personal status is a ‘private matter’, 
thus leaving scope for individual preferences, including those based on 
religious or cultural convictions in general. Nevertheless, the institu-
tions of the law regarding personal status and, in particular, the balance 
of rights and duties among the persons involved not only affect society 
as a whole, but also reflect this society’s basic common convictions con-
cerning what is probably the most important part of social life. There-
fore it is up to the national legislator to establish a legal personal status 
order that grants protection to everyone living in the country.
Thus, on the one hand, adr can serve as an instrument to achieve 
socially accepted solutions within a community living at a certain dis-
tance from society as a whole. It might give access to groups that would 
otherwise refrain from any kind of formal (non-violent) conflict reso-
lution. On the other hand, members of that community who refuse to 
use the community’s special bodies for conflict resolution may well be 
accused of undermining the community’s position, and of being a ‘bad’ 
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member. This could press individuals into using a religiously-driven 
system of conflict resolution against their will or interests, as the Cana-
dian example concerning the debate on introducing shari῾a boards 
in the Province of Ontario clearly demonstrates.59 As a consequence, 
unconditionally accepting communitarian bodies such as these could 
lead to ongoing cultural segregation and to a ‘culturalization’ of indi-
viduals seeking their individual ways within a broader society. Intro-
ducing parallel power structures may endanger socio-legal cohesion: 
where common legal standards, such as those regarding equal rights of 
the sexes, religions and convictions, are considered to be fundamental 
for society as a whole, solutions that deviate from these will certainly 
cause massive tensions. At the same time, individual religious choices 
are endangered if these individuals are unable to avoid the application 
of religiously-based laws containing provisions that promote unequal 
treatment.60 This is why most European legal orders do not allow fam-
ily status disputes to be formally decided by adr mechanisms.
Even in cases where adr is formally accepted by state laws (for exam-
ple, with respect to religious arbitration bodies such as the Beth Din and 
the Muslim Arbitration Tribunals in the United Kingdom61), the ques-
tion remains as to whether the mere existence of an adr agreement is 
sufficient. Certainly, within the scope of private autonomy, agreements 
between adult and mentally healthy persons are supposed to be valid 
and fair unless there is any specific evidence to the contrary. However, 
in the context of migration and societal segregation, formal freedom 
to agree or not to agree can be factually restricted to just one option, if 
the relevant party has to expect substantial disadvantages in social life 
in the case that they choose the ‘wrong’ option. Thus, if factual pressure 
on the weaker party is not a merely theoretical threat, the official recog-
nition of communitarian bodies for adr and their decisions could pre-
vent the weaker party from obtaining the protection granted by the law 
of the land and enforced by official courts. As suggested above, despite 
various reforms in several Muslim states, shari῾a of personal status does 
not grant equal rights to females and non-Muslims.
We should certainly reject the simplistic picture of Muslim women 
generally being oppressed, powerless victims. The German Supreme 
Court62 has stated that there is no room for the presumption that Turk-
ish wives living in ‘typical Muslim marriages’ are deprived of autono-
mous decision-making in their daily lives. Nevertheless, the problems 
that do arise, which are often caused by cultural motivation, are obvious 
and openly discussed among Muslims themselves. The commissioner 
for women’s affairs at the Central Council of Muslims in Germany has 
stated in an interview that, ‘Islam is not in need of a commissioner for 
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women’s affairs. It is not Islam that suppresses women, but men. And 
therefore Muslim women are indeed in need of a commissioner for 
women’s affairs.’63 It should be mentioned in this context that the Cen-
tral Council of Muslims in Germany declared in its charter on Muslim 
life in German society on 20 February 2002 (the ‘Islamic Charta’64) that 
Muslims are content with the harmonious system of secularity and reli-
gious freedom provided by the Constitution. According to Article 13 of 
the charter, ‘The command of shari῾a to observe the local legal order 
includes the acceptance of the German statutes governing marriage and 
inheritance, and civil as well as criminal procedure.’ In the Swiss canton 
of Zurich, the Union of Islamic Organizations in Zurich65 has expressly 
stated in its Basic Declaration that the Union does not intend to create 
an Islamic state in Switzerland, nor does it place shari῾a above Swiss leg-
islation (Section 1). The Union also expressly appreciates Swiss law con-
cerning marriage and inheritance (Section 5). Similarly, the renowned 
French imam Larbi Kechat has stated that ‘Nous sommes en harmonie 
avec le cadre des lois, nous n’imposons pas une loi parallèle.’66 Accord-
ing to Belgian experience, the vast majority of Muslim women living in 
between the rules of Muslim family law and women’s rights also claim 
the protection of Belgian substantive law.67 Thus, initiatives aiming at 
the promotion of shari῾a by adr mechanisms should not be overesti-
mated regarding their importance for Muslims living in the West.
Finally, advantages and disadvantages concerning the reliability of 
mediators and arbitrators have to be weighed up against each other. The 
idea of promoting officially-recognized adr mechanisms for Muslims 
in Canada was to grant the arbitrators the necessary personal and tech-
nical skills, including legal knowledge, by creating a system of educa-
tion and recognition for them. Indeed, one should be aware that refus-
ing to recognize ‘official’ adr bodies would not prevent people from 
using unofficial mechanisms involving persons of unclear background 
and skills. Two solutions are possible here: either to implement a sys-
tem of official adr or – the preferable approach in the author’s opinion, 
for the reasons given above – to heighten the cultural sensitivity of the 
state court system and implement information programmes focusing 
on the advantages of the existing legal system.
The situation is entirely different when the adr deals with conflicts 
other than those relating to marriage and divorce. Recently, a book 
appeared in Germany on how ‘shari῾a judges’ settle criminal disputes 
among Muslims in the country.68 While forms of mediation between 
perpetrators and victims are established in penal cases – usually under 
the supervision of the state (for example, according to Article 46a of 
the German Penal Law Code), the limits should be clear: the exercise 
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of pressure on victims or witnesses cannot be tolerated by the state. 
Nevertheless, the relatively small number of cases reported does not 
indicate the establishment of a parallel ‘shari῾a’ system. Rather, it seems 
to be restricted to parts of the population originating from huge Mid-
dle Eastern family clans that are used to ‘settling’ conflicts according to 
their cultural traditions. In addition, special motifs relating to an immi-
gration background may be well involved: official criminal prosecution 
in major cases would often lead to the loss of the perpetrator’s residence 
permit, thus possibly affecting his whole family living within the coun-
try or family members in the country of origin dependent on his finan-
cial support. In such cases, there might be a tendency not to involve 
state bodies, so as to avoid such effects. Another case involving Salafis 
was reported in Spain in 2009. According to these reports, a group 
of seven persons originating from North Africa allegedly ‘sentenced’ 
a woman who had committed adultery to death in a ‘shari῾a court’ 
condoned by the victim’s family.69 They were later set free because the 
woman had disappeared and thus could not identify the accused before 
the court. Until now, little research has been done in this field.
Preliminary Conclusions
In general, legal plurality does not usually endanger socio-legal cohe-
sion in mere ‘international’ cases. If persons only stay temporarily, de-
veloping few links to the state of residence, far-reaching legal diversity 
can be seen as a natural phenomenon in a globalized world. But ‘inter-
nal’ cases involving considerable normative differences and citizens or 
long-time residents do have such potential. Thus, they require greater 
homogeneity in basic legal decisions. How, then, to properly differenti-
ate between ‘international’ and ‘internal’? In this regard, I would favour 
the choice of forms of residence as the most significant connecting fac-
tor in family law issues, as immigration countries usually do for good 
reason. Concerning internal law, it is necessary to undertake thorough 
studies of the scope and limits of dispositive law and adr. In the field of 
family relations, state protection seems to be indispensable; thus, most 
Western legal orders are restricting the options available, especially 
with respect to basic legal institutions and adr.
To overcome mere technical or institutional problems by applying 
the law of the land, international efforts to improve the mutual recog-
nition of state decisions are needed. In those cases where documents 
are lacking, administrations and courts should be ready to find creative 
solutions or make more use of hardship rules.
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Besides that, immigrants from countries maintaining a personal law 
system and their descendants should be reasonably informed about 
the legal situation of their new home country. Research in the United 
Kingdom in particular has shown that to a considerable extent, reli-
gious marriages have been concluded under the misguided impression 
that they are valid under the law of the land. This includes information 
about the role of state law and institutions in family-related issues: in 
the West, the state and its legal system have achieved a strong position 
in recent last centuries. Economic solidarity within extended families 
has been largely replaced by more or less state-run systems of social 
security. At the same time, the state has assumed the role of the main 
protector of weaker family members, particularly children and wives 
in patriarchal cultural environments.
Problems remain in cases where parties are reluctant to bring their 
cases to state courts for various reasons. If they refrain from doing so, 
without any alternative available, the conflicts will continue and might 
even escalate. Thus, if state court solutions are to be maintained, it is 
absolutely necessary to respond to people’s reasons for rejecting these 
courts; something that can be achieved without touching the content 
of the law, for example, by increasing cultural sensitivity among judges 
and in administrations. In Germany, for instance, the Academies for 
Judges (Richterakademien), which serve as institutions for the training 
of judges and other legal personnel already in office, provide a number 
of short courses (up until now mainly taught by myself). Much more 
could be done in this field.
Practical experience proves that non-lawyers tend not to be inter-
ested in the law as such, but in the outcome of its application as far as 
they are personally concerned. Thus, in cases of differing options, the 
choice of the respective norms is often driven much more by personal 
worldly interest than by more abstract convictions about how the law 
should be in general. Therefore, the demand for shari῾a should not nec-
essarily be seen as a general refusal to accept the ruling law of the land. 
Nevertheless, the latter attitude does exist and is highly problematic 
in terms of social cohesion. In any case, it is mandatory to carry out a 
sound analysis of the considerably varying aspects – technical/institu-
tional, cultural and religious – in order to provide acceptable solutions 
from the perspective of the legal order, as well as those affected by the 
law.
It is essential that the basic rules of secular legal orders in liberal 
societies are accepted by society as a whole. But can such legal orders 
not only be obeyed, but also accepted by devout Muslims, and seen 
as ‘theirs’ as well? The overwhelming majority of Muslims living in 
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the West seem to answer in favour of that. They recognize that these 
legal orders are also engaged in a search for justice. Understanding the 
‘maqasid al-shari῾a’, the deeper reasons for Islamic rules, in the search 
for an overlapping consensus between the latter and the rules of secular 
states, could be a viable solution at a contemporary intellectual level 
(see also chapters 12 and 13 in this volume).
Examples of public discourse by Muslims in recent European fora 
express aspects of the thinking behind this approach. At a conference 
held in Sarajevo in 2007, the prominent Bosnian Muslim lawyer Enes 
Karić, who teaches at the Islamic Faculty there, explicitly stated that 
the caliphate is not part of the religion of Islam. He considers shari῾a 
to be a set of rules with moral goals, and secular states to be products 
of their actions. Therefore, in his view, ‘A state which is willing to pro-
vide a sufficient social structure, e.g. funds for students or pensions, 
which intends to establish economic and social justice, which respects 
and promotes human rights, is an Islamic state in this sense.’ (He also 
cited the Islamic maxim adl al-dawla iman-ha, zulm al-dawla kufr-ha – 
justice is the belief of a state, injustice is its unbelief – and said that the 
concept of citizenship is a major European achievement.) Finally, he 
said that the European secular democratic state under the rule of law 
fulfils the conditions for justice, and concluded: ‘Therefore, we don’t 
need a double system.’70
It would thus be highly advisable to support a Muslim research and 
educational system driven by such thinking, dealing with the condi-
tions of life in secular societies and their basic values. Muslims should 
play their fair part in the debate about the future of our common laws.
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Islam and the Problems of Liberal Democracy
Bryan S. Turner and James T. Richardson
Introduction
The main theme running through our chapter is that, while liberal gov-
ernments such as that of the United States claim to favour the separa-
tion of church and state, governments constantly intervene to regulate 
religions in multicultural societies, precisely because religious beliefs 
and practices create problems, real and perceived, of governance.1 For 
instance, states often intervene in the domestic space to protect the 
interests of children in interfaith marriages or in unpopular religious 
communities.2 In New York State in 2011, legislation was passed to 
recognize gay marriages, and yet state governments have regularly in-
tervened to control the practice of polygamy, for example among the 
Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints.3 The state 
intervenes to regulate the employment and practice of chaplains in 
prisons and in the military.4 In France, the state has banned the wear-
ing of the veil in public spaces. Therefore, in modern societies, there is 
widespread ‘management of religions’ by the state.5
One might ask why the management of religion is a problem for 
liberals. Surely the regulation of religion is a pragmatic and neces-
sary response to religious diversity? However, the problem is not the 
intervention but rather the absence of a level playing field, which is an 
essential aspect of liberal tolerance. The law must treat individuals and 
social groups on the same basis, and the state must not be seen to treat 
certain groups with special favour. This principle is very important 
when it comes to the recognition of religious practices. Jews should not 
receive special advantages over those that Hindus enjoy, and vice versa. 
In America, the ideal of the separation of church and state makes this 
principle central to constitutional rights. In practice, however, things 
are very different. Some religious groups are allowed special privileges, 
but others are not. The issue of equality versus respect for difference 
has become very acute in the case of Islam, and no more so than over 
the shari῾a. In some American states, politicians are pressing to ban the 
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shari῾a, but both Judaism and Catholicism have religious courts. Is this 
freedom of religion equally applied and available?
Brian Barry, an important critic of multicultural celebration of dif-
ference, argues that in modern societies, our commitment to the impor-
tance of difference has undermined an equally important value: the 
principle of equal treatment.6 He cites the exemptions and advantages 
enjoyed by the Amish community in the United States, which appear to 
have little relevance to the actual practice of their religion. Perhaps the 
most important absence of fair treatment in modern American society 
is that, while Jewish and Catholic tribunals are allowed to operate in cer-
tain areas of life, there is a widespread move to stop any institutionali-
zation of Muslim tribunals applying aspects of the shari῾a. The result is 
endless contradiction and confusion within cultural and legal practices.
Another example of such a contradiction occurs in the area of finan-
cial affairs. While there is widespread fear of the shari῾a as applied to 
domestic disputes, there is growing acceptance of so-called shari῾a-
compliant mortgages, shari῾a banking practices and institutions, and 
a growing commercial acceptance of shari῾a insurance schemes in 
America and other Western nations.7 While the public is fearful of the 
presence of the shari῾a in American court systems, there appears to be 
more acceptance of shari῾a finance, presumably because it is ‘good for 
business’.
The liberal dilemma is intensified because we live in a world in 
which religious differences are deeper and much more complex than 
in the past. We should note that when early philosophers, such as Rich-
ard Hooker and John Locke and the colonial leader Thomas Jefferson, 
addressed the issue of religious tolerance, they were mainly concerned 
either with conflicts between Catholics and Protestants or between 
Protestant sects. Although opposition to the presence of Jews in Europe 
had often been the cause of violence, the seventeenth and eighteenth-
century debates about tolerance were typically about tolerance within 
Christendom. By contrast, modern societies are multicultural and 
multi-faith. Extensive labour migration, as well as the acceptance of 
refugees from war-torn areas of the world, has transformed the West, 
including the United States, by creating significant diasporic commu-
nities that are often organized on the basis of religious identity. Argu-
ably, the Westphalian model of tolerance based on a clear separation 
between the private (individual conscience) and the public (the state 
and the law) no longer holds in societies with substantial Hindu, Jew-
ish, and Muslim minorities.8
Intolerance is not just about domestic political issues, because 
with globalization, the conflict between religions appears to be on the 
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increase. In the Middle East, and especially after 9/11 and the inva-
sion of Iraq, there is now ample evidence of conflicts in Islam between 
Shi’ite and Sunni communities, as well as conflicts between Chris-
tians and Muslims. In Iraq there have been serious attacks on Catho-
lic churches; in Egypt there is mounting tension between Muslims and 
Copts; and in Syria there is widespread fear that if and when the Assad 
regime collapses, there will be reprisals against both Alawite and Chris-
tian communities. Beyond these Middle Eastern conflicts, there have 
been growing tensions between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria, 
where Muslims represent about 45 per cent of the population. Spread-
ing peacefully to northern towns like Osogbo in the 1820s, Islam estab-
lished its presence in Nigeria by more forceful means during the Fulani 
Jihadist invasion of the 1830s. In response to the spread of Pentacostal-
ist evangelicals in Nigeria, various reform movements were created in 
the 1990s to attract young people to reformed Islam and to spread the 
religion across the country. As a result, Nigeria has become the focus 
of an often-violent religious confrontation.9 Consequently, American 
foreign policy has to try to improve the image of America and reduce 
tensions between religions. For example, the United States government 
spent $70,000 on advertisements on six Pakistani television stations in 
September 2012, disavowing an amateur movie depicting the Prophet 
in a prejudicial and hateful manner.10 The management of religion is 
therefore a strategy of both American domestic and foreign policy.
These modern difficulties within and between religions may be 
explained partially by the rise of fundamentalism in various world reli-
gions. However, we prefer to refer to this development as a growth in 
piety. The spread of veiling is one very obvious example of new forms 
of ‘urban piety’, and we can likewise regard demands for the implemen-
tation of some aspects of the shari῾a as yet another aspect of new piety 
movements. In much of North Africa and the Middle East, the Arab 
Spring was followed by demands for more traditional piety and the 
revival of the shari῾a.11 The growth of ‘urban piety’ also creates addi-
tional problems within the public domain. Although the secularization 
thesis in the sociology of religion in the 1970s predicted the decline of 
religion in the West, there has in fact been significant religious reviv-
alism across many societies. This revivalism is often associated with 
reformed Islam, but the manifestations of such piety are global.12 Puri-
tanical forms of religiosity are associated with the rapid urbanization 
of traditional communities and the growth of literacy among the urban 
lower and middle classes. This tendency can be seen in the develop-
ment of urban piety in Southeast Asia among newly urbanized Muslim 
populations.13
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These piety movements tend to create religious enclaves by sharp-
ening the differences between the pious and the outside world.14 Reli-
gious differences are often reinforced by in-group marriages, separate 
educational institutions, and various exemptions from public services 
and institutions (occasionally involving exemptions from taxation and 
military service). Such developments tend to create cultural and reli-
gious fissures in the public domain, in which religious groups become 
socially and geographically separate. The result is growing social frag-
mentation.
This argument can be challenged, of course. In the United States it 
is often claimed that inter-racial marriages have increased, suggest-
ing that the racial divisions of American society in the past have been 
repaired, and hence sociologists such as Jeffrey Alexander have argued 
that the civil sphere in the United States is relatively successful and har-
monious.15 More recently, Robert Putnam and David Campbell, in their 
report on the ‘Faith Matters’ surveys in 2006 and 2007, noted that three 
religious groups in America – Buddhists, Mormons and Muslims – are 
viewed unfavourably, and that certain religious groups have strong feel-
ings of mutual solidarity.16 Nevertheless, between one-third and half of 
all Americans are in interfaith marriages, and the majority of Ameri-
cans feel comfortable in a pluralistic religious world. For example, some 
80 per cent of Americans believe that ‘there are basic truths in many 
religions’.17 They conclude their study with the observation that ‘Geo-
graphic segregation by religion has largely ended, while social segrega-
tion along religious lines is also mostly a thing of the past’.18
Islam in America: A Historical Summary
Before examining the shari῾a in America in more detail, we offer a brief 
sketch of the situation regarding Islam in America. Muslims first came 
to America as African slaves.19 Black American Islam developed into a 
radical political movement under the Nation of Islam, and various radi-
cal leaders emerged from this anti-white political protest, most notori-
ously Malcolm X.20 While black African-American Islam is a signifi-
cant social group, very little research has been undertaken on the role 
of shari῾a within this community. However, in this chapter we are con-
cerned mainly with recent Muslim migrants. Unlike both Britain and 
France, Muslim migrants to America in the second half of the twenti-
eth century were typically well educated, and they quickly assimilated 
into American society, at least in economic terms. By the late 1980s, 
Muslim intellectuals had come to the conclusion that America was no 
AUP_Berger_vierde.indd   50 19-4-2013   12:25:31
america 51
longer incompatible with Islamic belief and practice, but a ‘place of or-
der’ or dar-al-aman, signifying that Muslims could comfortably live in 
the United States while also recognizing that it is a place of outreach. 
The majority of pious Muslims – like pious Christians – see America as 
a corrupt and immoral society in which Muslims have a responsibil-
ity to call people back to Islam, a practice known as da’wa. However, 
many Muslims from minority traditions such as Isma’ilis see America 
as democratic and pluralist, and therefore a society in which they can 
flourish and enjoy religious freedom. This argument about successful 
assimilation has received further support from a significant ethno-
graphic study of Muslims in America by Mucahit Bilici (2012), enti-
tled Finding Mecca in America. Despite discrimination and prejudice, 
Muslims are settling successfully in America, where they find freedom 
to practise their faith without draconian interference from the state.21 
In fact, for many Muslims, America has now become Dar-al Islam (the 
Abode or House of Islam). This phrase is often contrasted with Dar al-
Harb or the House of War, but a better and less controversial translation 
might be the arena of struggle against those things that threaten the 
integrity of Islam.22 Another term, as we have seen, is dar-al-aman, or a 
place of stability and proper order where people can peacefully practise 
their religion. Thus Bilici suggests that ironically, Muslims find they are 
better able to practise Islam in America than in many Muslim-majority 
societies with authoritarian governments.23
In this environment, a new leadership emerged from within the Mus-
lim middle classes. Unlike the traditional imams of an earlier period, 
the new professional leadership was not trained in the traditional reli-
gious literature, and approached the shari῾a from the perspective of 
Western training. This initially resulted in some tension and competi-
tion between the traditional leadership and the new professional class. 
Many of these legal professionals came to believe that shari῾a from 
outside America did not satisfy the needs of educated Muslims living 
in a multicultural and secular environment. One example is Khaled 
Abou El Fadl, professor of Islamic Law at ucla.24 He complained, for 
example, that the shari῾a Scholars Association of North America meet-
ing in Detroit in November 1999 was composed of fiqh scholars (legal 
experts) who had typically never lived in America, knew nothing about 
actual conditions, and came from totalitarian and corrupt regimes in 
the Middle East.25
While this ‘import’ of foreign scholars and scholarship was an 
important problem, the American Muslim community was also faced 
by the uncontrolled and often badly informed on-line debate about fat-
was where the discussants have no real legal training or legal sophistica-
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tion. As one young American Muslim of Indian background exclaimed, 
‘The Internet has made everyone a mufti’.26
Several attempts were made early on to improve this situation. In the 
1970s, a fiqh council was set up by the Muslim Students Association, 
but it was mainly concerned with narrow issues like the appropriate 
dates for fasting. In 1988 the Fiqh Council of North America was cre-
ated, but its critics claim that it was dominated by ‘naturalized Muslims’ 
who knew little about American laws relating to the family, property and 
divorce. Because Islam is a devolved religion and consensus comes from 
the community, such organizations rarely have much authority. It is also 
very important to realize that the shari῾a is not state law and historically 
could not automatically depend on the state to enforce qadi justice (that 
is, judge-made law). The situation is also complicated by the diversity of 
legal traditions in Sunni Islam, of which there are four dominant schools. 
One outcome of these developments is that much of the richness of tra-
ditional teaching has been lost in the United States, where there remains 
a dearth of scholars trained in the full breadth of Islamic law.
As we have noted, one interesting development in the West con-
cerns Islamic banking and finance. Many Muslim financiers argue that 
there is no serious incompatibility between Islamic norms relating to 
investment, banking and profit sharing, and American laws relating to 
finance.27 To take one example: the American financial house lariba 
(the Los Angeles Reliable Investment Bankers Association) called itself 
a ‘faith-based financing’ business in response to President Bush’s call for 
faith-based initiatives.28
Growing Fears Concerning Islam
By the beginning of this century, it would be reasonable to claim that 
second or third-generation American Muslims had become success-
ful American citizens and were well integrated.29 This positive situation 
was transformed by the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001. After the 
tragic event, Muslims were often identified as un-American outsiders 
who were fundamentalists and dangerous. While Muslims struggled in 
the majority of cases to re-affirm their loyalty and American identity, 
right-wing elements have attacked Muslim customs (such as veiling) 
and have more recently led a specific attack on what is seen as the sig-
nificant advance of shari῾a in American courts, alongside the growth of 
halal-certified goods, even including Thanksgiving Day turkeys.30
Thus the positive picture of ‘American Grace’ presented by Putnam 
and Campbell and of Americanized Islam by Bilici appears to be con-
AUP_Berger_vierde.indd   52 19-4-2013   12:25:31
america 53
tradicted by the response of the American public to the rise (alleged or 
otherwise) of religious radicalism, especially Islamic radicalism. Since 
9/11, the possibilities for pluralism and tolerance have been severely 
tested and constrained by a discourse focused on terrorism and secu-
rity. In particular, Islam as a civilization has come to be defined as fun-
damentally incompatible with Western values. Muslim communities 
have thus been marginalized by a mixture of official processes of secu-
ritization and popular hostility.
Moreover, the argument that America now has a benign social envi-
ronment of religious and racial tolerance is questionable given the 
widespread hostility to the proposal to build a Muslim cultural cen-
tre close to Ground Zero,31 the religious standpoint of the Tea Party 
movement (demonstrated by reluctance to endorse Mitt Romney as 
the Republican candidate because he is a Mormon), and the persistent 
notion that President Obama is a Muslim, among other things. There 
also is growing opposition to the idea that the shari῾a could be referred 
to in American court proceedings.
While there is evidence that Muslims in America have been quite 
successful in terms of social mobility and their integration into Ameri-
can culture,32 growing concern about the shari῾a is indicative of divi-
sions in modern America that may not have been obvious in the Faith 
Matters surveys on which Putnam and Campbell based their argument. 
Various lobby groups opposed to the shari῾a, such as act for America 
and the Society of Americans for National Existence, now operate in 
the United States to warn people about the spread of shari῾a.33 Many of 
these groups operate on the margins of mainstream politics, and it is 
possible that their animosity to Islam as a cultural threat will not have 
any long-term consequences. However there is a more fundamental 
issue being raised by the shari῾a, namely the growth of legal pluralism.
On 11 November 2011 (the Veterans Day holiday in America), nearly 
one thousand people attended a conference in Tennessee with the 
theme, ‘The Constitution or shari῾a’. The conference, organized by the 
shari῾a Awareness Action Network, which is a coalition of religious 
liberty and national security groups, focused on the alleged perils of 
shari῾a and efforts to promote the ‘Islamatization of America’.34 The 
conference was held at a large fundamentalist Protestant church after 
the hotel that was to be the original venue cancelled due to ‘security 
concerns.’ The conference attracted participants from across America 
and several other countries, who were told about efforts of the Mus-
lim Brotherhood to infiltrate the government, as well as the concept of 
‘lawfare,’ by which was meant the use of the judicial system to fight the 
spread of shari῾a and its ‘stealth jihad.’
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The moral panic about Islam and the shari῾a is being fostered by 
some prominent politicians in America, including several Republican 
presidential candidates. Congresswoman Michele Bachmann (Repub-
lican from Minnesota) has spoken of the ‘threat’ of Muslims bringing 
shari῾a law into the United States and has claimed that Muslims want to 
‘usurp’ the Constitution. Herman Cain has said he would not appoint a 
Muslim to his administration, and former Speaker of the House Newt 
Gingrich has also expressed concern about Muslims in the govern-
ment.35 Earlier in 2011, New York Congressman Peter King sponsored, 
despite vehement protests, a hearing of the Homeland Security Com-
mittee he chairs on the alleged threat of Muslim radicals in America. 
The hearing, held on 10 March 2011, attracted widespread attention 
both in the United States and overseas.36
Legal Plurality and the Spread of Shari῾a
The idea of ‘legal pluralism’ was originally associated with anthropolog-
ical research into the continuity of customary law in colonial societies, 
where it often existed alongside Anglo-Saxon common law. We may 
describe legal pluralism as a situation in which there are competing 
‘bodies of law’ within a given sovereign territory. It is often thought to 
be a problem emerging in the modern state, where the unified sover-
eignty of the state is challenged by different competing, and occasion-
ally overlapping, systems of law. Although legal pluralism is often asso-
ciated with both globalization and post-colonialism, legal pluralism in 
fact existed in Europe throughout the medieval period in terms of ius 
commune, commercial law (lex mercatoria), and ecclesiastical or canon 
law.37 Modern Muslims also like to imagine a time when the shari῾a 
had dominant and exclusive authority, but this notion also turns out 
to be mythical.38 We do not intend in this chapter to seriously engage 
with the technical literature surrounding the anthropological study of 
legal pluralism, and for our purposes it may be less problematic to use 
the term ‘legal plurality’ to describe modern societies grappling with 
diverse legal traditions.
While the ideas of state sovereignty and a unified legal code may be 
political fictions, they are useful fictions: any functional system of law 
would have to have some minimal agreement about a final umpire who 
could arbitrate between competing legal claims. The growth of legal 
pluralism becomes a problem in societies where a common citizen-
ship is fragmenting under the impact of globalization and the decline 
of shared culture.
AUP_Berger_vierde.indd   54 19-4-2013   12:25:31
america 55
In some societies, such as the United Kingdom, there is evidence of 
the development of religious arbitration, but these ‘courts’ are confined 
to private disputes (typically around marriage, divorce, adoption and 
so forth).39 If accepting religious law means in practice accepting third-
party arbitration, then legal plurality might not in itself pose a direct 
threat to state sovereignty. However for some critics, such as the pop-
ular press in the United Kingdom, which expressed almost hysterical 
concern over a lecture in which the Archbishop of Canterbury seemed 
to endorse the shari῾a, arbitration is merely the ‘thin end’ of the legal 
wedge, raising the problem of whether an arbitration hearing is in fact 
a ‘court’.
Many of these debates are concerned with the formal use of the 
shari῾a in the West, where judges may refer to marriage contracts made 
under shari῾a norms in disputes over inheritance or the care of chil-
dren. However, there is also informal and unregulated use of shari῾a, 
for example, through the spread of ‘online fatwas’ providing informal 
legal judgements and opinions about matters relating to how Muslims 
should live in a secular society. With the global spread of the Internet, 
some degree of informal but popular opinion formation is taking place 
between individuals in ways that may be compatible with shari῾a as a 
consensus-seeking legal tradition. This development involves the infor-
mal growth of religious codes in everyday life.
The informal spread of shari῾a tribunals in America and else- 
where and appeals to online shari῾a judgements can be defined as ‘the 
sharia-ization of the everyday world’.40 From the perspective of reli-
gious orthodoxy, however, there are some important questions sur-
rounding such online legal opinions. The first is that Internet religious 
opinions can no longer be controlled by traditional religious authori-
ties, and there is therefore an erosion of religious authority.41 The sec-
ond related issue is what we might call ‘fatwa shopping’, namely the 
search for a particular religious opinion that will satisfy an individual’s 
specific requirements.
The prospect of shari῾a courts operating in formally secular socie-
ties has given rise to acrimonious public debate in America, as well 
as Britain, Australia, and Canada. Recent protests, as we have noted, 
against the Archbishop of Canterbury’s public lecture on ‘Civil and 
Religious Law in England’,42 and the public dispute over the introduc-
tion of shari῾a into arbitration courts in Ontario, Canada, are exam-
ples of the moral panic concerning shari῾a.43 In both episodes, practical 
objections were raised about how women’s rights could be protected 
and how arbitration could be enforced.
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American Legal Exceptionalism and Shari῾a
Having considered various examples of the spread of the shari῾a, there 
is one simple objection to our argument, namely that the American 
Constitution in fact prohibits the spread of legal plurality by defending 
the central authority of the Supreme Court as the sole arbiter of law in 
the United States. However, a report from the Center for Security Policy 
(2011) claims that it has discovered fifty significant cases of the shari῾a 
in American courts, and fifteen Trial Court Cases and twelve Appel-
late Court Cases where it was found to be applicable in the case of the 
bar.44 The claims made in this report are, however, greatly overblown, 
as noted by University of Windsor law professor Julie McFarlane and 
by Wajahat Ali and Matthew Duss, writing for the Center for Ameri-
can Progress.45 MacFarlane states that a closer examination of the cases 
cited in the csp report shows that American judges usually reject any 
interpretation or ruling based on Islamic law. Most of the cases dealt 
with family matters (marriage contracts, divorce, child custody and in-
heritance), and judges assumed jurisdiction because of questions about 
basic fairness to the parties involved and other concerns, such as the 
‘best interests of the child’ in custody disputes. MacFarlane concludes 
that American courts take an exacting approach to contracts that refer 
to Islamic law principles. Ali and Duss point out the many internal con-
tradictions in the csp report, and note that, since most Muslims oppose 
terrorism, the report alienates them from those trying to stop terrorism 
fostered by a small minority of Muslims.
There have been several efforts to preclude the use of the shari῾a 
in legal proceedings in states in the United States, and more are being 
developed. In 2010 the State of Oklahoma passed a constitutional 
amendment with a 70 per cent voter approval precluding use of the 
shari῾a in its court system. A suit was brought immediately by the 
Council on American-Islamic Relations (cair) on the grounds that 
the amendment was in violation of the Establishment Clause of the 
us Constitution, which precludes the favouring of one religion over 
another by the government. A federal judge in Oklahoma granted an 
injunction delaying implementation of the amendment, and that rul-
ing was affirmed by the 10th Circuit court of Appeal in Denver.46 Court 
documents filed in the appeal by the cair and the American Civil Lib-
erties Union, as reported in a television newscast, state:47
The measure tramples the free exercise rights of a disfavoured minor-
ity faith and constrains the ability of Muslims in Oklahoma to execute 
valid wills, assert religious liberty claims under the Oklahoma Reli-
gious Freedom Act, and enjoy equal access to the state judicial system.
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Julie MacFarlane claims that following the Oklahoma example, two 
other states (Tennessee and Louisiana) passed similar constitutional 
amendments, and similar efforts were underway in nineteen other 
states as of March 2011.48 These efforts demonstrate a high degree of 
concern about the shari῾a in America that might be characterized as a 
‘moral panic’, given how little reference to the shari῾a is actually occur-
ring in courts in the United States.49 Furthermore, there is little evi-
dence that the majority of Muslims want the full implementation of 
the shari῾a as an alternative to secular common law, and certainly there 
is no evidence suggesting that Muslims want access to Islamic crimi-
nal law in the West. When the Western media discuss the shari῾a, they 
often equate it with the hudud rules specifying what are often horren-
dous punishments, such as stoning and cutting off the hands of thieves. 
Such reports neglect the reform of criminal law in Pakistan, for exam-
ple, where the conservative legacy of Syed Mawdudi has been chal-
lenged by younger scholars and political activists.50
Relevant Research on Muslims
Although there has been little recent systematic research directly fo-
cused on the shari῾a as a comprehensive system of norms and laws in 
the West, an earlier study by Haddad and Lummis did survey Mus-
lims in five sites in the United States on the basic values of Muslims in 
America.51 They found that most Muslims were supportive of American 
values, and that they were finding ways to make their religious practices 
mesh with other aspects of their life. There have also been a few recent 
studies of specific issues that relate to aspects of the shari῾a, particu-
larly family matters such as marriage, divorce, and custody of children 
(see below). The Pew Foundation has also published considerable re-
search on Muslim social status, views, and attitudes, but none to date 
dealing directly with the shari῾a.52 The aforementioned professor Julie 
MacFarlane has done perhaps the most relevant research for this chap-
ter, with her four-year in-depth study of divorce within Islamic com-
munities in the United States and Canada.53 Her research, motivated 
by the controversy that erupted in Ontario, Canada, in 2003, involved 
interviews with over 100 highly-educated divorced Muslim women and 
men (80 per cent women), as well as over 110 others (about 40 imams 
and 70 others working with divorce issues) from Muslim communities 
in selected cities in the United States and Canada (75 per cent from the 
us). She pointed out that many Muslims desire a religiously sanctioned 
marriage, which is achieved through a contractual marriage agreement 
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referred to as a nikah. This is easily accomplished and usually also ac-
companied by a formalized civil marriage. However, getting a divorce is 
much more complicated if the persons involved want it to be religiously 
sanctioned. This is the case because Islamic law and tradition allow the 
male much more power to end a marriage, and on terms that are more 
advantageous to him than to the female in the marriage. This imbal-
ance of power and rights has been noticed by many commentators, and 
is the subject of considerable controversy.
MacFarlane’s research reveals that informal processes of apply-
ing shari῾a elements to marriage and divorce in the United States are 
occurring, even though there is no formal recognition via statute in any 
state. Such informal processes are occurring because they are desired 
by those involved in important family-oriented rituals. However, Mac-
Farlane reports that none of those interviewed advocated establish-
ing a formal legal status for Islamic family law, preferring to retain the 
use of the civil law system as well as informal shari῾a-based processes 
when desired. She also says that there is little agreement among Ameri-
can and Canadian Muslims about what shari῾a means in terms of its 
application, noting that there is much debate among Muslim scholars 
and leaders about its core principles. MacFarlane describes the con-
cern over shari῾a as a ‘moral panic’, and laments that so much misinfor-
mation is being promulgated by the mass media and some politicians 
regarding what Muslims are doing and what they want when they live 
in Canada and the United States.
Inger Furseth has done research on Muslim women’s views concern-
ing arranged marriages.54 She interviewed a sample of Muslim women in 
Los Angeles, and found that they were divided on the value of arranged 
marriages. Some thought such marriages important as a way to have the 
young person remain in touch with his or her culture and family’s coun-
try of origin. Others were much more flexible, and had accepted more 
Western norms about marriage, allowing the young person more choice, 
or at least the right to veto an arrangement for a marriage that they did 
not like. Her research demonstrates that American Muslim women are 
not of one mind on this issue, a finding that perhaps should not sur-
prise anyone, but which has implications for applications of the shari῾a 
when a marriage results in a divorce. As noted above, there is consider-
able controversy about the issue of divorce within Muslim communi-
ties, and the issue of religious versus civil divorce is quite contested.
Furseth also did interesting research on the clothing worn by some 
Muslim women in America, an issue that some assume is derived from 
the shari῾a, and which has caused major controversies in some Western 
societies.55 If controversy erupts in America about the garb of Muslim 
AUP_Berger_vierde.indd   58 19-4-2013   12:25:31
america 59
women, this research will be quite germane. Furseth studied Muslim 
women in Los Angeles (the same sample as for her work on Muslim 
women’s views of marriage) on the issue of their dress code, and what 
it means to wear traditional Islamic clothing. She points out that there 
has been a growing emphasis on wearing a headscarf among Muslim 
women in recent decades, especially since the tragic events on 9/11. She 
attributes this to the women who wear the garb’s efforts to emphasize 
their religious identity. Furseth’s work emphasizes that Muslim women 
who cover themselves are exercising human agency, and disputes the 
idea that they are being coerced by Muslim males to do so. Indeed, she 
notes instances from her sample where the husband was opposed his 
wife’s wearing of the headscarf. While the role played by social net-
works in the decisions to cover oneself is acknowledged, the impor-
tant networks are female ones. In her conclusion, Furseth suggests that 
‘wearing the hijab has increasingly become a symbol of Muslim’s wom-
en’s courage to represent Islam in the public sphere and show solidarity 
with co-Muslims.’56 One conclusion to be drawn from this research is 
that American Muslim women are beginning to challenge and modify 
the practice of Islam. For example, in many traditional Muslim socie-
ties, women do not attend the mosque, and when they do, women are 
typically segregated from men. However, in many American mosques, 
women are gradually undermining these norms by claiming a space 
within the mosque with or alongside men.57
Conclusion
Legal pluralism or plurality, while viewed positively by some, can con-
tribute to the ongoing erosion of citizenship as a shared cultural, social 
and political framework. Legal pluralism and multiculturalism require 
a lively and effective framework of active citizenship if they are to be 
successful. The weakening of common ties, establishment of separate 
religious schools, growth of legal pluralism, wearing of distinctive re-
ligious dress in public spaces, ethnic segregation and development of 
symbolically segregated communities such as the proliferation of eruv 
in the Jewish world, and the consequent if unintended creation of par-
allel communities, can promote an acute differentiation of identity and 
have a divisive effect on society, leading to ‘the enclave society’.58
Religious differences and identities are often championed in the 
name of human rights, namely freedom of conscience. The paradox of 
these individual rights is that we need effective and viable states if rights 
are to be enforced, and the enforcement of rights is a necessary condi-
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tion of political life. Hence, despite much of the contemporary com-
mentary on the decline of the state and the growth of porous political 
boundaries, we need to be concerned that any decline in the authority 
and coherence of the state – associated with neo-liberal globalization 
– will in fact undermine the political foundations that are necessary to 
sustain legal pluralism and multiculturalism, and lead to the decline of 
participatory citizenship.
Our argument is that the real political issue behind the possible 
growth of shari῾a arbitration is not (or not just) the conventional femi-
nist anxiety about equal treatment, but a broader concern about the 
current state of citizenship in democracies such as in the United States. 
The notion that citizens have a right to choose the legal systems under 
which they are to be ruled in the name of cultural difference and mul-
ticulturalism makes questionable political sense, and could destroy 
the very institutions that protect our cultural diversity. In Genealogies 
of Citizenship, Margaret Somers provides a vigorous and passionate 
defence of citizenship as the necessary foundation of democracy and 
our best hope of sustaining social solidarity, equality and mutual trust. 
Her basic argument is that ‘democratic citizenship regimes (including 
human rights) can thrive only to the extent that egalitarian and solidar-
istic principles, practices, and institutions of civil society and the pub-
lic commons are able to act with equal force against the exclusionary 
threats of market-driven politics’.59
We find some solace in the empirical research reported above, 
based on studies of American (and Canadian) Muslim communities. 
The research reported by Pew and that reported by MacFarlane and 
by Furseth shows strong support among most Muslims for the values 
of American society, and little support for any extremist ideas or pro-
grammes. As Pew states in one of its recent reports, ‘Muslim Americans 
have not become disillusioned with the country. They are overwhelm-
ingly satisfied with the way things are going in their lives (82 per cent) 
and continue to rate their communities very positively as places to live 
(79 per cent excellent or good).’60 Indeed, Pew reports that Muslims are 
more satisfied with the situation in America than non-Muslim mem-
bers of American society (56 per cent vs. 23 per cent). MacFarlane’s 
finding that no one in her study was promoting or desired the estab-
lishment of formal shari῾a tribunals or courts is also of note. Furseth’s 
research also demonstrates that, while the Muslim women she stud-
ied are seeking ways to identify with their faith, they are not trying to 
force Islamic values upon others. Indeed, her work shows that there 
is some tension within Muslim communities over such issues as dress 
and arranged marriages, suggesting that there is no monolithic Islamic 
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set of cultural values that is invading American society and attempting 
to make others accept those values. Bilici also argues that debates are 
occurring about Muslim dress codes and the shari῾a within Muslim 
communities.
Obviously, more research is needed, but based on what is available 
so far, we would suggest that, while there are grounds for some concern 
about the implications for the potential development of legal pluralism 
and the spread of the shari῾a in America and elsewhere, those fears may 
be groundless, given the apparent fact that the vast majority of Muslims 
in America are finding ways to adjust to American secularism, while 
also expressing their religious identity in various ways.
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3 Australia
The Down-Under Approach and Reaction to Shari῾a:  
An Impasse in Post-Secularism?
Jamila Hussain and Adam Possamai
The Socio-Cultural Heterogeneity of Muslims and the Implication 
for Shari῾a
A recent report1 based on a research project on the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women reviewed 
official documents from 44 countries with a Muslim majority. It discov-
ered that among these countries, there were significant differences with 
regard to Muslim family law. The document concluded that there is no 
single functioning worldwide Islamic law. Islamic family law, wherever 
it is practised, is based on the laws and principles set out in the Qur’an 
and Sunna. However, because there are multiple schools of law and dif-
ferent family law provisions that are influenced by local cultures where 
Islamic law operates, no single tradition can claim ownership of it.
Through various migration patterns, Muslims in Australia have 
come from over seventy different nations. Thus they come from various 
local cultures that have different legal provisions. This makes Muslims 
the most ethnically diverse religious group in Australia. Some Muslims 
came from countries where Islam is the religion of the majority, and 
others from religiously diverse countries. And, of course, we now have 
a growing population of Muslims born in Australia. Ethnically speak-
ing, this is a religious group that has a wide range of experiences of 
Australian society, and Muslims in Australia are divided along ethnic 
and ideological lines.2
The shari῾a is a devolved law, sensitive to local traditions, and in this 
sense unlike so-called Roman continental law. Unsurprisingly there-
fore, the detail of provisions about marriage, marital property, alimony, 
divorce, inheritance, custody and guardianship of children differs 
among the different Islamic countries and ethnic groups. The under-
standing of the practice of shari῾a, or parts of it, in a secular society 
such as Australia, must thus be nuanced, taking into account the multi-
ethnic composition of its Muslim community.
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While shari῾a is not officially recognized in Australia, it informs the 
ideas and conduct of Australian Muslims in various ways. The opera-
tion and regulation of shari῾a in Australia is essentially ‘underground’ 
for Black,3 or what we prefer to call an unofficial parallel system. 
Although shari῾a has not been integrated into the legal system in Aus-
tralia, it continues to be applied at a local level in Muslim communities 
and mosques4 in certain ways and in areas of law that we will elabo-
rate upon below. Sometimes, because of the lack of a formal mecha-
nism of Islamic adjudication in Australia and because of the shortage 
of trained Muslim scholars, some women travel to their country of ori-
gin to apply to a shari῾a court.5 Muslims may feel more comfortable 
combining shari῾a norms and Australian laws in their understanding 
of the law. Further, given the ethnic diversity of the Australian Muslim 
community, there is no dominant shari῾a authority that can act as an 
overarching system and no dominantly authoritative person.6 As there 
is no hierarchy in Islam, and as there is a divergence of opinion as to 
whom should administer a shari῾a court,7 each Muslim is free to seek 
guidance from any scholar of his or her choice, leading to what is called 
‘fatwa or forum shopping’. This shopping-around has also extended to 
the Internet. In 2009, Black and Hosen pointed out that requests for fat-
was from Australia on the ‘Islam q&a’ website were so numerous that 
Australia ranked seventh out of 128 countries in terms of the number 
of these demands.8
As there is no formal process for Islamic adjudication in Australia, 
Muslims consult imams to settle issues relating to divorce and other 
private disputes. Islamic legal processes seek consensus rather than the 
adversarial environment typical of Western (common) law traditions. 
The overriding concern of most imams is to save the marriage and 
to avoid expensive and often bitter conflicts within a divorce court. 
However, when a marriage has broken down, many Muslims believe 
that an appropriate way must be found to divorce, which fits with their 
faith and cultural values. Some Australian Muslims report that they 
would not accept the authenticity of a divorce unless it was conducted 
according to their religious norms.9 At the same time, other Muslims 
are satisfied to have divorce procedures conducted according to secu-
lar law. In the past, many Muslims were confronted by a range of dif-
ficulties, including their lack of familiarity with the legal systems of 
their adopted countries, the previously adversarial nature of the courts 
administering these systems, the unsympathetic nature of some judi-
cial officials, and the differences of law relating to property, domestic 
violence and custody. Recent changes to the Family Law Act and the 
encouragement of greater cultural sensitivity have made the Austral-
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ian family law system more ‘user friendly’ for all ethnic groups,10 as we 
will discuss below.
Shari῾a in Australia
Since 9/11, and the Bali bombings in 2002 which killed 202 people, in-
cluding 88 Australians, the role of Islam in Australian society has been 
the subject of much discussion in the public and political domain. Cen-
tral to the debate about Muslim identity has been the issue of women’s 
rights under Islam, and the role of shari῾a. The debate has also concen-
trated on issues such as permission to establish Islamic schools, contro-
versy about ‘gang’ rapes,11 and shari῾a as regards family law matters. The 
debates were occasionally sparked by controversial remarks by Muslim 
clerics, often involving disparaging comments about women. All these 
factors have resulted in some Muslims becoming victims of discrimina-
tion, harassment and racial profiling.12 Debates over national security 
have brought into focus issues of multiculturalism and acceptance of 
diversity,13 and, as argued below, issues of post-secularism.
While the Archbishop of Canterbury’s speech in the United King-
dom14 was widely reported in Australia, a full national debate about 
shari῾a never really developed. The notion of the adoption or assimi-
lation of shari῾a was rejected outright by government ministers and 
spokespersons, with no explanation or discussion as to its particular 
attributes or how it actually operated in practice. When the Coalition 
Government (comprising the Liberal and National Parties) was in office 
in Australia from 1996 to 2007, Prime Minister John Howard attempted 
to gain political support by publicly condemning shari῾a.15 In the post-
9/11 atmosphere, Howard seemed to consider that it would be unwise 
to be associated with Islamic values and that, in any event, it would go 
against his strong political lines on ‘law and order’ and ‘Islamic threat’ 
to say anything positive about shari῾a. On assuming office in 2007, the 
new Labor government of Kevin Rudd was likewise not prepared to 
engage in a public dialogue about recognizing shari῾a, or parts of it.16
Black and Sadiq17 have observed mixed responses to shari῾a in Aus-
tralia, predominantly by non-Muslims, and they have made reference 
to ‘good and bad shari῾a’. For instance, it could be noted that while there 
is a public outcry over family law (see recent case studies below), there 
has been support for legislative change in Australia to facilitate Islamic 
banking and financial services. It seems that Islamic banking and 
finance laws are ‘good’ shari῾a worthy of adoption, whilst personal sta-
tus laws (marriage, divorce, separation, custody of children and inher-
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itance) are not.18 In the following paragraphs we will investigate what 
could be seen as bad in these latter cases of ‘bad’ shari῾a.
The Relationship Between Shari῾a and Australian Law
Muslims are required by their religious law to obey the laws of the 
country in which they live, provided that those laws do not oblige them 
to do something contrary to Islam. Therefore, for the vast majority of 
Muslims, there is not much conflict between shari῾a and secular law. 
For the most part, Muslims are free to follow the shari῾a in their private 
lives, while at the same time adhering to Australian law in all the areas 
it covers.
This is true of family law, as well as of other aspects of life. The 
requirements of the Commonwealth Marriage Act 1961, which gov-
erns all marriages in Australia, are broadly expressed. Provided that 
the required notice is given,19 the correct forms are filled in and the 
marriage is performed by an authorized marriage celebrant, there is 
no restriction at all on the time,20 place,21 or type of ceremony22 a cou-
ple may choose to conclude their marriage. Many imams are author-
ized marriage celebrants and can conduct a marriage ceremony that is 
valid in both Islamic and Australian law. Imams cannot validly conduct 
polygamous marriage ceremonies, since polygamy is forbidden in Aus-
tralian law. However, since the shari῾a permits, but does not require, 
polygamy, this issue does not create any tension.
The requirements for concluding a marriage under shari῾a can 
therefore be met within the framework of Australian law. A contract, 
whether oral or written, can be made. The mahr, an essential part of 
an Islamic marriage, can be paid in whatever form the parties choose. 
Muslims can choose not to marry anyone who is not a Muslim, or, for 
men, a woman who is not a Muslim, Jew or Christian.23
Traditionally, the common law in Australia did not regulate rela-
tionships within the family to any great extent. In recent times, how-
ever, laws have been introduced as deemed necessary for the protection 
of children, and to criminalize domestic violence. The shari῾a does reg-
ulate family life to a greater extent but, as mentioned, observing Mus-
lims can adhere to shari῾a requirements in their private lives without 
offending against Australian law.
In the area of divorce, on the other hand, there are more zones of 
conflict between shari῾a and Australian law. There are several different 
forms of divorce in Islamic law. A man may divorce his wife by pro-
nouncing talaq. This option is available only to men (unless they cede 
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this right to their wives), and traditionally did not require any over-
seeing by a court. Today, many Muslim countries require some official 
processes to regulate talaq divorce.
It is not so easy for a wife to secure a divorce unless she has it pro-
vided in her marriage contract that she retains the right to divorce her-
self. In Muslim countries, the wife may apply to the shari῾a court for a 
divorce by khul‘, in which case she normally agrees to return her mar-
riage gift (mahr) to her husband in exchange for his divorce by talaq. 
Another form is divorce by fasakh, which is more in the nature of an 
annulment and depends upon establishing grounds for fault. Accepted 
grounds differ among the various schools. The parties may also mutu-
ally agree to divorce.
Since the introduction of the Family Law Act in 1975, divorce under 
Australian law has not required proof of fault, and has become a sim-
ple procedure. Muslims do obtain dissolution of civil marriages from 
the Family Court but must resort to shari῾a to dissolve their marriages 
also according to religious law. This alternative can be required when 
a person has property or inheritance rights in an overseas country (for 
example, Lebanon) which does not recognize civil divorce. It is also 
of importance for those men and women who regard their religion as 
a vital part of their lives and who would not wish to depart from its 
teachings in matters concerning their family life.
Some Muslim women find themselves in a ‘limping marriage’ after 
a civil divorce. When a woman cannot persuade her husband to grant 
her a religious divorce as well, she is then divorced according to civil 
law but still married according to religious law. There is no shari῾a 
court in Australia to grant a religious divorce to such a woman, nor 
any central Islamic authority that might confirm her divorced status. 
Some imams feel that they are qualified to grant a divorce in these cir-
cumstances, but this is entirely at the discretion of the imam. There is 
some anecdotal evidence that some men who have promised to pay 
extravagant amounts of deferred mahr sometimes refuse their wives 
a religious divorce in order to avoid the obligation to make this pay-
ment. The result is that the wife cannot re-marry within her commu-
nity since she is still married according to her religion, but since Islam 
allows polygamy for men, the husband is under no such constraint 
and can re-marry at will without sanction from either Australian or 
Islamic law.
A further problem for women is that until very recently, there had 
been no instance of Australian courts enforcing the mahr, which left the 
divorced wife without the financial provision she would have expected 
from the terms of her marriage contract. However, in May 2012, the 
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nsw Supreme Court ordered a husband to pay his former wife the sum 
of aus$ 50,000 which in their marriage contact he had promised her in 
the event that he initiated divorce. The court applied principles of con-
tract law. The couple had married according to religious law only and 
the Family Law Act 1975 did not apply to their case.24
Rules concerning the custody of children vary considerably between 
shari῾a and Australian family law. Under shari῾a, the mother is enti-
tled to the care and control of small children (the right of hadhanah). 
The father retains guardianship and may assume care and control of 
children at various ages, which vary according to different schools of 
thought (madhabs). However, in practice, it seems that these rules are 
not always implemented.
Australian Family Law and Islamic Arbitration
Alternative types of dispute resolution are now well recognized in Aus-
tralian family law. The Family Law Act introduced a greater emphasis 
on counselling in cases concerning children. In 2004, the Family Court 
Rules were amended to adopt a new system of case management, with 
greater emphasis on counselling, conciliation and arbitration in fam-
ily law disputes. Parties are now obliged to explore avenues for dispute 
resolution before commencing proceedings in court. This procedure is 
in line with shari῾a law, and is regulated accordingly in many Islamic 
family laws in Muslim countries.
The Jewish community has for many years maintained a Beth Din, 
a Jewish religious tribunal, in both Sydney and Melbourne, where Jew-
ish people can seek resolution of problems involving family law. Simi-
larly, the Catholic Church maintains its own tribunal, with power to 
declare annulment of marriages that are not in accord with the Cath-
olic faith, and there are tribunals for other Christian denominations 
in Australia. These bodies allow those who approach them to obtain 
a mutually agreed settlement of their family problems, in accordance 
with their religious beliefs. At present, there is no national shari῾a fam-
ily law council or tribunal like those of the Jewish and Christian com-
munities. The services of individual imams or groups of imams are 
available in this field, but these are uncoordinated and unsupervised 
at present.
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Recent Attempts to Bring Shari῾a into the Public Sphere:  
Two Case Studies
Case study 1: 
Australian Federation of Islamic Councils (Ikebal Patel)
On 4 April 2011, in response to an inquiry into multiculturalism held 
in that year by the Federal government, Ikebal Adam Patel, the presi-
dent of the Australian Federation of Islamic Councils (afic), made a 
submission titled ‘Embracing Australian Values, and Maintaining the 
Rights to be Different’. In this document he underlined the fact that 
Muslim countries differ in their use of shari῾a. In his submission Is-
lamic law is viewed as being able to change according to the require-
ments of different places and times. It is thus implied, without being 
specific enough, that Australian Muslims can adopt and adhere to the 
same values shared by all Australian people. Using the active involve-
ment of the Australian government with regard to Islamic finance and 
halal food as examples of positive sites of cooperation (for example, the 
exportation of au$1.5 billion worth of halal frozen meat to Indonesia),25 
Patel recommended that multiculturalism in Australia should lead to 
‘legal pluralism’.
The Attorney-General, Robert McClelland, rejected the submission 
and claimed that there was no place for shari῾a in the Gillard govern-
ment’s debate about multicultural policy or in Australian society. This 
claim led to the publication in The Australian on 17 May 2011 of an arti-
cle titled ‘Muslims to push for shari῾a’, and in the following week, thir-
teen articles on the topic were published in three leading newspapers, 
The Australian, The Daily Telegraph and the Sydney Morning Herald. 
Of these articles, eight portrayed a neutral view on the issue, four were 
somewhat negative, and one was somewhat positive. Of the 262 read-
ers’ comments published on the Internet sites of The Australian and The 
Daily Telegraph, 78 per cent were pro-secular and/or against shari῾a, 
6 per cent were pro-shari῾a, and the rest tended to be off-topic state-
ments without any clear meaning. Of the negative comments, 34 per 
cent were virulent comments and/or expressed racist tensions. Exam-
ples of comments of that type were: ‘[w]e have our laws in Australia to 
protect anyone who lives in Australia. If you don’t like our laws leave, 
it’s that simple’, and ‘[i]f Muslims want shari῾a law, they should go back 
to Saudi Arabia’.26
On 17 June 2011, after an interview with The Australian,27 Ikebal Patel 
claimed that it was a mistake to have mentioned shari῾a law and legal 
pluralism. He pointed out that there had also been criticism from inside 
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the Muslim community, which was concerned by the lack of consulta-
tion with regard to his submission, and he underlined that in family 
matters, civil law should always take precedence. 
On 24 November 2011, Luke Simpkins, Liberal mp for the Cowan 
electorate, claimed in the House of Representatives that a poll con-
ducted in his electorate in Western Australia had found that almost all 
animals raised for meat, apart from pigs, are killed according to Islamic 
requirements. He argued that every business involved should clearly 
label halal meat. He stated:
So, when you go to Coles, Woolworths, iga or other supermarkets, 
you cannot purchase the meat for your Aussie barbecue without the 
influence of this minority religion. You have no choice. And the point 
is that almost no Australians are aware of this, because it is not la-
beled. … By having Australians unwittingly eating halal food we are 
all one step down the path towards the conversion, and that is a step 
we should only make with full knowledge and one that should not be 
imposed upon us without us knowing.28
Case study 2:  
Divorce in Australia: from an Islamic law perspective29
In 2011, an article written by Essof, a solicitor and migration agent, 
sparked a national debate on Islamic divorce. According to Essof, the 
current informal Muslim divorce process in Australia, combined with 
civil law divorce requirements, allows men to distort and abuse the cul-
tural system.30 Essof does not advocate a separate legal system for Aus-
tralian Muslims, but rather argues for the incorporation of the single 
aspect of Islamic divorce law. Islam, he argued, does not condone this 
behaviour. Rather, it is a consequence of the current inconsistency be-
tween civil and religious law in Australia, and of the recalcitrance of 
husbands who decline to finalize their religious divorces with their es-
tranged wives. Essof acknowledges that Islamic law operates on an in-
formal basis via imams, or community religious leaders, especially with 
regard to family law matters.
He points out that there are no existing formal structures in the Fam-
ily Law Act to deal with individuals or couples seeking divorce accord-
ing to an Islamic perspective. Although a Muslim man who receives 
only a civil divorce would be at liberty to re-marry, a Muslim woman 
receiving only a civil divorce, and not an Islamic one, would not, within 
her religion, have that same right to re-marry, even though she would 
be allowed it under Australian law.
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To address this issue, Essof proposes the establishment of a council 
of recognized imams and legal practitioners who have knowledge and 
understanding of divorce under both Islamic and Australian law, and 
the formalization of the divorce process in a way that it can be recog-
nized under Australian law. The final recommendation of his article is 
the inclusion of an extra criterion in the divorce application: the appli-
cant should be asked if he or she was married through a religious Mus-
lim ceremony. If the applicant responds in the affirmative, then s/he is 
required to prove to the Registrar that the couple has been divorced 
under shari῾a law. Contrary to Patel’s retraction, wherein he stated that 
civil law should take precedence in family matters, the case presented 
here seems to advocate the reverse.31
Shortly after the publication of Essof ’s article, a newspaper article 
entitled ‘Local Islamists draw on British success in bid for sharia law’,32 
written by the same journalist who reported the retraction by Patel, 
claimed that Essof ’s article was the latest move to give shari῾a priority 
over Australian divorce law under the guise of helping Muslim women, 
and pointed out that this would mean that Muslims would not be able 
to obtain a civil divorce unless they were first divorced under Islamic 
law. In this article the journalist argued that Australia had entered 
an ‘ambitious new phase that draws on the tactics that have handed 
success to Islamists in Britain’, thus claiming that there was a hidden 
agenda behind Essof ’s argument.
The two case studies we have discussed offered a moderate approach 
to legal pluralism in the public sphere. Although we are not discussing 
the nature of their arguments here, we want to underline the fact that 
in Australia and especially in the Australian media, there has not been a 
public dialogue of the Habermasian type (that is, engaged in communi-
cative action; see below) concerning the application of legal pluralism, 
specifically as it applies to shari῾a.
The New Australian Conservative Modernity  
and Its Obstacles to Post-Secularism
The social scientist Jakubowicz33 uses the expression ‘the new Austral-
ian conservative modernity’ to refer to the country’s resurgent social 
values of Christian conservatism, the active government priorities of 
disengagement and a rapidly expanding culture of surveillance and 
obedience. In this new phase of modernity, there is a process of de-
legitimization of diversity, especially concerning Muslims – meaning 
that the process ‘does not deny diversity, but rather seeks to reassert a 
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traditional hierarchy of cultural power within which diversity is only 
acceptable within the dominant moral order’.34 In this process, Fozdar35 
sees a retreat from multiculturalism resulting from the policies of the 
conservative Howard government (1996-2007). In this new Australian 
modernity, political leaders portray ‘Christianity as the norm, as a non-
migrant religion, and as the taken-for-granted foundation for the na-
tion’s values and laws’.36
However, one must be aware of the current situation in Australia 
with regard to its Christian heritage. Randell-Moon37 and Maddox38 
recently demonstrated that in the Australian case (a secular liberal 
society where a strong division between church and state is supposedly 
definitive), religion still has a part to play in politics. In this ‘secular’ 
liberal culture, where religion is often actually a significant factor in 
voting decisions and has increasingly intruded into the public sphere 
since the beginning of the 21st century, one should not be surprised to 
witness the many social and cultural bleeds across the border between 
state and religion. Granted that Christianity was for many years a silent 
backdrop to Australian national identity, Fozdar39 observes that there 
is now an even stronger sense of the legitimacy of the public status of 
Christianity, and one of the illegitimacy of other religious traditions.
Bearing in mind the relationship between the mass media and the 
way political agendas are constructed,40 this new religious project of 
the ‘new modernity’ also affects (and/or is affected by) the media. Black 
and Sadiq41 cite the national newspaper, The Australian, as highlight-
ing ‘differences’ between Muslims and non-Muslims in some Muslim 
countries (with topics such as stoning for adultery, forced marriages 
and female genital mutilation), and as feeding into the fear of what 
shari῾a family law would be in Australia if a dialogue on the subject 
were allowed. While there are demands from some groups in Australia 
for the adoption of full shari῾a,42 Saeed43 states that the large majority 
of Muslims advocating the use of shari῾a are only seeking its recog-
nition in a few areas (such as marriage, burial practices, and interest-
free financing) and are working towards a compromise between the 
demands of their religion and the Australian legal system.
Their detractors tend to present the religion of Muslims as unchang-
ing and as representing a pre-modern and patriarchal value system.44 
These detractors also tend to characterize the Muslim community as 
bounded, fixed and stable.45 This, of course, is far from being the case. 
Akbarzadeh and Roose46 discuss three ideal types of Muslims in Aus-
tralia, in order to provide a lens through which to look at this religious 
group. These are: an Islamist type who would embrace shari῾a in line 
with the historic experience of the caliphate; a moderate Muslim type 
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who engages with the secular West; and a cultural Muslim type – those 
who define themselves as Muslims but do not actively follow Islamic 
principles. Cultural Muslims often have a pragmatic approach to reli-
gion. Islam is celebrated when it helps consolidate a community, but is 
not allowed to interfere and interrupt the daily routine of life, which to 
all intents and purposes may be called secular.47
In Australia, these cultural Muslims are the silent majority of the 
Muslim minority group, not much engaged with advocacy for legal 
change. Those Muslims mainly engaged in working out shari῾a in Aus-
tralia in line with (and not in opposition to) the Australian legal system 
are of the moderate type. Some moderate Muslims are already working 
within a type of unofficial parallel legal system (as detailed above) in the 
private sphere. But when some moderate voices attempt to discuss, in 
the public sphere, how the two legal systems could interact, it appears 
the dialogue is not allowed to proceed. The ‘extreme right’ is already 
seeing the moderate Muslim as a ‘Trojan horse’ for radical Islamists, as 
if they were harbouring a hidden Islamic agenda.48 It might be argued 
that in the public sphere, debate about the partial use of shari῾a leads its 
detractors (who are not necessarily from the extreme right) to believe 
that this might be a first step towards implanting full shari῾a law, as 
if shari῾a were a homogenous and timeless law straight from the cali-
phate. This belief is not conducive to a fruitful dialogue about the future 
of religion in Australia that would be helpful in advancing a post- 
secular project.
By post-secularism, we refer to the process of the de-privatization 
of religion, and to the current dialogue about managing the presence 
of religious groups within secular frameworks in the public sphere. As 
Habermas49 has underlined, the challenge today is to draw the ‘delimi-
tations between a positive liberty to practise a religion of one’s own and 
the negative liberty to remain spared from the religious practice of the 
others’. In other words, how do we work with post-secular societies’ 
religious toleration in ways that celebrate religious diversity but that 
do not preclude the freedom to be atheist? And, more specifically to 
this chapter, how far should our own and others’ religious practices be 
implicated within the legal system?
However, as already indicated in this chapter, one should be aware 
of the difficulties of entering into such a dialogue. Michele Dillon, in 
her 2009 presidential address to the Association for the Sociology of 
Religion, stated quite sharply that ‘independent[ly] of whether an indi-
vidual is religious or not, tolerance of otherness does not come easily’,50 
that openness to alternative beliefs is more complicated than Haber-
mas might have us believe, and that the idea that all religious and athe-
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ist groups can live in a self-reflective manner ‘is attractive but hard to 
imagine’.51 Part of the solution for Habermas is to have neutral and sec-
ular governments that can ensure that communities of various beliefs 
can coexist on an equal basis. His post-secular project is based upon the 
notion that the state is neutral and objective,52 yet we know from stud-
ies in sociology how the state usually and instrumentally serves certain 
groups over others, as has already been alluded to in the above discus-
sion of Australia and its new conservative modernity.
It appears that in Australia, one aspect of the trend towards post-sec-
ularism, that is the focus on religious and legal pluralism, is not allowed 
to be fully aired in the public sphere, unless to be shown in a negative 
light. On that point, it can be argued that Australia is failing to meet or 
implement the post-secular project. The issue here is not solely about 
including shari῾a in the legal system or preventing its use in the private 
or public sphere, but about having a fruitful dialogue of the Haberma-
sian type in the public sphere. This is not happening in Australia’s new 
conservative modernity.
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4 United Kingdom
An Early Discussion on Islamic Family Law  
in the English Jurisdiction1
 Jørgen S. Nielsen
Background
In 1975 the Union of Muslim Organisations of the United Kingdom and 
Eire (umo) called a conference in Birmingham to discuss the place of 
shari῾a family law in England. In January 1977 the umo, together with 
the Anglo-Conservative Society, held a further meeting, this time in 
the House of Lords. The meeting discussed a number of practical issues 
facing Muslims, in particular those relating to schooling. But the main 
item on the agenda was a demand for the ‘domestication’ of Islamic 
family law for Muslims in Britain.2
In 1975 the Muslim case for the demand had been formulated by 
Sheikh Syed M. Darsh, an Azhar-educated Egyptian who had recently 
been seconded by the Egyptian authorities to the Regent’s Park Mosque 
in London:
When a Muslim is prevented from obeying this law he feels that he is 
failing a religious duty. He will not feel at peace with his conscience or 
the environment in which he lives…. They firmly believe that the Brit-
ish society, with its rich experience of different cultures and ways of 
life, especially the Islamic way of life which they used to see in India, 
Malaysia, Nigeria and so many other nations of Islamic orientation, 
together with their respect for personal and communal freedom, will 
enable the Muslim migrants to realize the identity within the freedom 
of British society. When we request the host society to recognize our 
point of view we are appealing to a tradition of justice and equity well 
established in this country. The scope of the family law is not wide 
and does not contradict, in essence, the law here in this country. Both 
aim at the fulfillment of justice and happiness of the members of the 
family. Still, there are certain Islamic points which, with understand-
ing and the spirit of accommodation, would not go so far as to create 
difficulties in the judiciary system. After all, we are asking for their 
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application among themselves, the Muslim community, as our Chris-
tian brothers in Islamic countries are following in the family tradition 
and the Christian point of view. The Qur’an itself has given them this 
right.3
At the time, the umo initiative attracted only fleeting interest in 
the media, and within the legal institutions there was no significant 
response. Dr Zaki Badawi, the then director of the Islamic Cultural 
Centre, part of the Regent’s Park Mosque complex, while not support-
ive, decided to test popular demand. In English law there was no reason 
why someone could not write a will requiring that his or her property 
be disposed of according to Islamic principles. It just had to be clear as 
to which version of Islamic law (or shari῾a) to use, so that there was no 
room for ambiguity. Such a will would be valid unless a relative con-
tested it. Dr Badawi had a will form prepared by competent lawyers and 
made it available to worshippers. No one took advantage of the service.4 
Perhaps this was not all that surprising, as the Muslim community in 
Britain, as in the rest of Europe, was at the time still relatively young 
of age. Only a decade later did questions of disposition of property at 
death start to become a practical issue for a growing number of peo-
ple. Thus, we saw tensions begin to be recorded in France between the 
expectations of Algerians and the demands of French law with regard 
to the disposition of immovable property.5
At the time, evidence of Muslim demand for the application of 
Islamic family law was patchy and remained so until the end of the 
1980s. A quick check through a few Islamic magazines published in 
Europe during the 1980s found little evidence of interest in the sub-
ject. The Straight Path, published in Birmingham from the Green Lane 
Mosque, and closely associated with the Ahl-i-Hadith movement, only 
mentioned an interest in Islamic family law in response to external 
events. During this same period, the question of Islamic family law did 
not feature in the pages of Al-Fadschr, published by the Shi’ite Islamic 
Centre in Hamburg, nor was it raised in the Dutch monthly Qiblah, 
published in The Hague. Even the journal of the network of German-
speaking Muslims, Al-Islam, published in Munich, did not deal with 
the question, even though it regularly carried general articles about 
shari῾a. In the late 1980s the umo’s initiative remained, to the best of 
my knowledge, the only one.
The impression was that the demand for implementation of Islamic 
family law for Muslims in Europe was usually only expressed by Mus-
lim leaders when offered an opportunity to do so, or when reacting 
to particular events. Much attention was paid to the overarching role 
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of the shari῾a, but when interpreted in practical terms, the magazines 
concentrated on the core ritual practices (the ‘five pillars’), economic 
life and the ethics rather than the law of family life, especially as regards 
the position of women.
However, a Muslim ‘demand’ for the implementation of Islamic fam-
ily law can be registered in ways other than direct expressions by lead-
ers and in their media. Throughout this early period, it was clear that 
the practice of paying a dower, mahr, remained commonplace. English 
legal expertise suggested at the beginning of the 1980s that English law 
would condone it when it appeared in a Muslim marriage contract.6 
Rude-Antoine, writing in the mid-1980s, indicated that over three-
quarters of marriages between North Africans living in France involved 
payment of mahr.7 The recurring problem in Britain of so-called limp-
ing marriages (that is, where a civil divorce has taken place but the 
absence of a religious divorce prevents the woman from remarrying 
in a form acceptable to her community) was another indicator, as was 
the high proportion of Muslim marriages that were formalized both 
in civil law terms and in Islamic terms. The breakdown of marriages, 
in particular, was an early matter of concern. Unpublished research 
conducted in the Birmingham family courts in the early 1980s showed 
that four out of five divorce applications from parties with Muslim-
sounding names were initiated by women, and the two most common 
grounds for divorce applications were the husband’s violence against 
the wife or his abandoning or deserting her.8
That there was a growing demand for some kind of shari῾a-related 
provision, or at least a perception that there was such a demand, was 
indicated by the formation in the early 1980s of the first two – rival – 
United Kingdom Islamic Sharia Councils, both located in London. 
These councils made themselves available to advise individuals on cor-
rect shari῾a solutions to personal and family problems and, if necessary, 
to issue a decision which, at least in the community if not in civil law, 
might have the weight of authority. There were also other, more visible 
indications that Muslims were expecting the institutions of the coun-
tries of residence to adapt to some of their religious requirements, other 
than those of family law. The issue that had been most common was 
that of access to halal food. Furthermore, English schools were in the 
main adjusting well to Muslim girls wearing some form of Islamically 
acceptable dress, while the question of the hijab in mainland Europe 
was still a few years off. Also, local governments in the United King-
dom were beginning to meet requests for burial facilities, and employ-
ers and local planning authorities were being faced with requests for 
prayer facilities.9
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Seeking clarification
It was the question of family law in particular that contributed to set-
ting the agenda for a three-year project which had been instigated by 
the Brussels-based Churches’ Committee for Migrant Workers in Eu-
rope (ccmwe) to consider the significance of the shari῾a for Muslim 
communities in Europe.10 The working group started work in 1983 and 
consisted of four members nominated by the ccmwe: Jan Henningsson 
(Sweden), Michael Mildenberger (West Germany), Jan Slomp (Nether-
lands), and myself (United Kingdom). Two Muslim members were in-
vited to join the group, namely Syed Darsh (uk) and Mehdi Razvi (West 
Germany).
Given the limited resources of a European (Protestant) church net-
work working in this field, the possibility of a study that would meet 
academic criteria was never considered. Instead, the project was con-
ducted as a ‘listening exercise’ consisting of three parts: a question-
naire sent to interested ‘experts’ known to the members of the working 
group; a series of four seminars, two each at the Quaker Woodbrooke 
College, Birmingham, United Kingdom, and at the Evangelische Aka-
demie, Arnoldshain, West Germany; and correspondence with invited 
religious and academic experts at the drafting stage of the final report. 
In this way, by the end, the exercise had involved a total of 95 individu-
als. Most were from Germany and the United Kingdom, but a few were 
also from France, the Netherlands and Sweden. They included not only 
Muslim and Christian religious leaders and scholars, but also practising 
lawyers and local and national government officials.
The first stage of the work was to draft a questionnaire to be sent to 
a number of significant Muslim individuals and organizations around 
Western Europe to get their views on shari῾a generally and, more specif-
ically, its family law dimensions. The questionnaire asked five questions:
1 What does shari῾a mean for you personally?
2 What does shari῾a mean for your community in this country?
3 What do you see as the function of shari῾a in your home country 
and in the Muslim world generally?
4 Does your understanding of shari῾a create problems for yourself 
and your community in this country? If so, which?
5 What contributions do you see shari῾a making to European society?
The questionnaire was answered by sixteen persons, of whom eleven 
were Muslims from three different European countries (the United 
Kingdom, West Germany and the Netherlands) and originating from 
eight different Muslim countries, and with a variety of different back- 
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grounds and occupations. There is no space here to analyse the 
responses in detail,11 but they covered a broad spectrum of views, 
ranging from those that required a comprehensive implementation of 
shari῾a to those that suggested that it cannot apply in a non-Muslim 
environment such as that of Western Europe, or that shari῾a needs a 
thorough rethink in relation to the modern world before any consid-
eration of its implementation. Many of the respondents preferred to 
talk of shari῾a as an ethical system rather than something with legal 
implications.
Worth noting is that none of the respondents wanted to define 
shari῾a as a legal code, although the implications of some of the answers 
to the subsequent questions suggested that in an ideal world this might 
be close: shari῾a to one respondent meant ‘the Law of God which 
was revealed by Him to mankind through His Prophet and Apostle 
Muhammad in order to be observed by them in every time and place 
as any individual (or group) with faith in Islam as his (its) religion.’ 
But others simply equated it with religion, giving ‘the direction to life 
and formulating one’s disposition’. Many of the respondents pointed out 
that the implementation of shari῾a should take account of the context, 
and some particularly stressed the necessity of this in the context of 
modernity, not least in the minority situations of Europe: ‘new fiqh has 
to be written for the Muslim countries themselves and much more so 
for Muslim minorities living now in non-Muslim countries.’
One response described the process of a growing consensus among 
the manifold Muslim community which ought to be brought about by 
concentrating upon the essentials of shari῾a and carefully adjusting them 
to the new situation, according to methods provided by the Islamic tra-
dition. Such processes may suffer from the confusion ‘between the per-
manent divine law … and the human elaboration’ and, consequently, 
by ‘some hasty and mistaken judgments’ hinder the ‘healthy mutual 
interaction with the society’ of the host-country. It should be kept in 
mind that ‘Islam indicates its basics and characteristics, but it does 
not meanwhile reject any other intellectual or social outcome which 
is not against its principles’. Moreover ‘a clear distinction may be kept 
between the application of shari῾a in a Muslim country and society, and 
its application among a Muslim community which lives as a minority 
in a non-Muslim country.’ Accordingly, two answers emphasize that in 
such a case, shari῾a can only be applied within a scope determined by 
the constitution and the laws of the host country. By contrast there is a 
group of Muslims (among them mainly converts) which ‘will take the 
shari῾a “lock, stock and barrel” … and defying British law where they 
don’t feel it is Islamic, e.g. marriage and divorce laws’.12
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A significant concern was voiced by a number of the respondents 
who pointed to secularization as the big challenge; the ‘real prob-
lem’, however, is ‘far more serious and fundamental’. Western Europe 
is increasingly becoming a ‘non-religious and even irreligious society 
with norms which a Muslim finds difficult to comprehend, let alone 
accept’. This is a second level of problems that Muslims – as they remind 
us – share with their Christian brethren and sisters. ‘The secular society 
emits values which a Muslim does not share or accept’.13
As a next step, the working group organized four seminars, two in 
Germany and two in Birmingham. The participants comprised Muslim 
and Christian intellectuals and community leaders, legal experts, and 
government officials. Given that the issue had been raised in the United 
Kingdom and at that time was not really exciting any interest outside the 
United Kingdom, the following account will be limited to the discus-
sions at the two seminars that took place in Birmingham over two week-
ends in February and September 1985. The first event was attended by 
about twenty people, who had been personally invited, while the second 
attracted thirty people following a public announcement. The first semi-
nar focused on family law, while the second one looked at implications 
for legal institutions and processes, as well as at broad, practical issues 
of integration in a multi-faith society (including education and reli-
gious practice in the workplace) which I will not deal with further here.
Considering family law, this was examined in the first seminar 
under the standard headings of marriage, divorce, inheritance, and the 
maintenance and custody of children. The participants first surveyed 
the general principles of English law as it stood at the time and of the 
Islamic legal tradition, before going on to an item-by-item comparison. 
As an example, the participants compared the principles of the Hanafi 
tradition of divorce as it was being applied in Pakistan after the Muslim 
Family Law Ordinance of 1961, and the English Matrimonial Causes 
Act of 1973 (see Table 1). A similar exercise was conducted on the basic 
principles of marriage (see Table 2). They concluded that in general 
terms, there was little dispute in principle between the two sets of prin-
ciples. But there remained two major tensions.
With reference to divorce, Muslim participants wanted the collec-
tion and evaluation (‘due consideration’) of the facts required by Eng-
lish law to be conducted by a Muslim panel for Muslim litigants. The 
panel, it was argued, could function under the existing law as an exten-
sion of the Family Division of the High Court. This was an option on 
which the non-Muslim participants were divided.14
In the case of marriage, it was the Muslim participants who were 
divided, in that some did not wish to give up the age of puberty as 
AUP_Berger_vierde.indd   84 19-4-2013   12:25:33
united kingdom 85
being sufficient to enter into a marriage, while others, following the 
legislation of most Muslim countries, were happy to accept the mini-
mum age set down in English law. The question of marriage guardians 
for women, required by the traditional shari῾a though under varying 
conditions depending on the school, was quietly ignored.
table 1 Grounds for dissolution of marriage
England Pakistan
        Grounds:
Irretrievable breakdown of marriage Incompatibility
        Facts:
- unreasonable behaviour - unreasonable behaviour
- adultery/intolerable - intolerable
- desertion - imprisonment for 7 years or more
- separation for 2 years (consent) - disappeared for 4 years or more
- separation for 5 years - husband’s inability to maintain
        Grounds for nullity:
- physical/mental disorder - physical/mental disorder
- lack of consent - lack of consent
- under age - under age
table 2 Conditions for marriage
England Pakistan
- free consent - free consent
- sound mind - sound mind
- public announcement - public announcement
- witnesses - witnesses
- age 16-18 (parental or court consent) - age: puberty
- unmarried - unmarried if woman:  
husband max. 4 wives
- dower (mahr)
Interestingly, the issue of polygamy was not one that raised tempers. 
There was consensus among the participants that ‘polygamy is, of 
course, impermissible in English law.’ However, looking at the prac-
tice of English law relating to cohabitees (‘common law spouses’), the 
participants did ‘not feel the discrepancy between English and Islamic 
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family law in this regard is insurmountable.’15 Other Muslim partici-
pants took the view that since polygamy is not obligatory in Islam, liv-
ing in a system in which it is banned should not be a problem for Mus-
lims.
A practical problem on both sides, Muslim and non-Muslim, 
seemed to be the general popular ignorance of the law of Islam. In the 
Muslim community this manifested itself typically in a popular equa-
tion of social custom, often very strongly held, with shari῾a. What are 
often broadly perceived by the English population as strongly male-
dominant practices are, as often as not, just as much in conflict with 
shari῾a as they are with English law and expectations. A point made 
with some effect by the Muslim participants was that the application 
of Islamic family law to the Muslim community would lead to a major 
improvement in the actual social status of women within many Muslim 
communities. Of course, this is, on the whole, correct, but by European 
standards of gender equality it would be insufficient, as some basic dis-
tinctions and inequalities would be retained in the fields of divorce and 
inheritance.
The issue of how to introduce some form or other of shari῾a into the 
English legal system revolved around two main approaches. For some 
Muslims, the nature of the shari῾a as a total, integrated system based on 
sources divinely revealed makes it extremely difficult to accept anything 
other than a separate system of family law, with its own autonomous 
judiciary. Parliament’s role would be to make the space in the country’s 
law and to establish the necessary courts. But the specific content of 
the law could not be under the control of Parliament, nor could there 
be appeal to higher, non-Muslim courts. The system envisaged would 
be much like that which functions in countries like Lebanon, Syria and 
Israel, which still retain elements of the old Ottoman millet system, 
with its self-governing confessional communities. At the other extreme 
is the model of a continuing unified system, but with the law opened 
up in a number of directions so as to create a generally permissive legal 
context in which different groups could voluntarily live according to 
their particular wishes. An example could be the theoretically possible 
legalization of polygamy, within which framework a Muslim could, if 
he so wished, enter into a polygamous marriage.
Another view expressed by some Muslim participants looked to the 
contents of the law, rather than its theologically overriding nature. In 
their view it was possible to build on the identified convergence of le-
gal principles and look to some method of building consideration of 
Islamic rules and expectations into the existing system of law. The con-
cept of a tribunal became central in the discussions, although clearly, 
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different kinds of tribunal were intended by different participants. Some 
saw potential in distinct Islamic family tribunals before which Muslims 
could opt to appear. It was accepted by some, but not all, that the deci-
sions of such tribunals could be subject to appeal into the general Eng-
lish system. Another view of such tribunals was one of a quasi-judicial 
body that would deal with cases with the purpose of presenting to the 
English family courts a settlement which takes into account considera-
tion of Islamic rules. It was felt that one of the advantages of some form 
of tribunal was that it could be seen as a method to be utilized by other 
communities, such as Jews and Catholics, with a similar attachment to 
religious family law.
The possibility that a reform of the adversarial court procedures, 
which in the mid-1980s still prevailed in the family courts but were 
under discussion, was seen as providing a context in which some vari-
ation of the tribunal approach might become practicable. In a uni-
form system of family courts based on arbitration and reconciliation, 
a particular bench might be identified as Muslim, and parties could 
opt to appear before a bench of their choice. This might ensure that 
Muslim expectations were taken into account within a legal system that 
remained essentially unified.
Issues and implications
Despite the passing years, the discussion then, just as similar discus-
sions now, raises a number of substantial questions. For a start, ques-
tions can be raised about the degree of consensus needed to be able to 
reach a unified Muslim family code. In fact, it depended on a number 
of assumptions: first, that the discussion of philosophical and ideologi-
cal foundations was suspended; second, that both sides accepted the 
context of a plural and diverse society with room for all; and third, that 
the Muslim participants, although generally traditionalists, did not feel 
bound by the results of classical jurisprudence (fiqh) and were prepared 
to exercise their personal judgment (ijtihad) in the light of the current 
environment.
Some observers might argue that such assumptions by themselves 
contribute to making the results of no operational interest, because 
such assumptions will generally not be met in actuality. The second 
assumption, that of living together in a diverse society has, I would sug-
gest, become broadly accepted, despite the recent attacks on multi-cul-
turalism from certain political quarters. The arguments today are more 
about concepts and ideological polemics than about the ordinary prac-
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ticalities of everyday life in the cities. The third assumption, the Muslim 
readiness to use ijtihad, is one that has a sound classical foundation and 
is one of the key characteristics of most contemporary Islamic move-
ments, even when they are of the more conservative kind.
More problematical is the first assumption, namely that the discus-
sion of philosophical and ideological foundations of a unified Muslim 
family code is suspended. The apparent contradiction is between a sec-
ularized Europe, whose legislative and judicial processes are primarily 
empirical in nature and rest on the foundations of popular sovereignty 
(although the historical foundations are clearly Christian), and on the 
other hand an Islamic system which is founded on the revelation of the 
word of God in the Qur’an and on the guiding behaviour and sayings of 
an inspired prophet, a system in which the law rests on the sovereignty 
of God. In fact, I would suggest that the difficulty here is more apparent 
than real. Even though God is the sovereign lawgiver, his authority still 
has to be interpreted, and this is a human process. This issue lies at the 
very centre of much current Muslim discussion about the role of Islam 
in the state. The real difficulty is not to be found in the clash between 
secularism and divine sovereignty but in the question of the identity of 
the judicial authority and its legitimacy. This is a dimension of an area 
of Islamic thinking which has undergone a radical transformation in 
recent generations – and which is still contested.
This transformation can be briefly described as follows. In the classi-
cal tradition the shari῾a and its institutions had been the primary field 
of confrontation between the political power and the Islamic authori-
ties, the former in the shape of an often militarized state and the latter 
in the shape of the religious scholars, or ‘ulama, and their institutions. 
The conception that God was the lawgiver in a polity or community 
defined primarily by its shared religion was the focal point of public 
legitimacy. Early attempts by the political leadership in the shape of 
the Umayyad and then the early Abbasid caliphs to present themselves 
as the representatives of that divine legislative power failed. It was the 
‘ulama who came to be accepted as those who held the authority to 
interpret, develop and refine the human understanding of the divine 
will. One of the most remarkable aspects of developments in shari῾a in 
the modern period has been the extent to which the state has succeeded 
in gaining control of legislation, including family law. It has done this 
partly by manipulating the various instruments of power, hard and soft, 
and partly by pursuing the one technique that had traditionally been 
available, namely control over the incomes of the ‘ulama. In the mod-
ern period this has been done by co-opting them as judges and experts 
in family law in the now government-controlled courts and by spon-
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soring training in the Islamic religious sciences, including law/fiqh in 
government-funded universities. In historical terms, this intrusion of 
the state in the field of shari῾a is truly radical. This contributes to com-
plications in Europe, where some Islamic tendencies will refuse to lend 
the state legitimacy, at least in core sectors of the shari῾a such as family 
law, while others will seek to co-opt the official institutions to legitimize 
practices whose validity in the community rest on a reference to the 
shari῾a.
Other significant changes have taken place in the practice and think-
ing of shari῾a, all in one way or another related to that basic revolu-
tion. One is the culmination of a long process whereby the shari῾a had 
been increasingly restricted to the domain of family law. However, there 
was a shift around the 1960s, when Islamic thinkers and movements 
began to try to regain ground. In various instances, one saw attempts 
to reintroduce aspects of shari῾a beyond the family chapters, as is illus-
trated by the growth of Islamic banking and economics both in practice 
and as an intellectual discipline across the Muslim world and into the 
major international banking centres outside the Muslim world.16 In all 
of these innovations, the state has been an active partner. In some cases 
the political leadership has been the initiator, and in other cases the 
innovators have made what are often great efforts to get the state on 
board. In such an environment, it is the more radical-puritanical move-
ments17 which have marked out their claims to legitimacy by distanc-
ing themselves from the state, reasserting the independence of Islamic 
teaching, above all the shari῾a, from the control of the political authori-
ties.
But these radical movements themselves also represent a revolu-
tionary break with the classical tradition’s division of the world into 
the ‘territory of Islam’ (dar al-islam) and the ‘territory of war’ (dar al-
harb). Generally this division of the world lost its significance, except 
for possibly a symbolic dimension, in the course of the 20th century, 
as traditional Islamic states were first colonized and then replaced by 
modern national states (although the national substance of such states 
has tended to remain weak). In the classical tradition it was generally 
agreed that shari῾a only applied in dar al-islam where there was a legiti-
mate Islamic authority, and where there were Islamic courts that could 
adjudicate disputes in the correct manner and legitimately. This meant 
that when Muslims travelled outside the Islamic lands, they were no 
longer subject to shari῾a, or at least not to those parts which had to do 
with human and social relations. If possible, the religious rituals were 
still to be performed, although a few voices suggested that even this was 
not necessary.
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The main difference between the majority of Muslims and the 
minority of radical-puritans today is that the latter regard the modern 
state as irrelevant and lacking legitimacy.18 They have often discarded 
the traditional geographical distinctions of dar al-islam/al-harb and 
personalized them: dar al-islam is where they are, while dar al-harb is 
the fallen world around them.19 The authors of the ccme project report 
were perhaps being premature when they concluded that, ‘Most Mus-
lim leaders in Europe today regard the old concepts of dar al-harb and 
dar al-islam as outmoded and irrelevant.’20 Although the terminology 
is mainly used in small, mostly politically extremist circles, elements 
of such thinking can be found more widely. With the shift from a ter-
ritorial towards a personal paradigm, it has become possible to argue 
within the traditional Islamic frameworks that shari῾a (or perhaps 
more correctly here, fiqh) potentially applies to Muslims wherever they 
are, thus making possible claims that Muslims in new minority con-
texts should also strive to practise the shari῾a, not only in rite but also 
in other chapters. First and foremost, this includes family and personal 
status law, but also economic law – and, the hard-liners would argue, 
also in such areas as tort and possibly criminal law.
In the context of such a discussion, it is the authority under which 
a judicial process functions, rather than the substance of the law itself, 
which becomes a key consideration. This partly accounts for the inter-
nal Muslim disagreement in the 1985 seminars about the nature of a 
tribunal or a court that might be asked to adjudicate Muslim family 
law disputes. For some participants it was clearly not enough that the 
existing English family court system takes Islamic expectations into 
account. The court dealing with Muslim family disputes should itself 
be Muslim in its character and staffing. There was further disagreement 
on the matter of appeal among those who took this view, some insist-
ing that an appeal either not be allowed or be allowed only to a higher 
Muslim tribunal. In fact, this view was probably also a reflection of the 
experience of Muslim family courts under British rule in India before 
1947. Muslim family cases, like all other cases, could in those days ulti-
mately be appealed to the Judiciary Committee of the Privy Council in 
London. There were instances of the higher courts in India, and of the 
Privy Council, either over-ruling a decision with reference to common 
law principles of equity or holding to a decision which was in effect 
a misunderstanding of rulings in the classical Hanafi tradition.21 Such 
unhappy results for Muslim scholars should be avoided, if possible.
Such lack of trust in the intent of European authorities can clearly 
be traced back to colonial experiences. The suspicions vary in strength 
and character in different parts of the Muslim world and are probably 
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stronger among, for example, Algerians than among Muslims from the 
Indian subcontinent. Basically this leads to the conclusion that Euro-
pean authorities cannot be trusted to consider Muslim practices fairly 
and correctly. This suspicion is mirrored from the European side. The 
implementation of Islamic family law is often interpreted as a politi-
cal manoeuvre with a variety of purposes. There is little doubt that the 
demand for shari῾a has been voiced from some quarters as part of an 
internal rivalry for leadership among the Muslim minorities. Equally 
there is little doubt that the demand is also part of the process of cul-
tivating links between European Muslim communities and major for-
eign Muslim sponsors, some but not all of them being states.
The Discussion Continues
The seminars of 1985 and the project of which they were part have not 
lost their relevance. The issues that were identified then are still with 
us today:
- What is meant by Islamic family law?
- How compatible are shari῾a family law rules with European prac-
tice?
- Who decides what Islamic family law rules are in a particular coun-
try?
- Who would be responsible for implementation?
- Who might be subject to it?
- How far is the demand driven by sectional interests?
- How do European democratic and human rights traditions deal 
with this issue, especially with regard to gender equality?
Most of these questions are far more technical than can be dealt with in 
the remainder of this chapter, but several of the other chapters in this 
volume touch on them. Let me here elaborate on the current disagree-
ments among Muslims regarding the legitimacy of the authority seek-
ing to implement family law.
Just as it was in England that the issue was first raised, so it is in 
England that it has remained most acute, and certainly where it has 
attracted most attention. Not long before the 1985 seminars were held, 
the first two uk Islamic Sharia Councils were established in London. 
They reflected both political and doctrinal differences, although a few 
of the members served on both councils. One represented a modern-
izing approach to the field and was an initiative of Dr Zaki Badawi, 
well-known for looking for constructive ways of integrating Islam into 
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the European environment. The other was sponsored by the Muslim 
World League, representing a line close to Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabi ver-
sion of Islam. Numerous anecdotal accounts indicate that they were 
primarily engaged with cases of women seeking an ‘Islamic’ approval of 
a divorce. Since then, there has been a multiplication of Sharia Coun-
cils and, in the most recent decade, also the innovation of the Muslim 
Arbitration Tribunal.22 Whereas the legal status of the decisions of the 
Councils is unclear, the Tribunal explicitly operates under English law, 
particularly the Arbitration Act of 1996. The issue of contention is the 
following.
Since an Islamically conducted marriage (nikah) has no legal stand-
ing in England, it follows in principle that such a marriage cannot be 
dissolved in the usual way through the family courts. In effect, it is up 
to the parties to decide how seriously to take their nikah if they decide 
to end the relationship. It appears that a majority of Muslim couples 
who get married in the civil process also get married by nikah. Among 
many of the Muslim cultural traditions, the civil marriage is regarded 
as something akin to an ‘engagement’ which only becomes a full mar-
riage with the nikah.23 It is with respect to this background that prob-
lems arise with divorce, as many will regard a divorce by the normal 
civil procedure to be inadequate. They will therefore want an Islamic 
divorce both for their own satisfaction and for the divorce to be rec-
ognized in the community. Traditionally such a divorce can be pro-
nounced unilaterally by the husband (talaq), while the wife needs to go 
through some form of judicial process (khul‘).
Different Islamic bodies have different views on this. According 
to research carried out at Cardiff University, the Birmingham Sharia 
Council accepts a civil divorce as valid and simply offers confirmation, 
if the parties so wish:
… the shari῾ah Council regard the obtaining of a civil divorce as clear 
evidence of the parties’ view that the marriage is over, and for the 
shari῾ah Council, this is conclusive, such that it does not deem it nec-
essary to grant a religious divorce to enable the parties to remarry 
under shari῾a (although it will do so to reflect the parties’ wishes for 
‘recognition’ by the Council of the ending of their marriage).24
This degree of accommodation is unusual. Much more common is the 
view that for a divorce to be valid in Islamic terms it needs to be con-
ducted under an Islamic authority, particularly if it is initiated by the 
wife in the form of a khul‘. This is stated unequivocally in a fatwa on 
the Internet:
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I would like to affirm that the divorce issued by the civil court in re-
sponse to the wife’s request is neither a valid divorce nor legitimate 
marriage dissolution. This means that such a wife remains a wife and is 
not free to marry another man. Marrying another man while the origi-
nal marriage is still in place is a violation of Islamic law and a crime.25
The uk Islamic Sharia Council takes a similar view but is more careful 
in its invitation to Muslims to use its services:
The Council conducts Islamic divorces only: it does not conduct cases 
as part of the uk legal or judicial systems: for advice regarding a civil 
divorce, please consult a qualified, legal representative.26
The Muslim Arbitration Tribunal (mat), established in 2007, has set 
out to solve the problem of tensions between shari῾a expectations and 
the English judicial process by seeking to operate under the terms of 
the 1996 Arbitration Act. Ultimately its decisions are therefore subject 
to the English courts, should a party be dissatisfied with the process or 
the result. The language used by the mat is ambiguous. Its description 
of its procedures refers to ‘the Tribunal’.27 However, in a recent docu-
ment on forced marriages it regularly uses the term ‘Judges’.28 It is also 
clear from this document that the mat sees itself not just as a forum for 
Alternative Dispute Resolution,29 but also a potential partner or advisor 
to the authorities in solving difficult problems, in this case forced mar-
riages.30 mat has thus formally located itself under the ultimate judi-
cial authority of the English (non-Muslim) courts. This lies close to the 
main option suggested by the participants in the 1985 seminars, namely 
an attempt to create a judicial forum, in the mat case a quasi-judicial 
one, which would have Islamic authority while situated within the for-
mal English system, although one step removed by seeking to function 
as arbitration. For the same reason, the mat project is opposed by the 
various shari῾a councils for theological reasons – mat is simply not suf-
ficiently independent of the non-Islamic state – although one is entitled 
to suggest that political rivalries also have a role to play.
But England is no longer alone in facing this challenge. In his recent 
study on Muslims in France, John Bowen refers to French Muslim 
debates about halal and haram marriages.31 At one end of the spectrum 
are those Muslims who refuse to have anything to do with ‘kafir mar-
riage’ and live together solely with a nikah. At the other end of the spec-
trum is a practice pursued by many imams, also in Belgium, namely 
agreeing to perform a nikah, so long as a civil marriage has already 
been conducted32 – thus accepting to operate within the civil legisla-
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tion. There is also evidence that a number of imams give in to parties 
who insist on having what they call a halal marriage, and then possibly 
going on to a civil marriage at some time later, a practice which carries 
a possible prison sentence for the imam. Some French Muslim scholars 
argue that the conditions for a valid French marriage are quite valid 
also in Islamic terms, so there should not be a problem – but again it is 
the question of whether the authority formalizing the marriage can be 
regarded as Islamically legitimate.
Recently conducted research in Denmark (unfortunately only in 
Danish) shows that these questions are also relevant there.33 The most 
common practice in all generations and across the ethnic groups, 
according to this report, is that an Islamic marriage is conducted. Many 
of these are not formalized as valid civil marriages, although here there 
are substantial ethnic differences, with the absence of civil marriages 
being most common among Somalis and least among Turks. Dissolu-
tion of such nikah marriages, with or without an accompanying civil 
marriage, is usually conducted through some form of informal arbitra-
tion involving family members and/or an imam. This can be particu-
larly difficult for women, especially in cultural contexts that are often 
very unhappy about divorce of any kind. This situation is encumbered 
by a Danish political-legal environment which is much more reluctant 
than that of England to countenance cultural flexibility in this area.
In conclusion, it could be argued that the tensions regarding the wish 
for some form of shari῾a family law principles to apply among Muslims 
living in Europe are – yet another – consequence of Europe’s past impe-
rial adventures. The shift of political, legal and cultural primacy to the 
European imperial centres from the mid-18th century until the late 20th 
century contributed, firstly, to the freezing of the historically natural 
evolution of family law with changes in Muslim society and, secondly, 
to Islamic family law becoming the symbol par excellence of Islamic 
resistance to the imperial projects and their consequences. The argu-
ments over the place of shari῾a in Europe therefore have deep symbolic 
meanings associated with minority identities, which we can only hope 
to overcome during a long period of negotiation and trial and error.
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5 The Netherlands
Applying Shari῾a to Family Law Issues in the Netherlands
Susan Rutten
Introduction
According to the latest official count, there were 837,000 Muslims in 
the Netherlands in 2007.1 Muslims therefore make up between 5 and 6 
per cent of the entire population. The majority still possesses a foreign 
nationality, often in addition to their Dutch nationality.2
When considering the application of shari῾a to matters of family law 
in the Netherlands, a distinction may be made between the application 
of shari῾a by the authorities under the Dutch national legal order, on 
the one hand, and application of shari῾a among Muslims themselves 
within the informal social legal order, on the other hand. In the for-
mer situation, Muslims are subjected by the State to shari῾a family law; 
in the latter, Muslims are subjected to Dutch secular law, but observe 
shari῾a principles within the informal social legal order.
Formal application of Shari῾a
With regard to the first category, application of shari῾a under the na-
tional legal system, two features of the Dutch legal order must be taken 
into account. The first is that religious legal systems, which may ex-
ist and co-exist in other countries, are not allowed in the Dutch legal 
order, as Dutch law is secular law. There is separation of Church and 
State, meaning that State law cannot be based on religious principles 
and State authorities may not impose religious norms on citizens. The 
second feature concerns the way in which the law governing family is-
sues is organized in the Netherlands, whereby family disputes may be 
resolved at different levels.
First, they may be resolved according to the rules of private interna-
tional law. Rules of private international law apply where a case relat-
ing to family law is considered to have an international character. As 
a result, foreign law may enter into the Dutch legal order in two ways: 
either through recognition of relationships or decisions established 
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abroad or through application of foreign law by the Dutch authorities. 
Quite often, Dutch rules on private international family law still refer 
to the law of a person’s nationality. If that foreign law still observes, or 
is based on, shari῾a law, the Dutch authorities apply shari῾a rules indi-
rectly.
The second level at which family law is applied is that of foreign 
diplomatic authorities. These can be consulted by foreign nationals in 
relation to all kinds of matters, such as the conclusion of a marriage and 
the establishment of a marriage contract, including agreement between 
the spouses on such matters as the dower, the establishment of parent-
age, reconciliation attempts, other family disputes, and matters of suc-
cession. The fact that diplomatic authorities can intervene in all kinds 
of family affairs and mediate or, to a large extent, indirectly decide in 
accordance with the principles of shari῾a, seems to diminish the need 
among Muslims to have their disputes resolved by Islamic religious 
authorities in informal settings.
The third level is the level of Dutch substantive law, which in itself 
offers a variety of possibilities for introducing shari῾a concepts.
Informal application of Shari῾a
With regard to the informal application of shari῾a among Muslims 
themselves, there is no general legal impediment to this practice. So 
long as the limits set by the national legal system are respected, peo-
ple are free to conduct themselves as they wish. Acting in accordance 
with shari῾a law is therefore permitted, on condition that Dutch law is 
observed. Muslims are even permitted to consult religious authorities, 
providing that Dutch law is not violated. Only in relation to a very small 
number of issues does Dutch law prescribe a certain sequence of ac-
tions, in the sense that religious activities may only take place after ob-
ligations under civil law have been fulfilled. The most explicit rule is the 
one governing marriage: a religious marriage may not take place unless 
a civil marriage between the spouses has already been concluded.3
However, acting in accordance with shari῾a principles may give rise 
to legal disputes. In that event, the informal and the national legal order 
may converge. Although shari῾a rules respected within the informal 
social order will not be officially recognized under the national legal 
system, the fundamental rights of Muslims, such as women’s rights, 
may be at stake. Protection of these fundamental rights might be disre-
spected within the informal social order. The question arises as to what 
role human rights can play in protecting the social position of Muslims 
within their informal social order.
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In this article, the application of shari῾a as a legal system will not 
be discussed. In what follows, I focus on describing the legal instru-
ments that may be used to either accept or reject shari῾a as rules of 
conduct for Muslims in their daily life. As a result, I will reflect neither 
on issues of private international law, nor on the application of shari῾a 
law by foreign consular authorities. In the following I will therefore first 
discuss the application of shari῾a concepts within Dutch substantive 
law and, second, the legal attitude towards the use of shari῾a in infor-
mal social settings. After having described the legal framework and the 
legal instruments available, I will conclude the article by briefly discuss-
ing the relevance of the political climate and political policy towards 
migration and integration, and the way in which this may affect the 
issue of applying shari῾a in the Netherlands.
Applying Shari῾a Under the Dutch Legal System
In this section, I will discuss the extent to which Dutch law enables 
Muslims to apply shari῾a to family law issues. This will be explained 
by describing the legal instruments available to accommodate religious 
family law values. The following instruments will be discussed: 1. party 
autonomy; 2. the favour-principle; 3. the use of open norms by the leg-
islator; 4. express legal provisions to accommodate expressions of reli-
gion; and 5. the fundamental right to freedom of religion.
Party autonomy
Many family disputes may be settled by the parties themselves, either 
by bilateral agreement or unilateral declaration, or by merely fulfill-
ing religious obligations, for example within the context of bringing up 
children. However, the formal requirements set by Dutch law must be 
met. For instance, divorce can only be pronounced by a court of law,4 
and marriage can only be concluded before the civil authorities.5 The 
divorce or marriage of Muslims carried out by an imam in the Nether-
lands will not be recognized by law. Where there are no formal require-
ments set by law, the parties are free to organize their family issues as 
they wish, with or without the involvement of an Islamic authority.
A second restriction is found in the applicable substantive legal rules 
themselves. It must be borne in mind that the applicable substantive 
law will often be determined by rules of private international law. Since 
many Muslims in the Netherlands still possess a foreign nationality, 
private international law will always come into play in matters of fam-
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ily law. For the purposes of this article, I will only discuss Dutch sub-
stantive law. Agreements governed by private law are usually valid as 
long as they are not in contravention of the law, public policy, or good 
morals.6 Future spouses are free, in principle, to agree for instance on 
the dower the man will have to pay to the woman according to shari῾a 
law.7 Only where the agreement violates public policy will the auton-
omy of the parties be limited. Another example is the following: people 
are free to determine how their property should be disposed of after 
their death. Under the rules of private international law, the applicable 
substantive law will either be the law of the nationality of the deceased 
or the law of his last habitual residence.8 Should the conflict rule refer 
to Dutch inheritance law, only a few restrictions must be taken into 
account and the disposition may not be contrary to good morals or 
public policy.9 So long as these restrictions are observed, distribution of 
the estate according to shari῾a law is enforceable.
The favour-principle
In some instances, the parties may choose which one of several alterna-
tives is to be applied. In these situations, a choice may be made for the 
alternative that mostly favours shari῾a principles. An example is found 
in the law governing names. The free choice of a child’s first name is 
given to the parents.10 They are allowed to choose ‘one of the 99 beau-
tiful names of Allah’11 if they so desire. Parents are also afforded the 
possibility of opting for either the mother’s or the father’s family name 
as their child’s family name.12 Thus, in order to demonstrate the child’s 
legal descent and to show its observance of Islamic religion, its parents 
may opt for the name of the Muslim father.
Express provisions and open norms
Dutch family law does not include provisions that expressly accom-
modate the application of shari῾a or other religious principles.13 On the 
other hand, the Dutch legislator has deliberately laid down open norms 
in several family law provisions, so that the specific circumstances of 
each case, changing circumstances and other developments may be 
taken into account.14 The ‘interest’ or the ‘best interest’ of the child is 
such a concept. It is used in all custody cases and in cases of child pro-
tection and needs to be construed depending on the factual circum-
stances of the case. It is debatable whether a child’s upbringing in ac-
cordance with shari῾a would be in its interest, or whether circumcision 
is in the interest of the Muslim child concerned. It follows from Dutch 
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case law that, if parents disagree on the circumcision of their child, cir-
cumcision is not readily considered to be in the interest of a Muslim 
boy.15 However, the Dutch courts will only arrive at such a conclusion 
after having weighed up the various interests and circumstances in-
volved in the case. One consideration is the religious and social inter-
ests of the parents and the child in having him circumcised.16
Freedom of religion
Freedom of religion and the practice of religion are fundamental 
rights, guaranteed, inter alia, in Article 9 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights. Although the provisions of this article are applica-
ble in the Netherlands, invoking freedom of religion has hardly ever 
been successful in matters of family law. In family law issues, freedom 
of religion usually has to be balanced against other interests at stake, 
such as the gender equality principle, the interest of the child and pub-
lic interests. Since it is common sense that the gender equality princi-
ple in Europe is of fundamental value and that the interest of a child 
should be given predominant weight as far as children are involved, 
balancing the interests often results in attaching more weight to these 
latter interests.17
The Use of Shari῾a in Informal Social Settings  
and the Role of Human Rights
Human rights may have a variety of functions where the application 
of shari῾a is concerned. On the one hand, human rights may serve as a 
shield against the application of certain shari῾a family law rules. Where 
shari῾a violates the principle of gender equality, the principle of equal-
ity between spouses, the principle of equality on the basis of birth, or 
the principle of equality on the basis of religion, its application is not 
accepted as a rule. In this event, application and recognition of for-
eign shari῾a family law rules may be refused. These grounds are also 
invoked in the debate about shari῾a councils (see discussion below). 
Furthermore, they impede the operation of shari῾a in all other areas 
of domestic law, for example where shari῾a condones violence or pre-
scribes circumcision.
On the other hand, human rights, primarily the right to freedom of 
religion, may be used to accommodate the application of shari῾a. How-
ever, as we have seen above, this freedom of religion is rarely success-
fully invoked in Dutch family disputes.
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And finally, human rights may be used as a tool to offer protection 
against human rights violations brought about in the informal social 
religious order. This last function of human rights will be discussed in 
more detail in the next section.
The example of the ‘chained wife’
The example of the ‘chained wife’ concerns the following situation: a 
Muslim wife has married a Muslim husband in both a religious and a 
civil ceremony. Only the civil marriage is legally valid in the Nether-
lands. In the case of divorce, it is the Dutch court, and the Dutch court 
only, which can rule on the divorce. The court will only dissolve the 
civil marriage, not the religious one. The latter can only be dissolved in 
religious proceedings. To obtain such a divorce, Muslims must apply 
to religious or consular authorities. To acquire a religious divorce, the 
cooperation of the husband is usually required. If the husband refuses 
to cooperate, the wife will remain in her religious marriage. As a result, 
she will not be free to enter into a new relationship. Her right to marry, 
her right to start a (new) family, and her right to develop and partici-
pate freely in society (her right of self-determination), are some of the 
rights that may be thwarted. The phenomenon of the ‘chained wife’ first 
emerged within Jewish communities, where it is presumably better 
known. The term ‘chained wife’ stems from the aguna, the chained wife 
under Jewish law who was not able to receive her get, the Jewish letter 
of divorce her ex-husband had to hand over to her. Nowadays, this issue 
has been extended to Muslim women.
In fact, Dutch case law does permit women to apply to the court for 
an order to force the ex-husband to cooperate with a religious or con-
sular divorce. Already in 1982, the Netherlands Supreme Court recog-
nized the possibility of ordering a Jewish ex-husband to deliver a get to 
his ex-wife before rabbinical authorities in the Netherlands.18 In 1989, 
the same Court recognized the possibility of ordering a Muslim ex-hus-
band to cooperate with a consular divorce so that the divorce would be 
valid in the state of origin as well.19 In a case in 2010, a Pakistani Mus-
lim woman, who applied to a Dutch Court of First Instance to force her 
husband to cooperate with an Islamic divorce carried out by an imam, 
was granted her request.20
In all these cases, the application was based on tort: depending on 
the circumstances of the case and the interests involved, failure to coop-
erate with a religious divorce after a civil divorce has been obtained may 
be regarded as a civil wrong (negligence) committed against the ex-
wife. The issue was thus resolved in accordance with the provisions of 
Dutch substantive private law.
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The question may arise as to whether the wife, to have the matter 
resolved, could also have successfully invoked human rights and thus be 
released from her marriage.21 It can be argued that the human rights of 
a chained wife, as summed up previously, had been violated. However, 
at least three dilemmas would have to be overcome. The first dilemma 
is that, since shari῾a represents informal law, the wife is only informally 
chained to the marriage. Legally, she is divorced; formal impediments to 
entering into a new relationship no longer exist. Should human rights 
be invoked for the sole purpose of resolving the social problems women 
face within the informal legal order? My answer would be in the affirma-
tive. Human rights protect real-life situations regardless of how these 
have come about. In a democratic, pluralist society, authorities should 
recognize that problems may exist within the informal legal order. Rec-
ognition of the existence of informal religious marriages and the social 
results of such marriages is a precondition for the will to have it solved 
by legal means. In a case concerning a Jewish aguna decided by the 
Canadian Supreme Court in 2007, the Court considered the following:22
Recognizing the enforceability by civil courts of agreements to dis-
courage religious barriers to remarriage, addresses the gender dis-
crimination those barriers may represent and alleviates the effects 
they may have on extracting unfair concessions in a civil divorce. This 
harmonizes with Canada’s approach to equality rights, to divorce and 
remarriage generally, to religious freedom, and is consistent with the 
approach taken by other democracies.
The second dilemma concerns the following question: should a secular 
state and secular courts intervene in religious disputes? My answer to 
this question would again be in the affirmative.23 Although States must 
exercise restraint in intervening in religious affairs, secular authorities 
may intervene if human rights are not observed in the application of 
religious rules. This was the argument used by the European Court of 
Human Rights in the case of Pellegrini v Italy, where the procedural 
fundamental rights of one of the spouses had been violated during the 
Christian Court proceedings,24 and more recently in two cases where 
churches were not allowed to dismiss one of their employees because 
they maintained an extramarital relationship. 25
The third dilemma reads as follows: must the parties themselves 
respect human rights in their private relationships? Not the State as 
public authority, but the ex-husband himself, is ordered by the court 
to cooperate in a private legal act, that is, a divorce, within the private 
marital relationship. Of the three dilemmas, the last one may be the 
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hardest to solve. Although human rights are primarily invoked against 
State authorities, there is a tendency to accept that human rights are 
enforceable in private relationships as well.26 Direct application of 
human rights in the situation of the chained wife is an interesting 
option that deserves to be examined more thoroughly. Should direct 
application not yet be accepted, human rights could at least be used to 
support the wife’s civil claim aimed at having her chained position ter-
minated. For one could at least argue that neglecting the fundamental 
rights of the wife would easily constitute an act of tort.
Application of Shari῾a: Politically Sensitive
Application of shari῾a in the Netherlands does not seem to be merely 
a legal question that can be answered by legal reasoning alone. Rightly 
or wrongly, it seems to be inextricably intertwined with policies on mi-
gration and integration. In the course of time, however, these policies 
have taken different forms. In the 1970s, the presence of migrants in the 
Netherlands was supposed to be temporary.27 Since it was assumed that 
migrants would return to their countries of origin, they were allowed 
to fully keep their identities.28 From the end of the 1970s onwards, there 
was growing awareness that migrant residency had assumed a perma-
nent nature. The objective then became for minorities to participate 
fully in society.29
The integration of migrants required mutual adaptation and recog-
nition of existing diversity. In the Integration Memorandum 2007-2011, 
social cohesion, social integration and participation are deemed essen-
tial conditions for integration.30 Very diverse ideas on ethnic, cultural 
and religious differences within society would have to be bridged. Soci-
ety realized that integration would be a long process spanning several 
generations. On several occasions, the European Court of Human Rights 
stressed the importance of tolerance and acceptance of religious plural-
ism in present-day democratic pluralist societies.31 But by 2010, the gov-
ernment’s patience suddenly seems to have run out. Multicultural society 
has failed, a Dutch Minister has proclaimed.32 Specific integration policy 
was put on hold. It was felt that many aspects of foreign cultures ham-
per the process of integration. The political majority’s policy of that time 
seems to be barring foreign elements from society.
In June 2011, in a paper entitled Integratie, binding, en burgerschap 
(Integration, bonding, and citizenship), the Dutch Minister of Internal 
Affairs launched the government’s new perspective on integration.33 In 
this paper, the government endeavours to establish a common and rec-
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ognizable basis for all its citizens. This common basic foundation is first 
of all shaped by the social achievements of Dutch society and by such 
fundamental values as freedom, equality, equal respect for all citizens, 
tolerance and solidarity. However, according to the Minister, existing 
unwritten codes of conduct also form part of this common basis. The 
Minister furthermore states that the Dutch government is also aware 
of the concerns about the incompatibility between the Western and the 
Islamic way of life among the traditional population,34 and its attitude 
towards symptoms of radicalization, violence, and other antidemocratic 
acts.35 The government also states that it considers itself responsible for 
allaying these concerns.36 This is a crucial, but worrisome point, as policy 
is no longer determined by existing incompatibilities and real dangers, 
but by fear; the fear that incompatibilities and dangers will be the decisive 
factor, whether such fears have a basis in reality or not.
Measures are to be developed in the area of family law in relation to 
foreign marriages. Marriage immigration is blamed as one of the rea-
sons for migrants’ failure to integrate. In particular, marriages entered 
into abroad with spouses not prepared for Dutch society are deemed to 
cause problems of integration and oblige society to make costly efforts 
to overcome the disadvantaged position of women and children. The 
government therefore intends to tighten the rules on marriage immigra-
tion, in particular as regards forced and polygamous marriages. In this 
respect, the government is pursuing a multidisciplinary approach, opting 
for both legal and non-legal, often social, measures. The intended legal 
measures are in the areas of family law,37 private international law,38 and 
criminal law,39 as well as in the area of migration law.40
It is interesting to see that the issue of forced and polygamous mar-
riages is nowadays approached from a totally different angle than pre-
viously. In the past, the issue was regarded as either a gender or human 
rights issue, or from the perspective of multiculturalism. As a gender 
and human rights issue, the most important goal used to be the provi-
sion of legal instruments to protect the interests of the wife in a forced 
or polygamous marriage. These instruments were found in family law 
(marriage impediments), in private international law (refusal to recog-
nize such marriages), and sometimes in criminal law (penalization of 
such marriages). Nowadays, what seem to have become of paramount 
importance are the consequences of such marriages for migration and 
integration. This change in attitude is to be regretted, since it implies a 
high risk of overlooking the specific interests of the parties concerned 
and of attaching too much weight to public interest. If the proposals are 
implemented and prove to be successful, the result will be less accept-
ance of shari῾a in the Netherlands.
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Conclusion
The Dutch legislator has expressly and deliberately allowed the applica-
tion of foreign law – by rules of private international law and by accept-
ing the competence of foreign diplomatic authorities – and the practice 
of religion. Furthermore, legal instruments are employed, such as party 
autonomy, open norms, and the favour-principle, so that all kinds of in-
terests may be taken into account. By means of these techniques, shari῾a 
has been formally included in the Dutch legal order. At the same time, 
the Dutch legal system offers a number of principles restricting the use 
of shari῾a: the secular nature of the Dutch legal system, the prevalence 
of human rights, and the legal constraints of ‘good morals’ and ‘public 
policy’, which function as ‘shields’.
Although the Dutch legal system may be well equipped to cope 
with legal and religious pluralism and consequently with shari῾a, some 
issues remain to be resolved. There is room for improvement in the 
application of existing legal instruments, which could be refined. The 
question is how to achieve this. If shari῾a manifestly infringes human 
rights or public policy, shari῾a may not be applied. Where the applica-
tion of shari῾a does not violate Dutch legal standards, it may be read-
ily accepted. From a legal perspective, less clear situations, such as the 
question of whether Muslim parents are allowed to have their sons cir-
cumcised, are the most challenging and open to debate. The instru-
ments provided by Dutch law to cope with these situations seem to 
be appropriate. However, correct application of the instruments often 
requires more understanding of the relevance and significance of 
shari῾a principles for those Muslims concerned.
Another problem results from the way in which the gap between the 
application of Dutch laws and the application of shari῾a family law to 
Muslims and their observance of shari῾a family law within the informal 
legal order is to be bridged. A precondition for resolving this dilemma 
is recognition of the informal legal order as a social reality. Legal rec-
ognition of this social reality, in the sense of legitimizing informal con-
duct, is not necessary, however, nor is it desirable in general. However, 
denial on principle of any legal relevance of the informal setting would 
entail not taking into account genuine, existing interests. Dutch secular 
rules already allow a certain degree of observance of shari῾a.
In addition, human rights are a potential instrument for coping with 
difficulties ensuing from the informal application of Islamic family law. 
These often concern the position of women and that of related persons in 
non-marital relationships, such as partners and their children. Human 
rights could be an interesting instrument in protecting the position of 
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women and children against unfair consequences of their observance of 
shari῾a. Thus far, human rights have rarely played such a role, and the 
further development of this role should thus be encouraged.
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6 Albania and Kosovo
The Return of Islam in South East Europe: Debating Islam  
and Islamic Practices of Family Law in Albania and Kosovo
Besnik Sinani
Introduction
Albania emerged at the end of the communist era in Eastern Europe as 
the only country where the communist regime had completely banned 
and penalized the practice of religion. It is also the only Balkan coun-
try to have emerged from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire with a 
mainly Islamic population: an estimated 70 per cent of Albanians are 
Muslims. Following the fall of communism, Albania has been seeking 
integration in the European Union and it is often feared that any revival 
of its Islamic identity will be an impediment to that endeavour.
Kosovo, the other Albanian-populated country in the Balkans, 
declared independence from Serbia in 2008 and has been seeking 
Western support and European integration. Although religion was 
not banned in Kosovo under the Yugoslav Federation, as happened in 
Albania, the communist regime discouraged the practice of religion. 
Nevertheless, Kosovo is facing dilemmas very similar to those faced by 
Albania regarding its religious tradition.
In both these countries, the Albanian Muslim Community (amc) 
in Albania and the Islamic Community of Kosovo (ick) in Kosovo 
represent Islam in relation to the governments and hold control and 
ownership of the mosques and educational institutions. Both these 
institutions have suffered from inherited weakness due to the long sup-
pression of religion in Albania during the communist regime and the 
strict control of religion in Kosovo under the Yugoslav Federation. It is 
believed that this weakness created the conditions for the presence of 
Middle Eastern charity organizations in the 1990s that were instrumen-
tal, among other things, in providing scholarships for a new genera-
tion of Albanians to study at Middle Eastern Islamic universities. Upon 
their return, many of them questioned the legitimacy and the religious 
credentials of representatives of the older generation who led the rep-
resentative institutions.
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In more recent years, however, both these institutions have become 
stronger, due to a number of factors: first, governments in both Alba-
nia and Kosovo have preferred to negotiate with these institutions than 
with other Muslim organizations; second, Muslim activists in various 
Muslim civil society organizations, even those critical of the leadership, 
seem to have recognized that the strength of these institutions is ben-
eficial for the whole community; and a third factor in Albania relates to 
representatives of the Gülen Movement, an organization with Turkish 
roots, having taken control of the leadership of the amc. Despite criti-
cism from other Muslims, followers of the Gülen Movement in Albania 
have concentrated their efforts on strengthening the amc and on tak-
ing control of mosques and other religious institutions in the country.
Today, in both of these countries with Albanian majority popula-
tions, questions are often raised in public debates regarding the way 
Western Europe perceives the Islamic identity of Albanians and whether 
Islam is a hindrance to integration in Europe. These questions are part 
of a common debate in Kosovo and Albania on identity, perceptions of 
the Ottoman past, and political and cultural orientation.1 These con-
cerns have affected attitudes towards Islamic practices and particularly 
the novelty of women wearing headscarves and men growing beards is 
perceived as tarnishing the image of Albanians in the West.
This chapter will discuss some of the debates that have emerged from 
the political elites regarding Islam in both Kosovo and Albania; debates 
that are mutually informed and influenced by one another. Further-
more, I will examine some examples of practices in matters of Islamic 
family law, whereby I will limit myself to those from Albania.
Under the Gaze of Europe
On 15 October 2011, the President of the newly independent Republic of 
Kosovo, Atifete Jahjaga, gave a speech in a remote region of her coun-
try, near the border with neighbouring Albania, in honour of Shtjefën 
Gjeçovi (1873-1929), a Catholic priest of the Franciscan order who is 
known for having recorded the tribal code that governed the highland 
regions, known as the Kanun of Lekë Dukagjini. Speaking about the 
Kanun and the role of the Catholic Church in the forefront of the strug-
gle for freedom and progress in the history of the Albanian people, she 
added:
Through the Kanun of the Mountains, known as the Kanun of Lekë 
Dukagjini, the descendants of Scanderbeg in their national resistance 
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against the Ottoman invasion regulate the lives of people and this 
made it impossible for the implementation of shari῾a in these lands 
and among our people of the Catholic or of the Muslim faith. In our 
lands it was unconceivable for the Ottoman authorities to cut off the 
hand of someone accused of stealing or to apply fifty lashes to some-
one’s body in public. So this Kanun preserved the honour and dignity 
of the individual and the national dignity for over five hundred years.2
Anti-Ottoman rhetoric is common in Albanian nationalist discourse 
and Albanian nationalism considers mountains ‘as sanctuaries of the 
nation’ where national values were preserved. The Kanun is perceived 
as a particularly Albanian institution instrumental in this preservation 
of the national character.3 Juxtaposing Christianity and particularly 
Catholicism as the opposite ‘other’ of Islam – one representing Europe, 
progress, liberty and an indigenous religious experience, and the other 
representing a backward, eastern, foreign threat – has also been part of 
Albanian political rhetoric since the fall of communism. This situation, 
in which the leaders of a Muslim-majority country reject Islam and 
allude to Christianity as the true legacy of the people of Albania and 
Kosovo, has occurred repeatedly in recent years.
Six years earlier, in 2005, addressing an audience at the Oxford 
Union in the United Kingdom, the former President of Albania (2002-
2007), Alfred Moisiu, declared that in essence, Albanians are Christians 
and Islam is not an original religion of the Albanians.4 In a similar vein, 
former deputy Prime Minister of Albania, Gramoz Pashko (1991-1995), 
stated in a paper he wrote on Christianity that the only hope for Alba-
nia is its young generation, ‘which has loved European Civilization and 
Christian values.’ Commenting on Mr. Pashko’s writing, the scholar 
Maria Todorova points out that ‘[this] frank appeal to Christian values 
from a country that before it became atheist was 70% Muslim bespeaks 
the naiveté and straightforwardness of the Albanian political discourse 
that has not yet mastered the ennobling façade of the pluralist vocabu-
lary.’ She further adds: ‘It is, however, also a tribute to the sound polit-
ical instincts of the new Albanian political elites who have not been 
duped by the pretence of supra-religious, non-racial, and non-ethnic 
universalism and pluralism of the European or Western discourse.’5
In her speech on the Kanun, Kosovo President Jahjaga has joined 
other representatives of the Albanian political elites in Kosovo and 
Albania in affirming a self-designation of European-ness permeated by 
Christian values and distancing itself from, if not completely rejecting, 
Islam.6 The novelty of President Jahjaga’s speech, however, is the refer-
ence to shari῾a law. The Ottoman past and Islam are often blamed for 
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the backwardness of the Albanians, for being the cause of historical 
misfortunes and for keeping Albanians away from their natural fam-
ily of European nations. Shari῾a law, however, has not been part of 
this tradition of nationalist discourse. The images of the cutting off of 
hands and flogging in public seem to have been transported from cur-
rent events in distant territories into threats in the Albanian histori-
cal imagination and into the current political discourse, as part of this 
politically engendered identity construction of being European.
As Talal Asad has pointed out, since the last decades of the twen-
tieth century, Europe has witnessed a shifting of borders that aims to 
represent what European Civilization is. ‘They reflect a history whose 
unconfused purpose is to separate Europe from alien times (“commu-
nism,” “Islam”) as well as from alien places (“Islam,” “Russia”).’7 It is 
under this configuration of the European identity map that Albanian 
politicians position themselves in the ‘right place’ of the dividing line 
between East and West, Islam and Christianity, where the affirmation 
of European-ness comes with the rejection of Islam, the Ottoman past 
and shari῾a law. President Jahjaga’s anti-shari῾a rhetoric does not relate 
to shari῾a per se, since the draconian punishments that she refers to 
were not part of the Albanian Ottoman experience, and we have not 
witnessed any calls in Albania or Kosovo for a ‘return to shari῾a,’ the 
cutting off of the hands of thieves or the flogging of adulterers. Her ref-
erence to shari῾a reflects the fears and anxieties of the West in relation 
to its former colonial subjects and Muslim migrants, as projected in 
the political profile of countries in the Balkans that seek to affirm their 
place in Europe.
On the other hand, Albanian Muslims in their daily life and in their 
religious practices make attempts to live according to the teachings 
of their religion, teachings that are known to be part of the corpus of 
Islamic law, or shari῾a. As I have attempted to show above, there are 
important similarities, overlapping issues and mutual influences in the 
discourse of the political elites in both Albania and Kosovo regarding 
religion. Despite similarities, however, there are differences in religious 
practices and discourse in Albania and Kosovo. In the next paragraph I 
will illustrate this discussion with examples of Islamic family law prac-
tices, whereby I will restrict myself to the situation in Albania.
Certainly, there is another discourse on shari῾a law emerging in 
Western Europe that seeks to accommodate aspects of shari῾a family 
law in the framework of multicultural citizenship. 8 Albanian elites have 
made clear, however, that their countries will follow a French model of 
republicanism9 that sees multiculturalism as equal to a ‘balkanization’ 
of society. The dominant and unchallenged notion of citizenship in 
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post-communist Albania and newly-independent Kosovo is permeated 
with the notion of national interest. However, Muslims are often chal-
lenged to answer whether their primary loyalty stands with the nation 
or with the Ummah, the global Muslim community. The assumption 
embedded in the question is that Muslim loyalties stand with a foreign 
entity in opposition to the national interest and European identity. The 
assumption is that young Muslims that embraced Islam after the col-
lapse of communism are loyal to religious agendas originating from the 
Middle East.10
Muslim responses to these challenges have been diverse. Some have 
appealed to an Anglo-Saxon understanding of secularism when argu-
ing for the right of women to wear the headscarf in public schools. 
However, there have not been attempts to go as far as to claim separate 
Muslim judiciary systems or to articulate a notion of similar forms of 
‘privatized diversity.’11 Ayelet Shachar points out that ‘the main claim 
raised by advocates of “privatized diversity” is that respect for religious 
freedom or cultural integrity does not require inclusion in the public 
sphere, but exclusion.’12 The dominant tendency of Muslims in Alba-
nia, however, has been one that seeks inclusion in the dominant soci-
etal paradigm and rather than claiming a distinctive place as a toler-
ated minority, they claim a place for Islam under the national umbrella. 
Muslim practices related to shari῾a, including those practices that 
incorporate matters of family law, have to be understood through the 
lenses of a post-communist society that often perceives its Islamic past 
and current Muslim practitioners as a liability in their bid to join ‘the 
European family’; they have to be understood, also, in terms of a Mus-
lim community that seeks a place for Islam in contemporary Albania, 
rejecting marginalization.
Islamic Marriage and Divorce in Secular Albania
A question was presented to imam Ahmed Kalaja, imam of Dine Hoxha 
Mosque in Albania’s capital, Tirana, during a question and answer ses-
sion in the mosque: ‘Am I permitted to hit my wife? Although I haven’t 
got married yet, I have performed the nikah.’13 The imam criticized the 
questioner, advising the congregation to lead a marital life of common 
understanding and affection, and to overlook shortcomings. He af-
firmed the permission granted in the sacred texts for such punishment, 
but he clarified that physical punishment is only allowed in extreme 
cases when the behaviour of the spouse is posing a threat to the religion 
and the wellbeing of the children and the family in general. He stressed, 
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however, that the Prophet Muhammad advised against hitting women 
and mentioned the example of the Prophet who is reported to have 
never hit a woman or a child.
Next, he addressed the rather awkward situation of the questioner’s 
status of being engaged but not married, although he had performed 
the Islamic contract of marriage, the nikah. A number of couples that 
intend to build a family and a home together are often, mostly for eco-
nomic reasons, unable to have their own house and, by consequence, 
are unable to have a wedding, which is customarily the event after which 
a couple will live together. The performance of a religious marriage – 
nikah – rather than a civil marriage, however, enables the partners to 
be in each other’s company without the presence of a chaperone. This 
distinction between being married and not being married, but having 
performed the nikah, seems to worry many imams. First of all, it leads 
to an understanding of nikah as somehow less than ‘a real marriage.’ 
In these cases, nikah seems to resemble what is customarily known in 
contemporary Albania as the status of being engaged.
The imam who answered the question, therefore, emphasized that 
once the nikah has been performed, the couple is considered married 
and that prior to this, the couple is not allowed to be secluded or have 
any physical contact. The imam emphasized that nikah is marriage. A 
number of imams that I interviewed in Tirana insisted that prior to the 
act of nikah, the couple ought to present the marriage certificate from 
the municipal office. There seem to be two main reasons for taking this 
approach. According to imam Ferid Piku, hatib of the Medrese Mosque 
in Tirana, Islamic law recognizes marriage contracts conducted by 
non-Muslim entities. If a couple that has been married in a Christian 
church, for example, later becomes Muslim, they don’t have to repeat 
the marriage, since their marriage is considered valid in Islamic law. 
Similarly, if a couple is married in the municipal office according to 
secular law, the marriage is still valid according to Islamic law. There-
fore, a couple that is married in the municipal office of a secular state 
is also considered married by the community of Muslims.14 According 
to imam Tahir Zeneli, who served as deputy head of the amc in the 
1990s, the Islamic validity of civil marriage contracts is the reason why 
the amc did not take any steps to ritually recognize the marriages con-
ducted during the communist regime, as was done by other religious 
communities, since those marriages were deemed legal and acceptable 
from an Islamic point of view.15
Another important reason, however, why Muslim imams in Alba-
nia insist that a couple should present a marriage certificate from the 
municipal office prior to performing the nikah contract, is to do with 
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the potential for divorce. According to the abovementioned imams, 
under current conditions, the act of nikah or the marriage contract 
according to Islamic law is more of a religious ritual. An imam that 
concludes a nikah has no power in the case of divorce to enforce the 
consequences of such a divorce, such as the conditions of the financial 
obligations on husbands as envisioned by Islamic law. In the case of a 
marriage contracted in the municipal office, however, the divorce liti-
gation can be taken to court. Indeed, the result of such litigation could 
be very different from that which would be envisioned in Islamic law. 
However, according to the imams that I interviewed, this is preferable 
to not having any legal recognition of the marriage or any legal protec-
tion at all. While quite often, when discussing marital conflicts, these 
imams exposed a gendered view of the relations within the family, 
when discussing divorce, their main concern was related to securing 
legal protection for women. Their concern relates to an understanding 
that in the case of divorce, women are in a position of disadvantage and 
that the court can provide legal and financial protection.
Certainly, shari῾a religious law retains moral strength, but these 
imams argue that matters of marriage and divorce should not depend 
on the strength of the participants’ religious convictions at the time of 
the marital conflict. In the absence of a system in which Islamic law can 
impose the obligations ensuing from a divorce settlement, they instead 
have the laws of the secular state impose a system of safeguards and 
obligations in the case of divorce, even though these legal obligations 
do not reflect or otherwise refer to Islamic family law.
According to these imams, in almost all cases of marital conflicts 
where they were asked to serve as mediators, the process of mediation 
was requested by women. This process of mediation is not recognized 
by the courts and has no legal weight. The imams themselves referred 
to these processes as ‘offering advice;’ that is, advice that the couple 
was free to follow or reject. The approach taken in these mediation 
processes also differed. Some imams preferred to remind the couple 
of the words of God in the Qur’an and the teaching of the Prophet, 
the Sunna, in matters of marriage, reminding the couple that although 
Islam recognizes divorce, ‘it is the most hated of the matters that have 
been allowed.’ Other imams, however, insisted that the best approach 
is to counsel on the basis of the standard ethical norms in society for 
maintaining a healthy marriage. Regarding the models offered in con-
temporary Albanian society, these imams were referring to ‘traditional’ 
norms, and they envisioned a gendered understanding of the obliga-
tions of women and the responsibilities of men.
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It is interesting to note that while traditionally in Islamic law and in 
many Muslim societies around the world today, the question of divorce 
is often discussed in relation to the deferred mahr, or dowry, and the 
financial settlements, particularly when the mahr amounts to a consid-
erable sum of money and valuable assets, the mahr does not seem to 
carry an equal weight among Albanian Muslims. The concept of mahr 
was abandoned in Albania with the abolition of religion in 1967, but was 
reintroduced in the 1990s with the re-emergence of religion. The first 
generation of imams that graduated from Islamic universities in the 
Middle East favoured and preached an idea of mahr that avoided large 
sums of money. Even in conversations with devout Muslims, the idea 
of large sums of money as mahr is scorned as indicating greed, mon-
etizing marriage and as standing in contradiction to the religious prin-
ciples of Islamic marriage. Albanian imams have quoted the prophet 
Muhammad as stating that even a ring can be given as mahr. In most 
cases, giving a ring as mahr has given an additional meaning to the 
custom, followed by most Albanians regardless of religious affiliation 
or lack of it, of offering the ring during the engagement party, known as 
‘the exchange of rings.’
During the early years of the re-introduction of religion in post-
communist Albania, one would often hear about conflicts between a 
young generation of devout Muslims who had discovered a new reli-
gious identity and their parents and relatives, who had grown up under 
communism. The way in which the ‘exchange of rings’ has been trans-
formed to also represent the offering of mahr is one of the ways in 
which some of these conflicts have been resolved.16 It is quite common, 
however, for the mahr to constitute the groom’s promise to provide for 
the bride’s expenses when performing Haj, the Muslim pilgrimage to 
Mecca in Saudi Arabia. Since this journey is to be undertaken under the 
condition that it is financially possible, it is understood by the imams 
in Albania to be a deferred mahr. Contrary to the stipulations of the 
deferred mahr, however, it is unheard of for a divorced wife to request 
that the sum of money needed to pay for the pilgrimage be given to her 
as part of a divorce settlement.
When it comes to child custody, imams in Albania seem to encour-
age accommodation, arguing that there are no major differences 
between Islamic law and the secular law that favour the mother, par-
ticularly in regard to female children. Certainly, these imams are aware 
that the discussion in Islamic law, particularly regarding male children, 
is more complex (at a certain age, the custody switches from the mother 
to the father), yet this position seems to be motivated by the personal 
conviction that the interests of children will be better served under the 
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care of their mothers – reflecting a gendered view of the role of women 
as caregivers – as well as by reluctance to take a stance against the law 
of the land.
This accommodating attitude to the laws and customs of a deeply 
secularized society is not articulated in religious treatises as a response 
to living in the context of a secular state. It is in the religious answers to 
individual cases reflecting the complex realities of devout Muslims that 
one can see a general tendency to avoid a confrontation with the laws 
and norms of Albanian society.
There has been more prominent confrontation between religious law 
and secular state law in matters of political participation. Some imams 
argue against participating in elections, since this amounts to recogniz-
ing and supporting a system that is not founded on the laws of God.17 
These voices, however, constitute a very small minority that carries lit-
tle weight in the community. This stance is even more striking when 
one considers that the majority of imams in Albania were educated in 
Saudi Arabia in the 1990s, where the religious establishment insisted on 
preaching an apolitical approach to politics in response to the political 
opposition of the Sahwa movement in Saudi Arabia, following the first 
Gulf War.18 Politically active imams explain their political engagement 
in terms of maslaha, or public interest, arguing that it is in the commu-
nity’s best interest to be politically active as a way of combating margin-
alization and achieving better integration in society.19
In an interview given to the us-based Slate magazine, imam Ahmed 
Kalaja of the Tirana mosque is quoted as saying that ‘he tries to “adapt 
to the peculiarities of the Albanian tradition.” He says Albania will 
always be a society of tolerance, where religion and state are separate.’20 
In arguing for the right of Muslim school girls to wear the headscarf, 
for example, Albanian Muslims have not argued against the principles 
of secularism, but have instead appealed to those models of secularism 
that allow for more religious freedom.21
The latest debates between Muslim groups and the governments 
of Albania and Kosovo have focused on the very same topics: Muslim 
groups demanded permission to build new mosques22 in the centres 
of the capitals of Kosovo and Albania, Prishtina and Tirana, protested 
against the state’s promotion of Mother Teresa, the former Catho-
lic nun and Noble Peace Prize laureate, and also protested against the 
ban on Muslim female students wearing headscarves in public schools. 
The building of new mosques was debated in relation to new Chris-
tian cathedrals recently built in both capitals. Muslims in both Albania 
and Kosovo feel that their governments are favouring and supporting 
Christianity at the expense of Muslims, as part of their attempt to show 
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a more European face. In the view of many Muslims in Albania and 
Kosovo, the debate over the headscarf is motivated by the same con-
cerns.23 As shown by the debate about the state’s promotion of the leg-
acy and missionary activities of Mother Teresa, Muslims in both Alba-
nia and Kosovo have argued that the governments in both countries are 
acting contrary to the principles of secularism. Many have questioned 
the sincerity of these Muslim appeals to the principles of secularism 
and have interpreted them as indications of Islamic fundamentalism 
and intolerance. What people tend to overlook, however, is that Muslim 
activists regard secularism as protection from those government poli-
cies that they believe favour other religious communities.
Despite the similarities and parallel debates in both countries, Mus-
lims in Albania have not followed the example of Muslims in Kosovo, 
who, on numerous occasions, have taken to protesting in the streets, 
sometimes leading to violent confrontations with the police. Imams 
and Muslim activists in Albania seem to have found their numerical 
strength to be the most suitable basis for addressing their concerns. 
The head of one of the major Muslim non-governmental organiza-
tions (ngos) in Albania told me about his conversation with a political 
candidate in the most recent municipal elections. After the politician 
had promised support for the building of a new mosque in the capital, 
the head of the Muslim ngo had responded that the building of the 
mosque is not the most important priority for Muslims. What Mus-
lims want is not to be made to feel like foreigners in their own country. 
The common complaint of many Muslims is that many politicians have 
adopted the European right-wing rhetoric about Muslim immigrants 
and are using it against Muslims in Albania.24
The Reflection of Europe
In October 2011, Albania completed a controversial census of the popu-
lation that included an optional question on religion. Many people have 
questioned the results of this census, particularly with regard to the 
matter of the self-declaration of ethnicity. The census is largely believed 
and openly celebrated, however, as an opportunity to remove, in the 
eyes of the outside world, the stigma of Albania as an Islamic country. 
The amc called upon the government to remove the questions relating 
to ethnicity and religion from the census.25 In October 2011, the amc 
restated its reservations regarding the process, but also called on Mus-
lims to freely and proudly declare their ethnic and religious identity.26 
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At the time of writing the results have not been announced, and they 
are expected to be made public some time in February 2013.
In any case, the manner in which the Albanian Muslim commu-
nity will deal with the challenges of a society still uneasy about its cul-
tural identity will depend much on how Western Europe deals with its 
own Muslim communities, on the rhetoric that its leaders adopt when 
addressing issues related to the Muslim presence in Europe, and on the 
kind of image Europe reflects for countries such as Albania and Kos-
ovo, that want to emulate Western political and economic systems.
As shown by many debates on social media networks, Muslims in 
Albania will have to address a number of issues that are today being 
debated within the community. The place of women in the mosques 
and their representation in community institutions are only some of 
the contemporary concerns of devout Muslims. They are also looking 
for ideas and answers from the West, as is shown by increased interest 
in the translation and the study of the works of Western Muslim think-
ers such as Timothy J. Winter and Tariq Ramadan, who recently vis-
ited Kosovo and Albania.27 There is an increased awareness that Mus-
lim identity and practices will have to reflect the national consensus of 
modelling their society on the European model. The question remains, 
however: will Europe reflect a vision that represents its Muslims?
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7 Greece
Debate and Challenges
Angeliki Ziaka
Introduction
Within Greece today, the Muslim community makes up almost 2 per 
cent of the total population and can be found mainly in the region of 
Western Thrace. It is the legacy of the long-lasting co-existence be-
tween Greeks and Ottoman Muslims, along with certain historical situ-
ations created both in Greece and the rest of South East Europe. This 
Muslim community, which is officially recognized by the Greek state, 
enjoys a unique legal status with regard to familial, hereditary and reli-
gious matters, along with a right to implement shari῾a law, particularly 
in accordance with the school (madhhab) of Hanafiya.
Perhaps the only example of the implementation of shari῾a in 
Europe, this situation has existed for many years in Greece, but has 
only recently (that is, in the last few decades) begun to spark discussion 
between Greek and European jurists, as well as supporters of human 
rights.1 For its part, the Muslim community in general seems to be sat-
isfied with this particular status, although they sometimes appeal to the 
Greek civil courts for relief from decisions by Islamic court function-
aries (muftis) that are based on the principles of shari῾a, usually ones 
involving family or inheritance.
In order to further our understanding of the particular situation of 
the Muslim community in Greece, we need to look at its historical cir-
cumstances, as well as the legal and social problems that have arisen 
from these. We also need to consider the perspectives and possible 
challenges resulting from the implementation of shari῾a in the region 
of Western Thrace. For many observers, the special status of Muslims 
in Greece should be regarded as a kind of Ottoman ‘neo-milletism’, in 
that it is not only anachronistic, but also contrary to the wording of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in terms of religious-legal 
decisions. For others, however, it represents a positive acceptance of 
religious diversity and constitutes an effective paradigm of skilful co-
existence. In the latter case, though, it may be argued that legislators 
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from both sides (from both the Greek-secular and the Muslim-religious 
sphere) need to modernize and harmonize this situation with regard to 
current conceptions of human rights, especially in matters that involve 
family law, the relations between husbands and wives, divorce, inherit-
ance and gender equality.
Geographical, Historical and Legal Overview
A survey of the history and emigration background of Muslims in 
Greece reveals that Greece, as well as the neighbouring Balkan coun-
tries, has a longstanding relationship of co-existence with Islam, mainly 
because of the special historical conditions in the region and the Greeks’ 
subjugation to the Ottoman Empire from the late fourteenth to the first 
half of the twentieth century. In other words, nearly five centuries of 
co-existence have occurred. Independence was a gradual process that 
started in 1821 with the Greek Revolution against the Ottoman Empire, 
resulting in the establishment of the first independent nation state in 
South East Europe (1829-1831).
Ever since the Greek state was established, the Orthodox Christian 
religion has been predominant and therefore recognized as the offi-
cial state religion. Christians of other confessions, as well as Muslims 
and Jews, were recognized as religious minorities in the protocols that 
were successively signed in London in 1829, 1830 and 1832, reflecting the 
Great Powers’ interest in protecting religious minorities living within 
the borders of the first independent Greek state.2 In this Greek state 
(which covered one-third of the area of modern Greece) there were 
only a few Muslims, and they were subject to the general Greek leg-
islation without any special legal provisions. Their number rose with 
the annexation of Thessaly by Greece in 1881. The first international 
legal document that gave a detailed definition of Greece’s obligations 
towards the Muslim community was the Convention of Constantino-
ple, signed between Greece and the Sublime Porte on 2 July 1881.3 Tsit-
selikis notes that ‘For the first time, a Muslim minority was protected as 
a legal entity enjoying religious and educational autonomy.’4
After the end of the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), when Greece’s borders 
were extended, the number of Muslims rose again and the legal sta-
tus of the Muslim minority was regulated by the Convention of Peace 
between Greece and Turkey (1-14 November 1913 in Athens).5 Arti-
cle 11 of the Convention provided additional rights to Muslims with 
Greek citizenship, such as equality before the law, religious freedom 
and religious autonomy, and guaranteed their legal status as a commu-
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nity. Article 9 of the Convention also recognized their religious leaders 
(muftis, imams, hatibs and muezzins), and provided special administra-
tive autonomy regarding Muslim property (waqf or vakf). Τhe Conven-
tion safeguarded the freedom to practice Islamic worship, and institu-
tionalized communication between the religious leader of Thrace and 
the higher Muslim religious leader, Sheikh al-Islam of Constantinople. 
Several years later, in 1920, when the Kingdom of Greece acquired large 
portions of Ottoman territory (including Eastern Thrace up to 30 kilo-
metres from Constantinople, and Smyrne [Izmir] and its wider admin-
istrative area), it confirmed its obligations concerning the protection of 
minorities under the Treaty of Sèvres of 10 August 1920.6
The legal status provided by the Convention of Athens lasted until 
1923, when at the end of the Greek-Turkish War (1919-1922) the Laus-
anne Conference7 created a new geographical map for Greece and Tur-
key. The first issue discussed at the Conference was the final settlement 
of Greek-Turkish borders. The concept of a homogenous nation state 
dominated the Conference and resulted not only in a re-affirmation 
of the previous massive and compulsory exchanges of population 
between the two states, but also the implementation of a final exchange 
that had no precedent throughout the geographical extent and history 
of the area.8 The massive Greek-Turkish exchange meant a permanent 
uprooting of the Greek population of Turkey, and in particular of Asia 
Minor and Eastern Thrace, from ancestral homelands that they had 
inhabited since the 8th-6th centuries bc. It also resulted in the obliga-
tory expatriation of Muslims who resided in Greece; that is, indigenous 
peoples (Greeks Valaades or Vallahades, Muslims of Crete, Pomaks 
and Roma) who had converted to Islam under the Ottoman Empire, or 
Turks who had resided in the area since the end of the 14th and begin-
ning of the 15th century.9 The Muslims of Western Thrace were exempt 
from this exchange, and later, when Greece annexed the islands of the 
Dodecanese from the Italian occupation in 1947, a small Muslim popu-
lation of Turkish origin was allowed to remain on the islands of Rhodes 
and Kos.10
The migration of the Muslims of Greece to Turkey and of the Chris-
tian Greeks from Turkey to Greece altered the demographic map of the 
two countries. This migration also caused Greece to change its legisla-
tion to accommodate the needs of the Muslims of Western Trace, who 
were guaranteed security by the Convention of the Treaty of Lausanne, 
according to which they received the official status of a ‘Muslim minor-
ity’. According to the Proceedings of the Acts of the Conference,11 the 
Turkish delegation objected to the use of ‘racial’ or ‘ethnic’ categories, 
instead emphasizing the religious character of the Greek minority in 
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Turkey.12 Despite the Turkish delegation’s arguments, the Convention 
of Lausanne (30 January 1923) made explicit reference to Greek inhab-
itants of Constantinople and Muslim inhabitants of Western Thrace.13 
Likewise, the Greek Christians of Constantinople, Imbros, and Tene-
dos, referred to by the Turkish State as the ‘non-Muslim minority-Rum 
Orthodox Christians,’ were protected by the Treaty of Lausanne.14 Τhe 
minority provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne remain in force today. 
Consequently, the faith, worship, customs, traditions, and education 
of Muslims of Greek citizenship are protected by the Greek Constitu-
tion and by special Greek legislation in accordance with the Treaty of 
Lausanne.15
In order for an outsider to understand what took place and what 
continues to take place at a political, legal and educational level in 
Greece, one has to consider the position of the minorities (both Chris-
tian and Muslim) that remained in Greece and Turkey in accordance 
with the Treaty of Lausanne.16 It is very important to point out that, on 
top of the charged historical background, there is also a constant debate 
over the ethnic as opposed to religious identity of the minorities.17 With 
regard to the Muslim minority of Western Thrace, recent decades have 
seen many appeals from formerly Muslim associations in the area to 
the European Court of Justice, in order to claim their right to be char-
acterized as Turkish associations.18 The Greek state insists on character-
izing them as ‘Muslim associations’, based on the Treaty of Lausanne, 
emphasizing that these associations are not exclusively Turkish, but 
also include Pomaks and Roma. The fact remains, however, that the 
other ethnic groups, Pomaks and Roma, have been and still are forced 
to learn the Turkish language in the minority schools, which has led to 
their ‘Turkification.’19 Regardless, though, of the dispute about religious 
and ethnic identity, the vibrant Muslim community of Thrace (which 
is estimated to have between 100,000 and 130,000 residents) certainly 
shares all the privileges enjoyed by every Greek citizen, while at the 
same time, its religious identity is protected by the Treaty of Lausanne. 
This is not entirely the case for the Greek minority that remained in 
Istanbul after the events of 1955. The prosperous Greek community in 
Istanbul, which then numbered 80,000 to 100,000, has today dwin-
dled to approximately 2,000 to 4,000 people, mainly because they are 
denied their minority rights under the Lausanne Treaty.20
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The Mufti and So-Called Neo-Milletism
The faith, worship, customs, traditions, and education of Muslims of 
Greek citizenship are protected by the Greek Constitution and by spe-
cial Greek legislation in accordance with the Treaty of Lausanne. This 
regulation of the relation between Greece and its Muslim citizens of 
Western Thrace is largely based on the ancient Ottoman system of mil-
lets. In effect, this system continues to create a kind of ‘neo-milletism.’ 
The Muslim community, which has been recognized by the Greek state 
since 1881 and which is defined by its religion, has retained certain priv-
ileges. This is the reason why certain regulations of shari῾a – in particu-
lar, religious rituals and family and inheritance law – remain in effect in 
Greece. These aspects of shari῾a are applied by the mufti, the religious 
leader and judge of the Muslim community.21
The Greek state has special provisions for the religious needs of 
the Muslims of Thrace, although the legal decisions of their religious 
courts are restricted in this area. Muslim Greeks in Athens, for exam-
ple, who wish to be married in a Muslim marriage, must go to the mufti 
appointed for their region. Muslim marriage is thus recognized by the 
Greek state.22 Muslim Greeks have approximately 300 mosques and 
metjitia (from masjid), smaller mosques for daily prayer (except for 
Fridays), and approximately 400 spiritual leaders (imam, hatib, muez-
zin). The mufti-ship is divided over three muftis, in Xanthi, Komotini 
and Didymotikhon, who together have the highest religious authority 
in Thrace. In addition, on the islands of Rhodes and Kos, there are three 
mosques with two imams and one mufti. The individual mufti-ship of 
Kos ceased to exist on 1948, and that on the island of Rhodes in 1974.
The mufti is the religious leader of the Muslims of Greek citizenship 
of Western Thrace; he also has the jurisdiction of qadi, that is, a judge 
who also acts as the highest religious teacher and interpreter-judge 
of Islamic Law, or shari῾a. He presides over special courts, Religious 
Courts, where he rules on familial, inheritance, and religious matters 
(including marriages, divorces, tutelage, alimony, emancipation of 
minors, Islamic wills, and intestate succession) of the Muslim com-
munity according to the Hanafi school of shari῾a. The mufti must be a 
graduate of Muslim Studies in theology and law, usually from the cities 
of Mecca or Medina, and be versed in the old Ottoman language, in 
which the decrees (fatwa-fetva) are written and redacted (which makes 
Thrace one of the few places where this old language from the Otto-
man Empire is still practised). Other prerequisites for his appointment 
are that he must have served as an imam for at least a decade, be the 
epitome of morality, and possess excellent theological qualifications. 
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In his capacity as qadi (judge and religious teacher), the mufti is a civil 
servant of the Greek state. According to article 11 of the Convention 
of Athens, the mufti is appointed by the Greek state with a Presiden-
tial Decree after nomination by the Greek Ministry of Education and 
Religion. He receives a salary from the Greek Treasury, with the rank 
of General Director. The rulings of the mufti in the religious court are 
translated from Ottoman into Greek and are then validated by the 
Greek Courts of Law.23
Due to the constant antagonism between Greece and Turkey on the 
issue of the Muslim minority, the issue of the election of the mufti of 
the Muslim community has remained prominent, primarily since 1980. 
Correspondingly, there are two views concerning the selection of the 
mufti. The first one is that the mufti is nominated by a committee of 
experts and is appointed by the Greek state.24 This procedure follows 
the custom of Muslim states in which the mufti is appointed by the 
state. The other view is that the mufti should be elected. According to 
the second opinion, which is expressed by a number of Muslims, the 
election of the mufti should be a matter for the Muslim community. 
This latter view represents the new political tendencies of Islam, which 
are influenced by Turkish policy in the area.25 Some contemporary legal 
scholars are in favour of the Muslim community electing their mufti. 
However, these researchers also suggest that the election would entail 
the abolition of shari῾a. The rationale behind the claims of these legal 
experts is that Greece is the only European country in which shari῾a is 
applied. In many cases, the application of shari῾a is not compatible with 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and modern views, such as 
those concerning the equality of the sexes. What seems to be the main 
problem for these legal scholars is the fact that shari῾a is considered 
antiquated, and the articles of the Convention of the Treaty of Lausanne 
should be modernized to benefit the Muslim community and its equal-
ity before the law.26 The Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly has 
moved towards this perspective in reference to the Greek and Turkish 
positions vis-à-vis minority issues. In regard to the issue of the imple-
mentation of shari῾a in Greece, a report produced by the Council of 
Europe calls on Greece, among other things, to
“allow the Muslim minority to choose freely its Muftis as mere reli-
gious leaders (i.e., without judicial powers), through election or ap-
pointment, and thus to abolish the application of shari῾a law – which 
raises serious questions of compatibility with the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights – as recommended by the Commissioner for 
Human Rights.”27
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The problem, though, of the election of the mufti is complicated by the 
broader political goals of the area’s political representatives and depu-
ties, who believe that the mufti’s spiritual and legal powers restrict and 
undermine their authority. Depending on the region and political con-
text, whole areas of residents are split on the issue of the ‘election’ of 
the mufti. The problem dividing the Muslims of the region is politi-
cal. Turkey supports the elected muftis and their proponents,28 while 
Greece appoints those who recognize their judicial authority. A con-
sequence, therefore, of the proposed election of the mufti, rather than 
his appointment, would be the Greek state’s refusal to recognize the 
implementation of shari῾a.29 The paradox is that the muftis and those 
advocating for their election do not seem willing to lose the legal rights 
that are provided to them by shari῾a and to be deprived of their legal 
jurisdiction.
Another issue is the interaction between the internal legal system of 
shari῾a family law and the Greek legal system. As a matter of principle, 
the civil courts do not have jurisdiction over cases that are under the 
jurisdiction of the mufti, according to the current legislation.30 How-
ever, wherever there are cases involving the violation of basic human 
rights, such as underage marriage (according to article 1350 of the Civil 
Code, underage marriage is not allowed), divorce without both par-
ties being present, marriage through representatives, and so forth, the 
mufti and the appointed judge in the area are obliged to find ways to 
safeguard the individual rights of the members of the Muslim Commu-
nity (lex ferenda).31 The truth is, however, that the number of Muslims 
of Greek citizenship who appeal to civil courts is small, and it is even 
smaller for Muslim women of Greek citizenship, most likely for reasons 
of stigmatization and social isolation.
Despite the existence for many decades of a special Muslim minor-
ity education system, the most appropriate way to empower new gen-
erations of Muslims in Western Thrace would be to once again discuss 
issues concerning education, so that brave decisions could be made 
in favour of the Greek Muslims.32 We should note that for the last ten 
years, a pilot educational programme has been in place for the children 
of the minority community, with positive results.33 Certainly, citizens 
educated in a wider European framework, whether it be the ‘major-
ity’ or the ‘minority’, are more capable, at a psychological, political and 
social level, of achieving self-determination for their community.
In the light of the aforementioned debates, however, we should note 
that the majority of the Muslim community is generally satisfied with 
the unobstructed functioning of shari῾a in Thrace. The people of the 
Muslim community seem to appreciate their freedom to apply shari῾a 
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within European territory, especially when such a thing is impossible 
in modern Turkey. Εven those who resort to elected and not appointed 
mufti prefer to perform Islamic religious marriages and to settle other 
family and inheritance matters according to the Muslim ethos, although 
the judicial acts of the elected mufti are typically not recognized by the 
Greek state. Through the application of shari῾a, the Muslims of Western 
Thrace feel closer to their Islamic obligations and preserve the Islamic 
umma and its justice.
Immigration and New Challenges
All of the above, of course, concerns the Greek Muslims of the ‘old’ 
Islam, that is, Muslims with Greek citizenship in Western Thrace. The 
‘new’ Islam is that of Muslim immigrants who have come to the coun-
try more recently, particularly since the 1990s, and who originate from 
all over the world (Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and so forth). They do 
not enjoy any special religious legal status and they are subject to Greek 
laws that apply, without any exception, to all immigrants.34 They are 
not dealt with on the basis of their religion, but their nationality, and 
as such fall outside the privileged measures for Muslims with Greek 
nationality. Consequently, the special minority rights applying to ‘old’ 
Muslims do not apply to the ‘new’ Muslims, who are mostly concen-
trated outside Thrace. This has created a host of problems regarding 
the lack of mosques and Islamic cemeteries in these areas (especially in 
the city of Athens), and the Greek government has been slow in keep-
ing its promise to allow the construction of a mosque in Athens and 
the creation of Muslim cemeteries. Consequently, there are now unoffi-
cial Muslim places of worship, which, according to the president of the 
Muslim Union in Athens,35 number as many as a hundred; while there 
is no provision for the education and training of their religious teach-
ers, the imams, as there is in other European countries, even though 
‘their quality is sometimes put under question.’36 In some cases, such as 
in relation to the issue of burial, services are performed by the muftis 
of Western Thrace in Thrace, since there is no other place in Greece 
for Muslim burial. The legal jurisdiction of the mufti on familial and 
inheritance issues applies exclusively to Muslims of Greek citizenship 
and especially to those of Western Thrace, although this aspect is under 
consideration vis-à-vis article 13 of the Constitution regarding religious 
freedom.37 Any other legal action between non-Greek Muslims can be 
impugned.
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There is no special legislative accommodation for Muslim immi-
grants with regard to the teaching of Islam. In accordance with the 
introductory report for the Law on Multicultural Education pre-
pared by the Greek Parliament’s Scientific Council in 1997, the focus of 
modern multicultural education is not necessarily on support of reli-
gious difference, but on ‘strengthening the ethnic identity of the vari-
ous groups of foreigners living in the country.’38 Greek schools, which 
found themselves unprepared in many areas, particularly in language 
training for foreign students and the management of multiculturalism, 
quickly began to adjust. Both legislators and the Ministry of Educa-
tion hastened to resolve these issues, to the extent that it was possible, 
through the creation of so-called intercultural or multicultural schools 
as early as 1996.39 At any rate, the children of all immigrants – regard-
less of their religion – study alongside Greek children in public schools 
from kindergarten to high school, without exception.
The Greek case could represent not a retrogressive example but one 
that expresses a smooth symbiosis and demonstrates respect for the 
various religious expressions of minorities. The main challenges that 
still exist are whether the implementation of shari῾a can operate as a 
cohesive or a segregating bond between citizens, what European Mus-
lims desire for themselves (is there only one will?), and how secular 
states can satisfy the many different tendencies within their societies.
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8 Unregistered Islamic Marriages
Anxieties about Sexuality and Islam in the Netherlands1
Annelies Moors
Introduction
Both in Europe and the Middle East, unregistered Islamic marriages 
cause a great deal of anxiety. Whereas the men and women who enter 
into these marriages consider them permissible under Islam, they are 
not registered according to the law of the country where they are con-
cluded. In the Netherlands since 2005, such marriages (which are often 
referred to as ‘Islamic marriages’) have drawn the attention of the secu-
rity services, and have become a topic of debate in both the media and 
in parliament. These marriages are seen as an indication of radicaliza-
tion and as a means through which salafi imams are trying to build a 
parallel society, while the women involved are defined as the victims 
of men using them for their own dubious purposes. In Muslim major-
ity countries, such as in Egypt, these marriages (often called ‘urfi mar-
riages) were already the focus of public debate a decade ago.2 In these 
countries, the state authorities often consider the women involved to 
have been duped by unscrupulous men who want to engage in sexual 
relations and then simply leave them, or deny that a marriage ever took 
place. In the following, I argue that the portrayal of the women who en-
gage in such marriages as victims of irresponsible men is, at best, only 
part of the story. Instead, I investigate how the categories of ‘urfi and ‘Is-
lamic’ marriages have been produced in Muslim majority countries and 
the Netherlands respectively, and how they circulate through fields of 
power. Whereas the state authorities consider these unregistered mar-
riages illegal and some religious scholars hold them to be irregular, if 
not void, the multiple and varied ways in which these marriages are 
concluded and lived indicate that the participants themselves draw on 
multiple discourses of permissibility.3
In the first section of this chapter, I discuss the shifting meanings of 
‘urfi marriages in Muslim-majority countries in the Middle East. Start-
ing with a brief reflection on the conclusion of marriages in classical 
Islamic law, I discuss how the emergence of the nation state and the 
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concomitant codification and reform of Muslim family law have turned 
‘urfi marriages into unregistered marriages. Next, I analyse how the 
meanings of ‘urfi marriages further diversified in the course of recent 
decades and become the topic of public debate. In the second section, 
I analyse how ‘Islamic marriages’ have emerged as a category of con-
cern in the Netherlands, and investigate the highly diverse motivations 
young women have for concluding such marriages and the multiple 
meanings these may hold for them. Whereas in both contexts, state 
authorities are particularly concerned about the effects of such mar-
riages on women, different issues underlie their anxieties about unreg-
istered marriages. In Muslim majority settings, the main concern is 
undesirable forms of sexuality, while in the Netherlands, the major tar-
get is undesirable forms of Islam.
Muslim Majority Countries: Towards the Registration of Marriages
Prior to the emergence of the modern nation state, unregistered (‘urfi) 
marriages, widely known in the community through various rituals 
and celebrations, were the norm. According to Islamic law, marriage is 
a contract that makes sexual relations permissible (halal); pre- or extra-
marital relations are considered zina (unlawful sexual intercourse). The 
marriage contract is similar to other contracts in that it is concluded 
through offer and acceptance; for it to be valid, two male Muslim wit-
nesses (two women may replace one man) need to be present. Fathers 
can conclude such a contract for minors, while according to most 
schools of law adult women entering their first marriage should have 
their marriage guardian conclude the marriage for them. The Hanafi 
school of law, in contrast, holds that a woman who has reached her legal 
majority has both the right to refuse a marriage and to arrange for her 
own marriage.4 The presence of a religious functionary is not necessary 
for a marriage to be valid, a written document is not required, and the 
marriage does not need to be registered to be valid under Islam. Public-
ity is required, however.
Whereas for most schools of law, the obligation of publicity is ful-
filled through the presence of two witnesses,5 in social practice, the 
normative requirements are both more gradual and more extensive. A 
publicly celebrated engagement (a commitment to marry which has no 
legal effects) often precedes the conclusion of the marriage contract. 
Whereas according to Islamic jurisprudence, once the marriage con-
tract is concluded, the couple can no longer be accused of zina, from 
a social perspective, the consummation of the marriage (dukhul) and 
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cohabitation are only considered licit after the wedding ceremony has 
taken place, which may be months or even years later. The new couple 
often use the period between the contracting and the celebration of the 
marriage to get to know each other better and to prepare for the wed-
ding and marital life.
Marriage entitles men and women to different rights and obliga-
tions. A husband is obliged to maintain his wife (in terms of hous-
ing, food and clothing), independent of the latter’s own means, and 
to pay a dower. Women are required to obey their husbands, at least 
as far as cohabitation is concerned. The relation between maintenance 
and obedience is evident in the ruling that if a wife leaves the marital 
home against her husband’s wishes (and has no valid reason for doing 
so), the husband is no longer obliged to maintain her. However, some 
schools of law allow for a modification of gender relations through the 
inclusion of conditions in the marriage contract.6 With the family law 
reforms of the past decades, in many Muslim countries marriages are 
only registered above a minimum age, while in some, the presence of 
the marriage guardian is no longer necessary and the requirement of 
obedience has been removed.7
There are some differences between Sunni and Shia Islamic law in 
concluding marriages. According to Shia jurisprudence, a marriage 
without witnesses is also valid, and it is possible to conclude a marriage 
for a specific period of time.8 In the case of such a ‘temporary marriage’, 
a man needs to pay a dower to his wife, but he is not obliged to pay 
maintenance and the partners do not inherit from each other. Children, 
however, have the same rights as in a permanent marriage. Whereas 
temporary marriages are often called mut‘a or sigheh (terms referring 
to sexual enjoyment), it is also possible for the partners to conclude a 
non-sexual temporary marriage. Especially in settings of strict gender 
segregation, non-sexual temporary marriages allow men and women to 
interact more freely.
Historically, religious authorities were rather flexible in recognizing 
marriages, using the notion of shubha; that is, assuming that the parties 
concerned thought they had concluded a valid marriage. In some cases, 
a child was even recognized as legitimate if a marriage was concluded 
up to one month before delivery.9 Regulations about the need to register 
marriages have come with the emergence of the modern nation state.10 
The concomitant centralization of authority has engendered the codifi-
cation and reform of Muslim family law. Also under the statutory obli-
gation to register marriages, however, unregistered marriages that ful-
fil Islamic conditions are considered irregular rather than invalid. Still, 
religious authorities often argue that registering a marriage is desirable 
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on Islamic grounds. Registration functions as a means to publicize a 
marriage and is beneficial for women, as only then can their rights be 
guaranteed. It is a means of checking whether the marriage meets the 
state regulations in question, such as the minimum age, the consent of 
both parties, and conditions for polygamy.11
In the course of the twentieth century, registration of a marriage 
has been normalized, as bureaucratic states increasingly require official 
documents for access to resources. Many countries have also devel-
oped means to register a marriage post facto through the ‘confirmation 
of an existing marriage’, especially in those cases where both partners 
act in unison. However, if one of the parties, usually the man, denies 
the marriage, the situation becomes far more complicated, and the reli-
gious establishment is particularly concerned about such cases. The 
media attention attracted by such cases and the sense of crisis they 
produce have engendered a trend towards stricter implementation of 
the legal obligation to register marriages, with the authorities imposing 
fines and other penalties to encourage the public to conform to statu-
tory law.12
Unregistered marriages: new variations
Whereas prior to the emergence of the modern nation state, unregis-
tered (‘urfi) yet widely publicized marriages were the norm, contempo-
rary ‘urfi marriages, by contrast, tend to be purposely concealed from 
particular categories of people, be it the state authorities, the parents 
or the husband’s first wife and her family. Whether the public consid-
ers these marriages to be licit or illicit depends largely on the extent to 
which and from whom they are concealed.
The least controversial ‘urfi marriages are those that are widely 
known about in the community, but not registered with the state. In 
some cases, these marriages are not registered because registration is 
not possible. A paradigmatic example is the case of underage girls. In 
many countries, codification and family law reform have introduced 
minimum ages for marriage; if girls have not yet reached that age, the 
marriage cannot be registered. Sometimes, if families insist on such a 
marriage, they will conclude a marriage contract, but only register it 
once the girl reaches the minimum age.13 In other cases, women refrain 
from registering their marriage because they consider it too disadvan-
tageous to do so. For instance, if they officially register a new marriage 
after divorce, they run the risk of losing custody over their children, 
while if they do so after being widowed, they may lose their right to 
their deceased husband’s pension.14
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Other ‘urfi marriages are characterized by a far greater emphasis 
on secrecy and are thus more controversial. These ‘urfi marriages are 
often considered to be evidence of ‘the family in crisis’, and are part 
of a discourse that also includes concerns about single females and 
delayed marriage.15 Some consider the great expense of getting married 
– the dower, gifts of jewellery, the cost of housing, and wedding par-
ties, mostly paid for by men – as the main reason behind delayed mar-
riage.16 However, in the first decades of the twentieth century, Egyptian 
men were already complaining about the high cost of marriage.17 Per-
haps more important for the rise in the average age at which someone 
gets married is the spread of women’s education and formal employ-
ment, which has provided young women with a valid reason for avoid-
ing early marriage.18 Getting married later stretches the time period 
between sexual maturity and married life. In a context in which sex-
ual relations outside of marriage are considered both Islamically and 
socially illicit,19 this places young adults in a difficult situation.
Under such circumstances, young people may consider an ‘urfi mar-
riage as a means of making sexual relations permissible under Islam. 
Such ‘urfi marriages are usually kept hidden from the couple’s fami-
lies and are only known to a small circle of friends.20 It is this type of 
‘urfi marriage that the state and many religious scholars in Egypt are 
particularly concerned about, both because they may be concluded in 
a way that does not fulfil the statutory conditions for a valid Islamic 
marriage (such as the agreement of the woman’s marriage guardian) 
and because they transgress social norms of deference to one’s par-
ents.21 A common trope is that of an unscrupulous man who uses an 
‘urfi marriage to trick a naive, young woman into a sexual relationship, 
pretending that such a marriage is a legitimate marriage. As soon as the 
woman is pregnant or once he has lost interest in her, he leaves her and 
denies that a marriage has taken place.22 Equally challenging to paren-
tal authority is another motivation for concluding an ‘urfi marriage. If 
a woman’s parents do not agree with her choice of partner, the couple 
may then use an ‘urfi marriage as a means to force her parents to agree 
with the marriage. This is similar to elopement, while remaining within 
the boundaries of Islamic law.23
Interestingly, in Turkey, where according to statutory law the reg-
istration of a civil marriage needs to precede a religious marriage, a 
very similar phenomenon is occurring. In the case that people first con-
clude an Islamic marriage, the levels of publicity or secrecy determine 
whether such a marriage is considered to be licit or illicit. Religious 
marriages that are not registered with the civil authorities, but that have 
the approval of the couple’s parents and are publicly known in the com-
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munity, are considered licit in the circles in which they occur.24 The 
very same religious figures are, however, highly critical of gizly (secret) 
marriages that are concluded without the knowledge of the parents and 
that are only publicized to a very limited extent.25
Some unconventional non-registered marriages have, by contrast, 
gained a measure of acceptance, and religious leaders have used ele-
ments from existing Islamic traditions in novel ways to legitimize cer-
tain kinds of contemporary ‘urfi marriages. Amongst Shia Muslims, 
this is the case for temporary marriages. Whereas in Iran under the 
Pahlavi Shahs, temporary marriage had come to be considered an out-
dated institution, the practice was revived after the Islamic revolution. 
Moreover, within a decade, it was no longer only considered an instru-
ment for regulating male sexuality. During a speech in 1990, former 
president Hashemi Rafsanjani redefined temporary marriages by also 
recognizing women’s sexual desire, explaining that it is also legitimate 
for women to take the initiative in concluding such a marriage. In his 
view, a temporary marriage could function as a solution to the pre-
sent-day problem of young people becoming sexually mature yet only 
being able to conclude a permanent marriage at a later age because of 
longer periods of study.26 Rafsanjani was strongly criticized by the sec-
ular middle classes and by women’s organizations, who considered the 
practice not only a relic of the past, but also a threat to the family and to 
women in particular, and an institution resembling prostitution. Based 
on her fieldwork in Iran, Haeri27 concluded that temporary marriage 
could indeed enable poorer divorced and widowed women to engage 
in affective relations. Still, she also pointed to the risks such marriage 
entailed for young women who had not been married before. Because 
of the cultural value attached to virginity for a woman entering her first 
(permanent) marriage, these women may face great difficulties finding 
a respectable husband.
Unconventional forms of marriage have also emerged amongst 
Sunni Muslims. In Egypt, there are indications that the number of mar-
riages in which the wife is older than her husband, and sometimes in 
a stronger financial position, is growing.28 Whereas such marriages are 
commonly registered, under specific conditions, such as when foreign 
women are involved, they frequently remain unregistered. According 
to Karkabi,29 when Western women and younger Egyptian men in the 
tourist resort of Dahab engage in a relationship, they often opt for an 
‘urfi marriage.30 For the men, such a marriage functions as a means to 
legitimize a longer-lasting sexual relationship, while the women con-
cerned do not aspire to a ‘real’ marriage.31 Another case is that of Rus-
sian-speaking female migrants in Hurghada, who, according to Walby,32 
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are often better educated, slightly older, and more mobile than their 
partners. Also in this case, an ‘urfi marriage is a convenient solution, as 
neither of the parties concerned is interested in a state-registered mar-
riage contract that limits women’s freedom of movement and imposes 
the duty of maintenance on men.
Another form of marriage that has engendered much public con-
troversy is the misyar (ambulant or visiting) marriage. In the case of a 
misyar marriage, the partners do not live together and the wife does not 
claim her right to maintenance and accommodation. Such marriages, 
which may or may not be registered, are often concluded by men who 
are already married. In that case, they are often kept secret from the first 
wife, but are publicly known amongst the family, friends and neigh-
bours of the woman engaging in a misyar marriage. Debates about this 
form of marriage emerged in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s. The Grand 
Mufti (Ibn Baz) issued a fatwa in 1996 which considered misyar mar-
riages permissible, but also stated that they needed to be made public.33 
In 1998 Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a prominent scholar aligned to the 
Muslim Brotherhood, stated in Qatar that he considered such marriages 
licit, as long as the women involved agreed with the conditions.34 In the 
following years, the debates continued. Some considered these mar-
riages an infringement of the rights of women, while others saw them 
as a possibility for women who might not otherwise find a suitable hus-
band with whom to enjoy marital relations and perhaps motherhood. 
References were made to well-educated women who could easily forego 
the right to maintenance.35 In 2006, the Saudi Arabian Fiqh Council not 
only deemed misyar marriages licit, but also the so-called ‘friend mar-
riages’ aimed at Muslim men and women who study in the West. These 
make sexual relations legitimate, but do not oblige men to cohabit with 
and provide accommodation and maintenance for their wives.36
Whereas such misyar marriages are often presented as a new phe-
nomenon emerging in the Gulf, there are indications that they may 
have a longer history and wider geographical presence. For instance, 
Granqvist37 describes some cases in rural Palestine in the 1920s in 
which women with some economic independence, usually widows 
with their own houses, opted for similar polygamous marriages. Also 
in poorer countries, such as in present-day Egypt, divorced women 
engage in such partially secret marriages. According to Sonneveld,38 
for them it is a way of dealing with the societal pressure they expe-
rience to re-marry. A divorced woman is usually only considered an 
acceptable wife for a man who has already been married. Rather than 
marrying a widower or a divorced man, which often comes with the 
obligation of caring for his children, they may prefer to become the 
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second wife in a misyar marriage, which enables them to keep some of 
their autonomy. While they ensure that their own social circle, includ-
ing their neighbours, is well-informed about the marriage, the first 
wife is not usually told. If such a misyar marriage is not officially regis-
tered, it can be kept hidden from the first wife more easily, especially in 
countries where the first wife is to be officially notified of her husband’s 
subsequent marriages.
Another kind of marriage that frequently goes unregistered is some-
times referred to as a ‘visiting marriage’. These are the marriages con-
ducted during the summer vacation by older men from wealthy Gulf 
States with young girls from poorer families in countries such as Egypt, 
Morocco, India and Indonesia. Whereas such transnational marriages 
have a long history, it was after the oil boom, which created new and 
very stark inequalities between these oil economies and poorer coun-
tries, that such marriages became particularly exploitative, with young, 
sometimes underage girls forced into such marriages by their fathers 
and discarded by their husbands after the summer holidays when the 
latter had returned home. Such marriages have become a topic of debate 
and have also drawn the attention of government officials.39
In short, present-day unregistered marriages differ considerably 
from pre-modern ‘urfi marriages. The main point of difference is that 
the new ‘urfi marriages are often kept purposely hidden from at least 
some of the parties concerned, be it state officials, the couple’s parents, 
or the first wife. Functioning as a means for young people to have sexual 
relationships without concluding an officially registered marriage, they 
are the topic of much anxiety, as there are disputes about their Islamic 
validity, they challenge social conventions, and they may, in some cases, 
be highly exploitative. For women who have previously been married, 
or are past the acceptable age for marriage, such marriages may be a 
means to acquire marital status while maintaining some measure of 
independence. In turn, these various forms of ‘urfi marriages release 
men from the responsibility to provide maintenance and accommoda-
tion. How such marriages affect women depends to a large extent on 
the resources women can draw on.
‘Islamic Marriages’ in the Netherlands: Gender and Securitization
Not only in Muslim majority countries, but also in the Netherlands, un-
registered Islamic marriages have become a topic of debate and policy-
making. According to the Dutch Civil Code, ‘religious functionaries’ 
are only allowed to conclude a religious marriage after a civil marriage 
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has been concluded (Article 68 Book 1 Civil Code).40 This regulation 
emerged in the course of contestations between state authorities and 
the Roman Catholic Church in the early nineteenth century. Except for 
occasional discussions about a possible infringement of the freedom of 
religion, this regulation hardly drew any public attention until it was 
revitalized in the course of the debates in 2008 about imams who con-
cluded Islamic marriages prior to civil marriages.41 This then raises the 
broader question of how such Islamic marriages have become a social 
and legal problem. Who are the main actors in this field, and when and 
under which conditions did this happen?
As a starting point for analysing how this issue emerged as a topic of 
public debate and contestation, I performed a search on ‘Islamic mar-
riages’ in a number of Dutch dailies, covering the period from 1992 until 
2010.42 During the first thirteen years, very few articles were published 
referring to Islamic marriages. Moreover, these covered a wide range 
of topics and mainly concerned such marriages abroad. This stands in 
stark contrast to 2005 and 2008, when there were two distinct peaks in 
media attention (ebbing away in the following years), which related to 
two specific issues, the round-up of an alleged terrorist organization 
called the Hofstad network in 2005 and the debate on salafi imams con-
cluding Islamic marriages prior to their civil registration in 2008.
The sudden hype about Islamic marriages in 2005 emerged in the 
context of the trial of the members of the Hofstad network, when jour-
nalists reported on the Islamic marriages that were concluded in the cir-
cles around this network. Not only were these marriages unregistered, 
but they were also concluded in a highly informal manner, with the 
parents of the young women concerned unaware of their involvement 
in such marriages. Many of the newspaper articles referred to informa-
tion provided by the two Dutch civil security services, the Algemene 
Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (aivd) and the Nationaal Coördina-
tor Terrorismebestrijding (nctb).
Islamic marriages have indeed become a security issue. They are not 
only regularly and publicly referred to in the reports of the security ser-
vices, but in February 2006, the nctb also published a special report 
asserting that Islamic marriages formed a threat to national security.43 
The main arguments presented in this report were that these marriages 
may function as a means to recruit women for violent jihad, that they 
can be considered an indication of a man entering the last phase prior to 
dying as a martyr in a terrorist attack, and that they may in time be con-
sidered as a threat to the democratic rule of law. Whereas little evidence 
was provided to support these statements, they were regularly referred 
to in the press.44 In fact, whereas journalists refer to information pro-
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vided by the security services, the nctb report, in turn, used newspaper 
articles as one of its sources. In this way, in a closely-knit web of mutual 
referencing, Islamic marriages – a phenomenon previously unknown to 
the large majority of the population – were linked to violent jihadism.
In 2008, Islamic marriages again became a topic of public debate 
and contestation. This time the target was salafi imams, who were 
accused of concluding an Islamic marriage between partners who had 
not yet performed a civil marriage. In this case, members of parliament, 
including the social democrats (PvdA), the Christian democrats (cda), 
the right-wing liberals (vvd) and Geert Wilders’ anti-Islam party 
(pvv) played a pivotal role in turning Islamic marriages into a mat-
ter of public concern. The press extensively reported on the parliamen-
tary questions they posed and the investigations of salafi imams and 
mosques they requested. These Islamic marriages were first and fore-
most considered as evidence of and an instrument for the development 
of a strictly orthodox Islamic ‘parallel society’ that purposely distanced 
itself from Dutch society. As had been the case with the newspaper 
articles in 2005, the arguments presented by members of parliament 
resonated strongly with those of the reports produced by the Dutch 
security services (especially aivd).45 By contrast, little media attention 
was paid to later reports, commissioned by the security services and by 
the Ministry of Justice, which employed a more empirically grounded 
approach and came to less alarmist conclusions, at least as far as Islamic 
marriages were concerned.46
Although two different categories of Muslims were the target of 
these two periods of hype, first violent jihadist and later salafi imams, 
the women entering into these marriages were framed in similar terms. 
They were first and foremost defined as victims. During the first period 
of hype, it was argued that they were recruited by unscrupulous male 
extremists, who employed ‘loverboy-like’ practices to mobilize them 
for jihad.47 In the case of salafi imams, they were considered the vic-
tims of those who intended to institutionalize the shari῾a in the field of 
family law in the Netherlands and hence propagate gender inequality.48 
In addition to this dominant discourse that defined women as vic-
tims and as devoid of agency, the media also employed an alternative 
discourse that centred on sexuality. In some cases, these media debates 
give space to Islamologists, who describe Islamic marriages in neutral 
terms as a means to Islamically legitimize a sexual relationship. Journal-
ists themselves have also picked up this theme, but tend to use a more 
normative, and at times sensationalist, tone, presenting these forms of 
sexuality as somewhat dubious. Especially in articles about the Hof-
stad network, Islamic marriages were often linked to polygamy, with 
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the women involved described as playing an active role in arranging 
such polygamous marriages.49 Journalists used normative terms such 
as ‘loose marital morale’,50 while the nctb commented in its report that 
it had the impression that ‘behind the pious way in which the Hofstad 
network presents itself publicly, there is a world of unlimited licentious-
ness’.51 Adopting a moral tone and also highlighting the fact that the 
parents of the young women were often unaware of these marriages, 
this alternative discourse on sexuality seems closer to the more con-
servative views of an older generation than to that of the young people 
involved. This is remarkable, because in mainstream Dutch society, the 
sexual autonomy of young adults is generally valued.
In short, it is evident that the sudden interest in Islamic marriages 
has been driven by the securitization of Islam, with the young women 
involved mainly considered to be victims of jihadist or salafi imams 
or, alternatively, as engaging in dubious Islamic sexual relations. This 
public attention has led to the criminalization of the imams involved 
in concluding these marriages. This raises a number of questions. Are 
these Islamic marriages a new phenomenon that emerged in 2005 with 
violent jihadism and then in 2008 with the growth of salafi Islam? 
Are the women who enter into such marriages indeed the victims of 
unscrupulous men and driven by ideological motivations to reject a 
civil marriage?
Dutch Islamic marriages in practice: multiple motivations  
and meanings52
As the discourse about the women involved in Islamic marriages un-
derlines that they are ‘the weaker party’ (and therefore in need of le-
gal protection), what might be their motivations for entering into such 
marriages? Before 2005, engaging in an Islamic marriage was not con-
sidered a societal problem or a legal concern, and hence, little attention 
was paid to such questions. Still, there are indications that the ways in 
which many migrants from Muslim majority countries concluded their 
marriages were rather similar to those they would have used in their 
country of origin. Also in the Netherlands, it was quite common for 
migrants from Muslim countries to use the gap between the conclusion 
of the marriage contract (whereupon the couple was married accord-
ing to Islam) and the actual wedding (after which the couple would live 
together) as some kind of dating period.
There were a number of options as to where to conclude an Islamic 
marriage contract. If neither party had Dutch nationality, they could 
conclude the marriage contract at the consulate, and they also could opt 
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for marriage in their country of origin. In countries where some form 
of Muslim family law was codified, such as in Morocco, for instance, 
marriages at the consulate, as in the home country, fulfilled both the 
conditions for an Islamic marriage and were recognized and registered 
by the state. These marriages were then also valid according to Dutch 
law.53 When one of the parties had also acquired Dutch nationality, only 
marrying at the consulate was no longer an option. In this case, a Dutch 
civil marriage was required before the couple in question could be mar-
ried at the consulate.54
The situation for those holding Turkish nationality is different, 
because in Turkey a distinction is made between a civil and a reli-
gious marriage, whereby the state only recognizes the former. As in the 
Netherlands, a civil marriage is required before a religious marriage 
can be concluded. For those who married at the consulate, the ques-
tion was whether and when to conclude the religious marriage. As has 
been the case in parts of Turkey, some couples decided to conclude a 
religious marriage (imam nikah) before entering into a civil marriage 
(resmi nikah). In more conservative circles, where there was little space 
for the young couple to date before concluding the Islamic marriage 
contract, the main motivation for doing so was that the young couple 
would then be able to get to know each other better without having to 
commit themselves to an official state-registered marriage.55 With the 
criminalization of Islamic marriages in the Netherlands, imams have 
become more hesitant to become involved in such marriages. As there 
is no Islamic ruling that an imam needs to be involved in the conclu-
sion of an Islamic marriage, people who are aware of this may simply 
decide to marry in the presence of two witnesses.56 In other cases, they 
try to find a middle way. Rather than looking for ‘an imam’, couples 
involve someone with ‘enough Islamic knowledge’ about how to con-
clude such a marriage. In some sense, this may be considered a way in 
which Islamic marriages are becoming more informal.
The above indicates that one reason for women to enter into an 
Islamic marriage before engaging in a civil marriage is that the tradi-
tional sequence of the arrangement and conclusion of a marriage is 
thereby followed, with the period between entering into the contract and 
the wedding itself, allowing for a degree of intimacy, for the preparation 
of the wedding and for setting up a new household. However, there are 
also more specific reasons why women in the Netherlands decide to first 
conclude an Islamic marriage. Below, I start by examining those cases 
in which the couple is not able or willing to conclude a civil marriage. 
Then I turn to the question that seems to haunt the Dutch authorities 
most: if no civil marriage is concluded, why enter into an Islamic mar-
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riage that has no legal effects in the Netherlands? Is it because the parties 
concerned are not aware of this? Are they perhaps under pressure to do 
so, or do they actively desire to enter into such a marriage?
Obstacles to concluding a civil marriage
In the course of the last thirty years, the Netherlands has witnessed a 
trend towards increasingly informal marriages. A growing number of 
couples simply cohabit without entering into a civil marriage or con-
cluding another form of contract.57 Some couples that conclude an Is-
lamic marriage, however, would actually have preferred to register their 
marriage, but they face the problem that they are not able to enter into 
a civil marriage. For in order to conclude such a marriage, a number of 
documents are needed, such as a legalized birth certificate, valid proof 
of identity and proof of civil status (that is, evidence of not being mar-
ried). Sometimes people do not have the required documents and are 
not able to acquire them, for instance if they are refugees. In other cases 
they do not have legal resident status and are thus very hesitant to even 
enter into the process of concluding a civil marriage, although this may 
be legally possible.
People are not only unable to conclude a civil marriage because 
they do not have the documents needed, however. Concluding a mar-
riage may also be impossible because they do not fulfil the conditions 
for a civil marriage. In the Netherlands, marriages between relatives 
in the first or second degree are forbidden (which is also the case in 
Islamic law), forced marriages are forbidden, neither party may already 
be married, and both need to be eighteen years or older (unless the 
woman has already given birth or is pregnant; then the minimum age is 
sixteen and the permission of the parents is needed). Statutory Muslim 
family laws have also often emphasized the need for consent to marry, 
institutionalized minimum ages for marriage (for instance, in Morocco 
the minimum age is also eighteen years), and have curtailed polyga-
mous marriages, although usually short of outright forbidding them. 
With respect to Muslim minorities in Europe, some Islamic scholars 
have argued strongly in favour of concluding a civil marriage contract, 
because only in that case are women’s rights guaranteed.58
If one of the parties is underage or already married, couples can-
not conclude a civil marriage in the Netherlands. How often couples 
conclude an Islamic marriage for such reasons is hard to say. A few of 
the women with whom I discussed marriage arrangements had entered 
into an Islamic marriage when they were sixteen years old. Polygamous 
marriages were occasionally mentioned, but only involved marriages 
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abroad. Roex59 also states that some of her salafi respondents married 
very young and that a few of her respondents were polygamously mar-
ried, but most of them were eighteen or older and the number of polyg-
amous marriages was very small.
An Islamic marriage has no legal effects under Dutch law, hence the 
parties concerned are seen as engaging in a sexual relationship out-
side of marriage, which is of no concern to the law.60 Yet, the ques-
tion remains whether such Islamic marriages may be unwanted by 
the women who enter into them. It is true that Islamic marriages may 
be used to bind youngsters at a young age, but there is no reason to 
assume that there is a direct relation between forced marriages and 
Islamic marriage.61 Civil marriages as well as sexual relations outside 
of marriage may be unwanted, while Islamic marriages may be strongly 
desired. The underage girls entering into an Islamic marriage who 
were involved in the Hofstad network, those mentioned by Roex and 
those whom I interviewed, were not pushed into such marriages by 
their parents, but rather did so without asking their opinion or for their 
approval. The same seems to be the case with the women who enter into 
a polygamous marriage.
Legal obstacles are not the only reason why Muslims refrain from 
civil marriage. Some are able to conclude a civil marriage, yet prefer 
not to do so, because they would find such a situation disadvantageous. 
Entering into a state-registered marriage may, for instance, cause the 
loss of social security benefits and other financial entitlements. Such 
considerations may also be found amongst non-Muslims in the Neth-
erlands as well as in Muslim majority countries, as the previous exam-
ple of Egyptian widows indicated. There is also a category of women 
that faces no legal impediments to entering into a civil marriage, but 
that, at least for the time being, refrains from doing so for very different 
reasons. These are ethnic Dutch women (often, but not always converts 
to Islam) who want to marry a Muslim partner, usually from a migrant 
background, who face strong resistance from their own family. In order 
not to antagonize their families or hurt their feelings, they may opt to 
enter into an Islamic marriage only. Their parents do not need to be 
involved in such a marriage, or even know about it, as it does not have 
legal effects, while by concluding an Islamic marriage they themselves 
engage in a licit sexual relationship according to Islam.
Opting for an Islamic marriage
If some Muslims in the Netherlands are unable or unwilling to con-
clude a civil marriage, this still begs the question, why opt for an Islamic 
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marriage? The narratives of women who enter into Islamic marriages 
point to two different lines of argumentation. Some do so in response 
to social pressure; to them, Islamic marriages are of little importance. 
Others, by contrast, actively desire to conclude an Islamic marriage. 
Due to their religious convictions, having an Islamic marriage is what 
counts most for them.
In more conservative Muslim circles in the Netherlands, parents may 
find it hard to accept that their son, or especially their daughter, has a 
relationship that is not quickly legitimized in the form of a marriage. 
Once some sort of relationship becomes apparent, the parents expect 
that marriage will soon follow. As a result, the couple may feel strong 
social pressure to enter into a marriage for which they themselves do 
not feel ready. In such cases, concluding an Islamic marriage may be 
a convenient solution. By doing so, they can show their consideration 
for the concerns of their parents, who consider an Islamic marriage to 
be crucially important, and avoid offending them. Having grown up 
in the Netherlands and being aware of mainstream Dutch ideas about 
relationships and marriage, they themselves may hold quite different 
ideas and may value the civil marriage as the real marriage. To them, 
concluding an Islamic marriage is a means to appease their parents and 
the larger Muslim community, while they consider the period between 
concluding the Islamic marriage and, if things work out well, register-
ing a civil marriage as a ‘try-out’ period that is quite similar to dating.
However, these youngsters are faced with the criminalization of 
imams who conclude such Islamic marriages. While some will either 
do without an imam or find someone ‘knowledgeable’ about Islam to be 
involved in the Islamic marriage, others opt to marry in the country of 
origin. Often having spent most, if not all, of their lives in the Nether-
lands, they do not always take such marriages very seriously. However, as 
such a marriage in the country of origin is often officially registered, it is 
legally valid, not only there, but also in the Netherlands. If the marriage 
does not work out, and especially if the husband subsequently refuses to 
cooperate in the dissolution of the marriage, the wife may discover that 
it can take a lot of effort, time, and money to arrange a divorce.
An Islamic marriage may also function as a means for a woman to 
convince her family to agree to a marriage to a man of her own choos-
ing. Although family pressure in Muslim migrant circles, especially 
those who have been in the Netherlands for a long time, has gradu-
ally diminished, and most parents would not push their children into a 
marriage they actively resisted, parents may refuse to accept the choice 
a daughter has made. Some families are, for instance, hesitant about 
a partner from another ethnic background, or one who is not a born 
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Muslim but has converted to Islam. If the couple can find an imam who 
is respected by their families and who is willing to conclude an Islamic 
marriage, this may solve the problem. Once they are married according 
to Islam, the parents may well decide that it will be of little use to exert 
further pressure.
Actively desiring an Islamic marriage
If for some couples, engaging in an Islamic marriage is simply a con-
venient solution to mediate between the normative ideas of older and 
younger generations of Muslims from migrant backgrounds, then 
those who enter into an Islamic marriage out of conviction follow very 
different lines of argumentation. Expressing a strong commitment to 
Islam, they tend to experience their religion in more strictly orthodox 
ways. Some of them may be part of the salafi Muslim circles that have 
been the focus of much public debate and political concern. For these 
Muslims, an Islamic marriage is their first priority, as it makes their re-
lationship permissible under Islam.
Rather than a means to enable a form of dating (during the period 
between concluding the marriage contract and the public wedding), 
amongst women who actively desire an Islamic marriage, dating is often 
purposely rejected. This category, which includes both born Muslimahs 
and also a relatively large number of new Muslimahs (women who have 
converted to Islam), holds different convictions about the preferred way 
to conclude a marriage, from the moment of getting acquainted to the 
wedding ceremony. Their preferences differ not only from mainstream 
Dutch conventions, but also from those of many Muslims from migrant 
backgrounds. They often strongly support the normative notion of gen-
der segregation. Before the marriage contract is concluded, the man 
and the woman only meet each other a limited number of times, and 
always in public; that is, in the company of others or in a public setting. 
They use these meetings to exchange ideas about how they would like 
to organize their marital relations, what they expect from each other, 
and sometimes write this down in the form of marital conditions. Then 
they search in their own circles for someone with Islamic knowledge 
to be involved in the conclusion of the marriage contract. This is espe-
cially important for a new Muslimah, because her non-Muslim father 
cannot function as her marriage guardian; this becomes the responsi-
bility of an imam. Such Islamic marriages are not only very different 
from the Dutch notion of dating; born Muslimahs from migrant back-
grounds also emphasize that such marriages differ greatly from tradi-
tional arranged marriages, where parents are also strongly involved in 
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the choice of partner, but which focus more on family relations and 
material matters than on character and religiosity. The wedding itself 
is also often celebrated in a different way. With more gender segrega-
tion and with music that is limited to the singing of religious hymns 
(anashid), often by the female friends of the bride, the wedding fes-
tivities are generally smaller-scale and far less commercialized than is 
common in Muslim migrant circles.
Still, a commitment to an ‘Islamic marriage and wedding’ does not 
imply that the women concerned reject civil marriage. Rather, they 
deal with civil marriage in a pragmatic manner. At some point in time, 
they may well conclude a civil marriage, because it is the most con-
venient way to safeguard financial rights, such as entitlements to one’s 
husband’s pension, inheritance rights, and the relationship with their 
children. Such considerations are very similar to those made by non-
Muslim Dutch when dealing with the question of whether to officially 
marry or not.
Temporary Shia marriages
Shia Muslims only make up about 10 per cent of the Dutch Muslim 
population. Mainly coming from Iranian, Iraqi, Afghan and Pakistani 
backgrounds, there are great differences in their level of commitment 
to Islamic law. For those who came to the Netherlands from Iran, often 
as refugees after the Islamic revolution, following the shari῾a is often 
not a major concern in everyday life. To those who came from South-
ern Iraq, fleeing Saddam Hussein’s regime after the failed uprising in 
1991, Islamic law is often an important guideline.62
When Shi῾ites in the Netherlands conclude a temporary marriage, 
this is a highly informal affair. Many of these marriages are concluded 
between Shia men and ethnic Dutch women, who are non-Muslim 
at the time of marriage. For the men involved, such a marriage has a 
strong religious meaning.63 Whereas in a country such as Iran, some 
couples conclude a temporary marriage simply to avoid the accusation 
of zina and the risk of prosecution, in the Netherlands, pre-marital sex 
is not a concern of the legislature. If a Shia man in the Netherlands 
concludes an Islamic marriage with an ethnic Dutch woman, he does 
so because he does not want to engage in a relationship with a woman 
(which may well mean any kind of dating) with whom he has not con-
cluded an Islamic marriage. The women involved in such marriages, 
who tend to be unfamiliar with the concept of a temporary marriage, 
may simply agree to them because they sense that such an arrangement 
is important to their partner. These temporary marriages are concluded 
AUP_Berger_vierde.indd   157 19-4-2013   12:25:37
158 applying shari῾a in the west
in a highly informal manner, not only without a religious functionary, 
but also without witnesses, and the dower demanded by the woman – 
on the request of her husband – is usually insignificant. In fact, many of 
the women involved would not agree to conclude a more formal form 
of marriage, let alone a civil marriage, as it would be far too early in the 
relationship for them. It is precisely because a temporary marriage is 
so informal and has no legal effects that they agree to such marriage. 
The risks Haeri sees for women who engage in unregistered Shia mar-
riages in Iran, where rights to maintenance are more important and 
non-virginity is culturally more problematic, are far less relevant in the 
Dutch context.64
Some Dutch women who initially conclude a temporary marriage 
for the sake of their partners gradually start to see its value and take it 
more seriously, especially when they feel attracted to Islam and convert. 
However, they may also express some ambivalence about this institu-
tion, because of their concerns that men may abuse it as an easy means 
to engage in a large number of sexual relationships with few obliga-
tions. Socializing in circles of born Shia women, they become aware of 
the fact that women from countries such as Iraq are far more hesitant 
to conclude a temporary marriage, as for them, temporary marriages 
often have negative connotations.
Conclusion
Both in Muslim majority settings and in the Netherlands, women who 
engage in unregistered Islamic marriages have been defined as the vic-
tims of men. It is true that some of these marriages do not work, or may 
even be highly exploitative, but this is not necessarily a consequence 
of how these marriages are concluded. Women have a wide variety of 
motivations for entering into and consenting to unregistered Islamic 
marriages prior to, or even instead of, a registered or civil marriage. 
They may be simply unable to officially register a marriage, find it too 
disadvantageous, or feel that they and their partner are not yet ready 
for an official marriage in either a material or an emotional sense. In-
stead, they may opt to conclude an unregistered Islamic marriage to 
legitimize their relationship. In some cases, women may enter into an 
Islamic marriage as a means to force their parents to agree with their 
choice of partner. For others, especially more strictly orthodox or salafi 
women, an Islamic marriage is what really counts.
In mainstream public discourse, however, unregistered Islamic mar-
riages are considered to be highly undesirable. In Muslim majority 
AUP_Berger_vierde.indd   158 19-4-2013   12:25:37
unregistered islamic marriages 159
countries, the main issue at stake is that such unregistered marriages 
undermine established structures of authority. Unregistered marriages 
amongst young people are a particular source of concern, as they chal-
lenge a whole set of strongly intertwined authority structures. They do 
not simply defy the state authorities, but also go against the grain of 
gender and generational hierarchies. They challenge the authority of 
the parents, which is especially problematic in the case of daughters, 
and go against the opinions of at least some religious figures. Unreg-
istered marriages such as those conducted by older single women or 
women who have previously been married tend to be deemed less 
problematic, as these simultaneously function as a solution to social 
concerns about a ‘woman without a man’. For these women, unregis-
tered marriages may entail a level of autonomy that is not recognized in 
the conventional marriage contract, while men are not burdened with 
the obligations that such a contract brings. Whereas religious authori-
ties are very hesitant about unregistered marriages and may consider 
them a threat to societal stability, they may also recognize that there 
are grounds for considering them permissible under Islam. Moreover, 
some also recognize that changing societal conditions, such as the ten-
dency to delay marriage, require unconventional solutions.
The concerns in the Netherlands about Islamic marriages are very 
different. In this case, state authorities do not object to the fact that 
the couple does not conclude a civil marriage. Instead, they consider it 
problematic that they enter into an Islamic marriage, considering this an 
indication and instrument of radicalization and an attempt to develop a 
parallel society based on the shari῾a. As has become evident, rather than 
finding themselves in the position of passive victims, young women 
often actively partake in the arrangement of an Islamic marriage, and 
may well enter into a civil marriage later. They have a great variety of 
reasons to do so. For some, it is because they consider the civil marriage 
‘the real marriage’ that they do not yet want to conclude a civil marriage. 
Moreover, amongst those for whom an Islamic marriage is of para-
mount importance, there is no indication that they actively refuse a civil 
marriage for ideological reasons (or would do so more consistently than 
non-Muslim Dutch). After all, the Roman-Catholic Church also only 
recognizes Roman Catholic marriages as real marriages, and considers 
civil marriage to be a merely administrative act. In fact, these women 
deal with civil marriage in a way that is very similar to that adopted 
by their non-Muslims: they follow a pragmatic approach. The paradox 
is thus that whereas the Netherlands has witnessed a strong tendency 
towards more informal marriages in the last four decades, in the case 
of Muslims, an ideological commitment to civil marriage is required.
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9 Understanding and Use of Islamic Family 
Law Rules in German Courts
The Example of the Mahr
Nadjma Yassari
Introduction
This chapter will address the question of how domestic courts may ac-
commodate foreign legal institutions within the scope of their own le-
gal system. The example chosen is the Islamic dower (mahr), as it is the 
most prominent institution of Islamic family law adjudicated in Ger-
man courts for over forty years.1 For this purpose, the following ques-
tions will be raised: first, what is the mahr, and second, how is the mahr 
understood and interpreted by German courts?2 These questions will 
be discussed by focusing on two aspects: first, the legal techniques at 
hand in order to fit the mahr into German law, and second, the ways 
parties argue their cases.
Generally speaking, the mahr is a legal institution of Islamic fam-
ily law, consisting of an asset of monetary value that the husband gives 
his wife upon marriage.3 Usually the payment of the mahr is split into 
two halves: one part, the so-called proper dower, is due at the time the 
marriage is concluded, and the other part, the so-called deferred mahr, 
is due at the time the marriage is dissolved. It may also be that the full 
payment of the mahr is deferred to the time of the dissolution of the 
marriage. The mahr can appear in a domestic court essentially by two 
means. First, in cases involving foreigners, the rules of private interna-
tional law may point to the application of a foreign law under which 
the mahr has been contracted. In these cases, the German courts have 
to apply the applicable law and decide on the mahr according to those 
foreign rules. There are many examples of such cases in German courts. 
However, the conflict of laws rule may also point to the application of 
German domestic law. These cases particularly concern parties who 
are citizens of different (Islamic) countries, so that, according to the 
German conflict of laws rules, the law of habitual residence (that is, 
German law) applies. Additionally, cases have occurred where German 
Muslims had agreed on a mahr, which the wife then claimed under the 
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provisions of German family law. As the mahr is foreign to German 
domestic law, courts often struggle to understand and appropriately 
accommodate it within their own legal framework.
The common thread running through the struggle to accommodate 
the mahr in a German setting is – in accordance with the German the-
ory of functional approach (funktionale Qualifikation)4 imported from 
the field of private international law – the search for the function of 
the mahr. In doing so one must, as a first step, determine the func-
tion and aims of the foreign institution according to its native law (the 
law under which it has been contracted) in order to be able, in a sec-
ond step, to accommodate it within similar legal instruments available 
under domestic law.
In the following, we will first discuss the function of the mahr. This 
will be done in great detail, which is necessary to get a proper under-
standing of the problems we encounter in the German court rulings 
on this matter. In these rulings, we will limit ourselves to an analysis of 
the judicature of the German Federal Supreme Court, with a focus on 
its legal techniques as well as the cultural and religious arguments put 
forward by the parties.
Function of the Mahr
When analysing the many purposes and aims that have been attributed 
to the mahr, two categories can be distinguished: material and immate-
rial functions.
Immaterial functions
The mahr is said to be a token of the husband’s respect for the wife and a 
sign of his commitment to marriage.5 It furthermore touches upon the 
idea of prestige, as the mahr is considered to correspond to the level of 
desirability of the wife and the financial potential of the husband.6 In 
addition, it is argued that a high mahr may deter the husband from a 
quick and thoughtless repudiation and prevent him from engaging in 
polygamy, since a new mahr is due for all subsequent marriages.7 These 
functions are meant to influence the behaviour of the parties to act in 
a specific manner or are expressions of a certain status of the wife and/
or the husband. As such, the mahr is seen as a bargaining tool in the 
negotiations of spouses of Islamic origin.8
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Material functions
Additionally, there are material or economic aspects to the mahr: it is 
supposed to ensure financial security when paid as a prompt mahr at 
the time of the conclusion of the marriage, by providing the wife with a 
certain degree of economic independence and enabling her to build up 
her own property.9 It has also been seen as a financial cushion after di-
vorce, since in most Islamic countries, there is no substantial post-mar-
ital support for the wife.10 And finally, it has also been argued that the 
mahr is conceived to counterbalance the lesser inheritance rights of the 
wife in the case of the husband’s death.11 This last function is particu-
larly raised in view of the husband’s potential polygamous marriages, as 
the inheritance portion of the wife will have to be divided between all 
wives. In the words of Indian scholar Asaf Fyzee, in a nutshell, the mahr 
is ‘a provision for a rainy day’.12
The Mahr in the Classical Works of the Fuqaha’
A look at the fiqh works of classical Islamic scholars, on the other hand, 
reveals that none of these functions of the mahr has been really dis-
cussed in depth. Instead, the mahr is dealt with as a contract of ex-
change, governed by the rules of the contract of sale.13 In this context, 
some have interpreted the mahr as being the counter value for the sex-
ual submission of the wife in marriage.14 This interpretation has been 
taken up by some German courts to designate the mahr as the ‘price for 
the sexuality of the wife’.15
Evaluation of the Mahr
In evaluating the aforementioned functions, it will be shown that the 
economic function of the mahr is predominant. As will be explained 
in the paragraphs below, the interpretation of the mahr as being the 
price for marital cohabitation is not sustainable. It is true that, in cer-
tain cases, the mahr has a symbolic value and that, in other cases, it 
has deterred husbands from thoughtless repudiation. However, today, 
the mahr is mostly a significant financial instrument of family law in 
Islamic countries.
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The mahr as a counter value for marital cohabitation?
If the mahr were to be considered the counter value for marital cohabi-
tation, its implementation in German courts could become difficult in 
view of the principle of public policy. According to this principle, a for-
eign legal provision shall not be applicable if the result of its application 
is obviously incompatible with essential principles of German law. This 
is particularly the case when the foreign rule is incompatible with the 
German Basic Law, the Grundgesetz. Putting a monetary value on mari-
tal cohabitation would therefore be a matter of public policy. The read-
ing of the mahr as such a monetary counter value is, however, the result 
of a misinterpretation of the mahr. Generally, the advocates of such a 
theory base their view on two arguments: first, the nature of the mahr 
as a contract of exchange and the application of the rules of the contract 
of sale on the mahr agreement; and second, the fact that the mahr is 
forfeited when a marriage is dissolved before its consummation. Both 
arguments are – as will be shown below – unsustainable.
First, the fact that the mahr is considered a contract of exchange 
governed by the rules of the contract of sale does not necessarily justify 
the conclusion that the mahr is a ‘purchase price’ for marital cohabita-
tion. It is true that, in the literature, the agreement on mahr is called 
a reciprocal exchange contract (Arabic mu‘āwada), to which the rules 
of the sales contract are applicable.16 This has a specific background, 
however: Islamic law does not know any general theory of contract.17 
General rules are derived from the regulations of model contracts, such 
as the contract of sale.18 Thus, the link to the sales contract does not 
reflect the nature of the mahr being a sales or leasing contract of female 
sexuality, but is derived from the structure of Islamic contract law.19 
It highlights that the regulations of the sales contract can be applied 
as general rules to certain aspects of the mahr.20Accordingly, anything 
that can be the subject of a contract of sale can be chosen as the subject 
of the mahr. Additionally, the conditions of a valid purchase price must 
also be observed for the mahr: the mahr should have a monetary value, 
be determinable and its performance has to be possible and legal.
Second, it is true that under certain circumstances the mahr is for-
feited when a marriage is dissolved before its consummation. There-
fore, there is a connection between the mahr and marital cohabitation. 
These regulations, however, do not offer a consistent picture: whereas 
the wife is entitled to half of the mahr if her husband divorces her prior 
to consummation,21 this is not the case when the spouses die before 
consummation. In this case, the wife keeps her right to the full mahr, 
and that right will be inherited by her heirs.22 On the other hand, the 
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wife may refuse to comply with her marital duties as long as the mahr 
has not been given to her.23 However, this right of retention is a uni-
lateral right of the wife; the husband cannot refrain from paying the 
mahr because the marriage has not been consummated: he must pay 
the mahr prior to consummation.24 Thus, there is no reciprocity in this 
right. If the mahr were really the counter value for marital cohabitation, 
its regulations would have to be much more stringent and comparable 
to the purchase price in a contract of sale. This is, however, not the 
case. The wife is still entitled to the mahr, even if she has not ‘fulfilled 
her duty’. As a matter of fact, many of these regulations are explicable 
by their historical context. Very often, there would be a considerable 
gap between the time when the marriage was contracted and the time 
when the marriage was actually consummated. This was particularly 
the case when minors were married, or in marriages by proxy where 
the husband-to-be was absent. If, in the meantime, the marriage was 
dissolved by the husband, half of the mahr became due. Some argue 
that this amount was meant to compensate the girls for their reduced 
chances of remarriage. In other words, it constitutes some kind of dam-
ages awarded to the girl for the delay or the shortfall of a financial pro-
vider. Others argue that half of the mahr was due in order to compen-
sate the husband for the expenses incurred in view of the marriage.25 
Finally, one has to consider the marriage, its consummation and the 
mahr as a unity. It is true that the consummation of the marriage is not 
a condition for its validity. However, marriage is considered to be the 
only legal framework within which sexual activities are allowed and 
even a duty. Thus, some authors hold that only by the consummation 
of marriage, the process of marrying is ‘completed’.26 Consequently, the 
reduction of the mahr in case of a repudiation before consummation is 
not so much linked to the concept of the mahr as the ‘price for marital 
sexual cohabitation’, but is rather connected to the not yet completed 
process of marrying.
The mahr as an economic factor
The predominance of the economic function of the mahr is very well 
illustrated by the immaterial functions attributed to it. All aforemen-
tioned immaterial functions will only materialize if the mahr is of a 
substantial financial value. What kind of prestige or seriousness would 
be expressed by a low mahr? How could a low mahr deter the husband 
from repudiating his wife or prevent him from entering into a second 
marriage? Furthermore, a look at the practice of mahr reveals its eco-
nomic importance: in Iran, for example, 80 per cent of divorces are 
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khul῾ divorces, whereby, in the absence of legal or contractual grounds 
for divorce, the wife can gain the consent of her husband to divorce in 
return for some kind of consideration.27 This consideration is usually a 
part or the whole of her mahr. According to a survey conducted by the 
magazine zanān, Iranian women often try to negotiate a high mahr in 
order to exit an unwanted marriage more easily while at the same time 
keeping some parts of the mahr for financial security.28
New legislation in some Muslim countries also highlights the eco-
nomic importance of the mahr. The regulations in Iran, Iraq and the 
United Arab Emirates illustrate this very well. In 1998, the Iranian leg-
islator enacted a new law, the ‘Act on the Adaptation of the Value of the 
Mahr to the Inflation Rate’, according to which a mahr contracted in 
Iranian currency must be adjusted by the inflation rate at the time it is 
claimed (which, as we have seen, can be many years after the mahr had 
been agreed).29 Under Iranian law, the agreement on the mahr figures 
in the standardized marriage contract as prompt mahr, meaning that 
it must be handed to the wife upon her request. In general, as long as 
the marriage is working and the couple lives happily together, hardly 
any woman claims her mahr during the marriage. In most cases, the 
mahr is claimed, like the deferred mahr, upon dissolution of the mar-
riage, whereby the time gap between these two moments can be cru-
cial, implying a substantial deflation of the monetary value. In order 
to secure the stability of the mahr and to ensure that women are not 
deprived of their rights, the amount of the mahr must be adapted to the 
inflation rate.
Based on similar grounds, in 1999, a decree was issued in Iraq,30 
ordering the value of the deferred mahr, expressed in Iraqi currency, 
to be adapted to its gold value at the time of the conclusion of the mar-
riage.31 Earlier, in 1997, the United Arab Emirates enacted a federal law, 
the ‘Act on the Limitation of the Amount of the Mahr in the Marriage 
Contract and the Expenses Incurring for Marriage’, to limit the amount 
of the mahr.32 This law contrasts with the two previous laws in that it 
puts a ceiling on the amount of the mahr. Accordingly the prompt mahr 
is limited to 30,000 dirhams and the deferred mahr to 50,000 dirhams 
(roughly 6,000 and 10,000 euros, respectively). The explanatory mem-
orandum33 of the Emirati Personal Status Act34 makes clear that this law 
was enacted to limit the extremely high marriage expenditure, which 
has led to a substantial age gap between the spouses, with Emirati men 
taking foreign wives and men incurring debts to afford the expenses of 
marriage.35 This also points to the economic importance of the mahr.
To sum up, today, the primary – though not only – function of the 
mahr is to provide economic security for the wife.36
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German Case Law
With this background in mind, we now turn to German case law. So 
far, the German Federal Supreme Court (bgh) has decided on the mat-
ter on three occasions.37 The case law will be analysed under the two 
abovementioned aspects of the court’s legal techniques and the argu-
mentation brought forward by the parties.
Decision of the Supreme Court of 28 January 198738
In this case, the parties had married in 1976 in Munich. The wife was 
a Muslim Palestinian with an Israeli passport. The husband was Ger-
man. Both were students. They had a civil marriage first and, for the 
sake of the religious wedding, which took place afterwards, the hus-
band converted to Islam. In the certification of their religious marriage, 
the spouses agreed on the payment of 100,000 Deutschmarks (dm) as a 
mahr. Four years later, in 1980, the parties were divorced by the judge-
ment of a German court under the application of German law. Addi-
tionally, the husband, in the absence of the wife, pronounced an Islamic 
divorce in the mosque where they had married. In the certification of 
the religious divorce witnessed by the imam, the husband included in 
handwriting the sentence that there were no financial claims between 
the parties. The wife contested this and petitioned for the payment of 
the mahr. The Court of First Instance recognized the wife’s claim as an 
agreement on post-marital maintenance and ordered the man to pay 
the dower of 100,000 dm.39
The Court of Appeal overturned the judgement and rebutted the 
validity of the wife’s claim. It argued that an agreement for the payment 
of a mahr that had been made in the course of a religious marriage 
was not valid, since religious marriages as such had no effect under 
German law. However, the Court conceded that even in the case that 
the agreement on the mahr was to be considered valid, it had to be 
qualified under German law as a stipulation of a marriage contract, that 
is, an agreement on the matrimonial property regime. These kinds of 
agreements had to be authenticated by a notary. Thus, it did not recog-
nize the mahr because of the lack of these formalities.40 The wife finally 
sought the revision of the decision at the Supreme Court.
What arguments did the parties make, and how did the Supreme 
Court respond? The husband argued that he had not been aware of the 
fact that he was committing himself legally and binding himself when 
signing the agreement. He argued that he had believed the agreement 
to be just a ‘formality’ without legal effects, that is, some kind of folklor-
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istic addition to the wedding. The wife, on the other hand, argued that 
both had meant the agreement to be binding and that the husband had 
been fully aware of this, since extensive negotiations on the mahr had 
been conducted between him and her father beforehand. In evaluating 
these arguments, the Supreme Court held, first, that the reservation of 
the husband would only be legally relevant if the wife had been aware 
of it. A secret reservation on the binding character of the commitment 
is not relevant under German law. Second, if the husband really had 
not been serious about this commitment, he would have had to contest 
the agreement for error within the legal time frame, which had already 
expired. Finally, the court held that a person who, for the sake of a reli-
gious marriage, had converted to another religion, could not claim to 
not have been aware of the effects of such marriage, and in particular 
that a mahr was due in a Muslim marriage.
As far as the validity of the mahr agreement was concerned, the 
Supreme Court held that, although the religious marriage did not have 
any effect under German law, this did not affect the validity of the mahr. 
It suffices that the religious marriage was valid under considerations of 
religious/Islamic law as perceived under the law applicable to Muslim 
Israelis. As there was no obstacle to the validity of the marriage, the 
agreement on the mahr had to be considered valid. The court did not 
consider the aspect of public policy or raise the question as to whether 
the mahr did or did not exist in German law. It considered it a valid 
agreement and went on to its interpretation.
The Supreme Court, however, did not decide on the categorization 
of the mahr within domestic family law. The Court objected to both 
interpretations of the lower courts, since it held that the lower courts 
had failed to consider the intention of the parties when agreeing on the 
mahr. However, it gave some indications as to how this intention had to 
be sought. Within the framework of German rules governing the inter-
pretation of contracts, due respect was to be awarded to the principle 
of good faith and good morals. Furthermore, the circumstances of the 
case, such as the duration of the marriage, had to be considered to dis-
cover the real intention of the parties. As a result, the Supreme Court 
recommitted the case to the Court of Appeal for further investigations. 
The parties finally settled the case outside the court.
Decision of the Supreme Court of 14 October 199841
In the second case, the parties, a German woman and a Syrian man, 
had married in 1976 in Germany. The husband later acquired German 
citizenship. Before their civil marriage, the parties concluded a German 
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marriage contract which was authenticated according to German law. In 
the marriage contract, the husband agreed to pay his future wife a mahr 
of 20,000 dm; 10,000 on the conclusion of the marriage and 10,000 if 
the husband’s behaviour entitled the wife to ask for the dissolution of 
the marriage. The marriage contract explicitly enunciated the cases in 
which the wife would be entitled to ask for the dissolution of the mar-
riage. Those cases included the grounds for divorce under German law.
In 1995, the couple was divorced by a German court. The wife remar-
ried two months later and sued her ex-husband for the payment of the 
mahr shortly afterwards. He refused to pay either the prompt mahr he 
had not honoured at the time of marriage or the deferred mahr due at 
the time of divorce. The Court of First Instance ruled that the woman 
had forgone her right to the prompt mahr since she had not claimed it, 
but ordered the ex-husband to pay the deferred mahr, which was due at 
the moment of the divorce.42 The ex-husband objected, but the decision 
was upheld on appeal. The Court of Appeal did not try to fit the agree-
ment on the mahr into any of the German categories of family law. The 
court rather considered the agreement to be an independent acknowl-
edgement of debt (German Schuldversprechen), which, under German 
law, was valid and had to be honoured.43 The Court of Appeal looked at 
the terms of the agreement and concluded that the parties had intended 
the wife to be able to claim the deferred mahr if she had a reason under 
the marriage contract to get a divorce. Since this held true, the wife was 
entitled to 10,000 dm.
The husband petitioned for revision at the Supreme Court. The 
Supreme Court rejected the assumption that the mahr was an inde-
pendent acknowledgement of debt, since this kind of agreement does 
not mention the reason for the payment. In the case of the mahr, how-
ever, the reason, that is, the mahr, was explicitly mentioned. Again, the 
Supreme Court criticized the lower courts for not taking into account 
the intentions of the parties. In particular, the Supreme Court criticized 
the lower courts for failing to consider whether the agreement on the 
deferred mahr was intended to be a post-marital claim. This was of par-
ticular importance, as the wife had re-married soon after her divorce 
and post-marital maintenance is only due as long as the ex-wife does 
not have a new spouse.
Decision of the Supreme Court of 9 December 200944
The third and most recent case involved an Iranian couple who had 
married in 1992 in Tehran with a mahr of 15 million Iranian rials pay-
able at any time at the demand of the wife. In 1993, the spouses left 
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Iran and settled in Germany, where both acquired German citizen-
ship. The couple divorced in 2006 in Germany, according to German 
law. Later on, the wife petitioned for the payment of the mahr. One of 
the main problems in this case was the characterization of the mahr 
and its submission to one of the available conflict of laws rules.45 This 
choice and the resulting law applicable had a considerable effect on the 
outcome of the trial. The wife argued that the mahr had to be governed 
by Iranian law and, in application of Iranian law, the amount that was 
due had to be adapted to the inflation rate, according to the aforemen-
tioned ‘Act on the Adaptation of the Value of the Mahr to the Inflation 
Rate’. As a result, the sum of 15 million Iranian rials would amount 
to approximately 15,000 euros, whereas without such adaptation, the 
counter value of 15 million rials would be only 1,500 euros, thus ten 
times less.
The husband, on the other hand, argued that the mahr had been 
agreed in Iran under the presumption that the spouses were to live 
there. Now that they had changed their domicile, this change of cir-
cumstances defeated his reasons for agreeing on a mahr. As the circum-
stances had changed, the mahr agreement had to be considered void. 
According to him, the applicable law was German law. As this law did 
not know any such institution as the mahr, there was no legal basis for 
its award. In any event, when applying German law, Iranian law was to 
be considered in so far as the wife had forfeited her right to the mahr, 
because it was she who had petitioned for the divorce. Her petition for 
divorce was thus to be seen as a request for a khul῾, in which she had to 
waive her right to the mahr. The husband also argued that the function 
of the mahr was to deter husbands from divorcing their wives. In the 
case that the wife herself had petitioned for divorce, she had forgone 
this protection herself and could thus not claim for a mahr.
The Court of First Instance decided in favour of the husband. It 
argued that the main function of the mahr was the financial protection 
of the wife in case of divorce. Since the parties had moved to Germany 
and had got a divorce under German law, the wife had profited from the 
post-marital protection awarded to her under German law, which had 
improved her financial post-marital position considerably as compared 
to Iranian law, which hardly knows any post-marital financial claim. 
The mahr had thus lost its raison d’être. However, in contradiction to its 
own arguments, it upheld that the agreement on the mahr as a contrac-
tual obligation had to be fulfilled, even if only with its counter value at 
the time of the claim, which was 1,500 euros.46
The Court of Appeal overturned the case by choosing a differ-
ent characterization of the mahr under the conflict of laws rules. In 
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doing so, it submitted the case to Iranian law and adapted the sum of 
15 million rials to the Iranian inflation rate, awarding the wife a sum of 
roughly 15,000 euros.47 The Court of Appeal did not address the ques-
tion of whether she had lost her claim because she had petitioned for 
divorce, that is, the question of whether the fact that the wife had asked 
for divorce led automatically to the loss of the mahr.
The husband challenged the decision at the Supreme Court and won 
the case. The Supreme Court first decided the question of the charac-
terization of the mahr. His decision led to the applicability of German 
law. Within German law, the Supreme Court recognized the validity 
of the mahr agreement as a valid contractual commitment that had to 
be honoured by the husband. It refused, however, an adaptation to the 
inflation rate according to Iranian law, since that law was not applica-
ble. Again, the Supreme Court emphasized that the intention of the 
parties was to be consulted in order to understand the nature of their 
agreement. Obiter dictum, the Supreme Court rebutted the argument 
that the wife had lost her claim to the mahr, because it was she who 
had petitioned for divorce. However, as in this case, the amount of the 
mahr was not considerable, the Supreme Court did not find it necessary 
to expand more on the nature of the mahr agreement or any problem 
which might occur under German law, in particular the embedding of 
the mahr within the institution of German family law. This question 
still remains open.
Evaluation of the Cases
The arguments of the parties
In evaluating the legal and cultural argumentation of the parties, one 
can distinguish three layers of argumentation. First, the legal and the 
cultural religious arguments are intermixed and these aspects are high-
lighted according to the position taken. The religious background and 
motivation for concluding such an agreement is evident. The legal basis 
for the award of the mahr in German courts, however, remains the con-
tractual agreement by the spouses. The basis on which German courts 
approach such agreements is from the perspective of contract law, 
hence the general rules for the conclusion of contracts and the principle 
of freedom of contract in family law in particular. The cultural and re-
ligious arguments are then put forward by the parties to underpin their 
respective positions: the wife claims that the mahr is her religious right, 
even outside the socio-legal and religious framework within which 
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the agreement was made in the first place. The husband equally raises 
the cultural and socio-legal aspect of the mahr when claiming that, in 
another legal and social setting than the one under which the mahr 
was conceived, the mahr loses its raison d’être and therefore should no 
longer be upheld and honoured.
The question of whether the mahr is contrary to public policy and 
good morals also falls within the ambit of this layer. Men often argue 
that the mahr, in its presumed concept as counter value for marital 
cohabitation, infringes the rule of domestic public policy. Women, on 
the other hand, emphasize that the mahr is an instrument of empower-
ment in a family law system which is intrinsically patriarchal: consider-
ing the mahr as an equalizer of the bargaining powers of the spouses, 
the mahr must, therefore, pass the barrier of public policy. The social, 
cultural and religious backgrounds of mahr agreements are thus picked 
up when convenient and dropped when they fail to strengthen the indi-
vidual position of the party.
Second, one can observe a mixing of the applicable domestic and 
displaced foreign law. Both spouses try to import that from the for-
eign, Islamic-based family law which is favourable to them. This is quite 
visible in the 2009 case, where the wife attempts to have the amount 
of the mahr raised through the application of the Iranian ‘Act on the 
Adaptation of the Value of the Mahr to the Inflation Rate’, whereas the 
husband, while rebutting the application of that act, pleads within the 
application of German law for the taking into account of the khul῾ rules 
under Iranian law to see the wife lose her right to the mahr.
Finally, there is a mixture of foreign and domestic procedural law. 
Whereas Iranian procedural law accords different rights and duties to 
the spouses, depending on who petitioned for the divorce, German 
procedural law is gender-neutral. Accordingly, German divorce law 
generally does not take into account who demanded the divorce first 
or whether that party is at fault. Under Iranian and Islamic-based fam-
ily laws in general, on the other side, the legal implications of a divorce 
differ according to the gender of the plaintiff: whereas the husband 
does not need any reasons to petition for divorce, the wife has to argue 
her case on the basis of legal or contractual divorce grounds. In both 
cases, the wife is entitled to her mahr and any post-marital claim, as 
far as available. If, however, the husband does not apply for divorce or 
the wife is unable to prove her divorce grounds, she can only base her 
divorce petition on a khul῾ divorce, in which she has to forego to a cer-
tain extent her right to the mahr and/or other financial entitlements. By 
blending German procedural and Iranian substantive law, the husband 
attempted to suppress the wife’s claim to the mahr.48
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The arguments of the Supreme Court
None of the three decisions of the Supreme Court explicitly gives an 
answer to the question of how to accommodate the mahr in German 
law. In fact, the decisions are all formulated very prudently. A first basic 
statement is the acknowledgement of the validity of mahr agreements 
in general. Thus, the Supreme Court dismissed the argument that mahr 
agreements must be void, since the institution as such is alien to Ger-
man law, or that mahr agreements are contrary to public policy, like 
some lower courts had argued before.49 Instead, the Court established 
the validity of mahr agreements as a contractual agreement between 
spouses, covered by the principle of freedom of contract in family law. 
As such, the mahr agreement needs to fulfil the basic requirements of 
a contractual agreement, that is, the consent of the parties and the ab-
sence of duress and error. Furthermore, the Court rightly considered 
the mahr to be a specific feature of marriage law, which presupposes a 
valid marriage.
The question of whether a religious marriage alone would suffice as 
grounds for claiming the mahr was not directly answered. It is, however, 
hardly conceivable that a purely religious ceremony, which according 
to German law is not considered a valid marriage, may be legitimate 
grounds for a mahr claim.50 Even if one considers the 1987 case where 
the court had based its decision on the validity of the religious mar-
riage, the court kept in mind that the parties had also had a civil mar-
riage in Germany. One must thus conclude that a mahr agreement will 
only be honoured if the parties are considered validly married under 
German law.
The question as to the nature of the mahr agreement and its categori-
zation under German law was, however, not answered by the Supreme 
Court. Instead, the Supreme Court stated that the mahr agreement had 
to be interpreted according to the intention of the spouses while con-
tracting the mahr. The Supreme Court thus suggests that each mahr 
agreement has to be considered in each individual case on its own mer-
its. In doing so, due account must also be taken of the underlying con-
cept of the institution of the mahr under its native law.
Testing the Mahr in German Family Law Categories
To categorize the mahr agreement within German law, the courts thus 
need to interpret the intention of the parties while simultaneously bear-
ing in mind the functions and nature of the mahr in its native law. The 
AUP_Berger_vierde.indd   177 19-4-2013   12:25:38
178 applying shari῾a in the west
categories that can then be used are either the agreement on post-mari-
tal maintenance or the agreement on the matrimonial property regime. 
Can the mahr be interpreted as an agreement on maintenance?
Under German Law, spouses may contractually agree on their recip-
rocal post-marital maintenance duties and derogate from statutory 
law.51 Interpreting the mahr agreement as a maintenance agreement52 
allows the court to make use of all adjustment instruments offered by 
German law: accordingly, if the marriage was of short duration, the 
court can adapt the amount of the mahr on the basis of the German 
rules on maintenance53 and in accordance with the theory of change 
of circumstances, according to which a change in the economic, legal 
and business realities underlying a contractual agreement can invali-
date or modify the terms of a contract. Moreover, a very high mahr 
can be adapted to the financial capability of the husband54 and a very 
low mahr can be raised according to the needs of the divorcee.55 In-
terpreting the mahr as a maintenance agreement, however, generally 
does not match the intention of the parties.56 If, at the time of the mar-
riage and the agreement on the mahr, the parties had the intention to 
move to Germany or if one of the parties was a German citizen, it is 
doubtful whether, with the acceptance of the mahr, the wife intended 
to waive her maintenance rights awarded to her under German law. But 
even if both parties are of foreign origin, such an intention is difficult 
to presume,57 since in Islamic countries, the mahr and the maintenance 
claims stand next to each other. Thus, mahr is hardly interpretable as an 
equivalent of maintenance.
Can the mahr be interpreted as an agreement  
on the matrimonial property regime?
As with maintenance, the statutory provisions on the matrimonial 
property regime may be modified by the spouses. These modifications 
must be inserted in a marriage contract (German Ehevertrag) that needs 
official notarization.58 The German matrimonial property regime is the 
separation of property with an equalization of surplus (Zugewinnaus-
gleich) after the dissolution of marriage. In principle, each spouse owns 
and administers his or her property independently.59 Upon termination 
of the marriage, however, the accrued gains, that is, the additions to the 
assets of each of the spouses achieved during the marriage, are equal-
ized. This means that the spouse with the higher surplus has to pay the 
partner with the smaller increase one half of the excess.60
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In Muslim countries, on the other hand, the concept of matrimonial 
property is generally ignored.61 Based on the general freedom of the 
wife to own and administer her assets independently, the properties of 
the spouses are completely separated: each spouse remains the owner 
of his or her assets before, during and after marriage. If the mahr were 
to be understood as an agreement on the matrimonial property regime 
under German law, one could read it as a modification or supplemen-
tation to the statutory regime, whereby the parties exclude the equali-
zation of surplus and install a regime of separation of goods with the 
mahr being a lump sum to be paid to the wife upon divorce.62
However, this interpretation is hardly arguable, since in most cases, 
it will not match the intention of the parties. If both parties are Muslims 
living and marrying in Germany and additionally contracting a mahr, 
this agreement might be made out of respect for their religious back-
ground rather than as an expression of their intention to exclude the 
regime of surplus upon divorce.63 This is even more so when one of the 
spouses is German and the other is of foreign origin. Finally, when the 
parties are both foreigners who married in their country of origin, then 
such an interpretation is still improbable, as there is hardly any aware-
ness on the part of the parties regarding the possibilities for arranging 
for other forms of matrimonial property regime in Muslim countries.64 
Therefore, here again, this interpretation does not fit.
Evaluation and Conclusion
Although the guiding principles developed by the Supreme Court to 
come to a true determination of the meaning of the mahr are certainly 
valuable, their implementation reveals difficulties. There is no doubt 
that the intention of the parties must be sought to understand what 
they had in mind when contracting the mahr to translate their percep-
tion into German law. Such a translation is, however, not easy, as the 
intention of the parties is hardly detectable. In most cases, the spouses 
agreed on a mahr without mentioning further reasons or giving explicit 
explanation as to its relation to maintenance or matrimonial property 
regime. They simply contracted the mahr because in their view, it was 
an integral part of the act of marrying. This becomes quite apparent 
when looking at the arguments and ways parties argue and negotiate 
their cases. Legal, social and religious arguments and explanations are 
used at will to strengthen the respective positions.
The recourse to the national law of the countries of origin of the 
spouses may also bring major obstacles. For example, the question 
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arises as to how far the rules of the displaced law must be consulted. 
What is to be done in mixed marriages between citizens of different 
Muslim countries that have different regulations on the mahr? The 
problem is quite apparent in cases involving, for example, Emirati and 
Iranian couples: shall the court be more lenient towards Emirati law, 
which limits the amount of the mahr, or Iranian law, which adapts the 
sum to the inflation rate, and thus raises its amount? A change in the 
amount of the mahr in terms of reduction or increase must then also 
be compatible with German interpretation rules, that is, by analogy to 
similar situations under German law. And finally, what about the many 
cases where the parties are German Muslims and no underlying law of 
origin is detectable? One can think of the many Turkish cases, since 
Turkish family law, as a reception of Swiss family law, does not regulate 
the mahr anymore.
The way out of these kinds of evaluative problems is to abandon 
the fitting of the mahr into the existing categories of German family 
law; that is, the maintenance and matrimonial property regime. As the 
Supreme Court sees it, the mahr is a valid agreement and German law 
generally accepts that the spouses make agreements on their financial 
obligations.65 If one considered the agreement on the mahr as a specific 
kind of family law contract unknown to statutory law, but still valid 
under the concept of freedom of contract, it could exist next to the 
established German categories. Liberating the mahr from the exigen-
cies of German family law categories would also release the court to a 
considerable extent from exploring the ratio of a non-applicable law or 
from making sense of the cultural and religious arguments put forward 
by the parties for the sake of fitting the mahr into preconceived catego-
ries that are not suitable.66 The court would have to judge the agree-
ment alongside the claims for maintenance and matrimonial property 
issues and navigate through its own familiar legal notions.
Nevertheless, the mahr must be contextualized within the setting of 
German family law and the available family law instruments to make 
sure that none of the spouses is disadvantaged. If the award of the mahr 
would stand as a contract sui generis next to the statutory rules of a valid 
maintenance claim and the equalization of surplus as regulated under 
German matrimonial property law, it would have a significant effect on 
their respective amounts: the payment of the mahr to the wife would 
increase her assets and thus influence the amount of surplus that would 
have to be equalized. Additionally, a substantial mahr would decrease 
the wife’s need for post-marital maintenance, so that, here again, a fair 
financial balance is achieved between the parties. It must, after all, be 
borne in mind that the mahr is conceived to provide a certain economic 
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security for the wife in systems which hardly know any financial (post-)
marital solidarity between the spouses. It is a tool to protect the wife 
in specific legal surroundings. Whenever this situation changes to the 
benefit of the wife, her need to be protected will diminish.67 This is also 
why the mahr must be accounted for within the new legal context in 
which it is being evaluated. However, this does not change its character 
as an independent contract sui generis and the fact that the parties must 
honour their contractual obligation. Only when giving the mahr a place 
of its own, a fair distribution of the financial burden of the ex-spouses 
will be achieved and due respect given to the mahr agreement to finally 
bring legal certainty to the appraisal of the mahr under German law.
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10 A Language of Hybridity
Honour and Otherness in Canadian Law and Shari῾a
Pascale Fournier 1 and Nathan Reyes
Introduction
In Canada, as throughout most of the geopolitical West, honour crimes 
have recently been the object of growing hostility. The federal govern-
ment sparked controversy when it indicated in a pamphlet given to 
immigrants upon application for citizenship, that ‘Canada’s openness 
and generosity do not extend to barbaric cultural practices that tolerate 
spousal abuse, “honour killings,” female genital mutilation, forced mar-
riage or other gender-based violence’ (emphasis ours – pf and nr).2 
Similarly, a recent public policy report underlined that honour crimes 
are ‘proliferating without regards to Canada’s Criminal Code or Cana-
dians’ deep cultural revulsion from the very concept’ (emphasis mine 
– pf).3 In many ways, this projection of a ‘civilized’ Canada simultane-
ously reifies the notion of shari῾a as inherently contrary, even antitheti-
cal, to Canadian law. It also contributes to a dichotic, binary vision of 
law, culture and identity, through which West/East, secular/religious, 
or public/private are never mutually constitutive.
Perhaps due to this (mis)perception of law, the ancient notion of 
honour in law has sparked a perplexing resurgence in public debate in 
Canada and in the West generally, fuelled by an international campaign 
for women’s rights,4 but also by the other great legal issue of the last 
decade: the widespread discussions on the limits of multiculturalism. 
Yet honour is no foreign notion to Western law, including Canadian 
law. Despite such vehement discourse around the otherness of honour 
crimes in seeming opposition to Canadian law, an examination of the 
latter reveals the existence of a defence of provocation, or ‘passion,’ that 
mirrors the very nature of honour crimes. However this defence – the 
roots of which may be found in the defence of honour of the French 
and British Penal Codes of the nineteenth century – is never confronted 
with the same apprehension, vehemence and perceived otherness as is 
the notion of honour crimes.
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In this chapter, we outline how socio-legal ‘hybridity’5 manifests 
itself in the notion of honour in law. By outlining the complex trans-
plantation processes of Western notions of honour crimes onto Islamic 
legal norms, our aim is to provide a descriptive basis for normative dis-
cussions on cultural diversity. In addition to challenging the perceived 
otherness of various aspects of shari῾a (versus the familiarity of Cana-
dian law), the chapter attempts to illustrate the incoherence of the rig-
idly dichotic view of law and culture, all of which interact with, trans-
plant into and impact one another. This chapter approaches the hybrid-
ity of both the East and the West and stresses that negating the similar-
ity between Western and Eastern legal institutions has the potential to 
considerably impair our understanding of cultural and legal diversity.
Law, a Language of Hybridity?
Multiculturalism6 has guided Canadian policy throughout recent his-
tory so as to account for the hybridity of identity, born of the intersec-
tion and interaction of innumerable cultures in a country founded on 
immigration. Despite this reality, however, Canadian law is largely por-
trayed as minimally impacted by ‘other’ legal regimes;7 this portrayal 
is exemplified by, amongst other things, an editorial that appeared in 
the National Post in 2011, reporting that there have been twelve known 
honour killings in Canada since 2002 and calling for community ac-
tion against minority ‘brutal traditions,’ stressing that honour killings 
are ‘anathema to Western culture.’8 If Canadian law is depicted as West-
ern, secular, familiar, it can do so by conveniently positing itself on one 
side of a binary, implicitly asserting that it is not Eastern, not religious, 
not like other legal systems. Such implicit assertions often become, with 
time and repetition, the unstated norms9 of the Canadian justice sys-
tem.
Allowing the focus of this chapter to shift back to that of a critically 
comparative examination of legal regimes, it becomes apparent that 
without turning the ‘ethnocentric gaze’10 back upon itself so as to per-
ceive the unstated norms at the heart of Canadian law, ‘other’ law – in 
this case shari῾a – cannot in turn be properly perceived. The self must 
recognize that, within itself, there is the other; only then can it recog-
nize that in the other, so there is some self. Law is inherently hybrid, 
and Canadian law is no exception. It is hoped that the following exam-
ination of honour in both Canadian and Jordanian law may help to 
illustrate that ‘the colonial binaries – of us/them, here/there, West/non-
West, colonizer/colonized – have long been mutually constituting.’11
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Familiar Facts from West to East
In this section, an applied examination of the notion of honour is un-
dertaken in two apparently disparate legal regimes: Canadian law (sec-
ular law)12 and Jordanian law (shari῾a).13 Ultimately, the purpose of this 
examination is to exemplify the hybridity of law, and the incoherence 
of a binary vision of law, according to which the East and West are ir-
reconcilably separated, to the point of being defined in opposition to 
one another. We argue that only by looking inwards to recognize the 
otherness in Canadian law14 can one learn to see past the otherness of 
the other.
The Other Within: (Dis)Honour in Canadian Law
Turning the gaze back upon itself, the legitimacy of the perceived oth-
erness of shari῾a (and familiarity of Canadian law) must first be ex-
plored within a Canadian legal and socio-political context. After trac-
ing the genesis of honour in medieval British law, this study exposes 
some of the Canadian legal system’s concrete implications for honour, 
in the guise of passion and provocation, as a discursive practice. We will 
argue that this defence can be seen to amount, in some applications, to 
a form of Western ‘honour’-tainted defence, and that it constitutes a 
worrying source of legitimization of gender violence.
The defence of provocation is a British legal institution which can 
be traced back at least to the seventeenth century,15 and whose pre-
modern articulation was grounded in honour-permeated value codes. 
This defence was invoked when the accused, having been a witness to 
his wife’s adultery, killed his paramour. Chief Lord Justice Holt worded 
the rationale behind the defence in 1707 thus: ‘jealousy is the rage of 
a man, and adultery is the highest invasion of property.’16 As put by 
British criminal law scholar G.R. Sullivan, early provocation defence 
amounted to a ‘hot-blooded yet controlled vindication of one’s honour 
rather than spontaneous, uncontrolled fury.’17 The very foundations of 
this legal institution seem tainted with notions of male honour upheld 
by violence.
Contemporary forms of the defence of provocation in Canada have 
been presented as possessing a wholly different normative foundation. 
This defence was defined by the Supreme Court of Canada as com-
passion towards ‘human frailties which sometimes lead people to act 
irrationally and impulsively.’18 The defence’s modern raison d’être is thus 
said to have completely shifted from upholding a male-centric West-
ern honour code to accounting for the universal human weakness of 
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momentary ‘irrationality.’19 This is still defended by many scholars in 
the common law world as a valid justification for the maintenance of 
the partial defence today.20 In keeping with this universal, individual-
istic rationale, Canada’s Criminal Code outlines that murder may be 
reduced to manslaughter ‘if the person who committed it did so in 
the heat of passion caused by sudden provocation.’21 The Code further 
establishes that ‘[a] wrongful act or an insult that is of such a nature 
as to be sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of the power of self- 
control is provocation for the purposes of this section if the accused 
acted on it on the sudden and before there was time for his passion to 
cool.’22
In Canada, a collective framework of honour such as that found in 
many countries of the East is hard to fathom, as the sociological organi-
zation of gender violence within the family seems to forbid it. For the 
period between 1978 and 1998 in Canada, 66 per cent of family femi-
cides23 were perpetrated by the woman’s partner, while only 26 per cent 
were perpetrated by parents, siblings and other relatives.24 That being 
said, Baker, Gregware and Cassidy note that ‘in the English-speaking 
West, including the United States, the locus of honour has shifted from 
the traditional extended family to the individual man.’25
This evidence of Canadian ‘honour’ seems to belie the claim that 
‘honour values are exclusive and particularist and stand in sharp con-
trast to the universal and inclusive values of the West.’26 The otherness 
of honour crimes and shari῾a may not be so foreign to Canadian values 
and legal practices as one would imagine; the private forms that hon-
our takes and the West’s cultural violence that is sometimes unleashed 
under the guise of universalistic passion must not be overlooked. It, 
too, is concerned with some form of honour, however unseen and 
pushed to the ‘private’ sphere. Intimate passion crimes – that is, crimes 
committed in the intimacy of one’s private life – are thus a particu-
larly important locus of public policy and gender equality concerns. 
After all, the often-denounced subjectivization of the defence in cases 
like Supreme Court of Canada in R v Thibert27 arguably offers women 
no more protection than the honour codes of the British medieval 
provocation defence, as argued by Abu-Odeh.28 Furthermore, Western 
‘crimes of passion’ may sometimes be more dangerous than the tradi-
tional Oriental honour crime, as they draw legitimacy from unstated 
private honour codes.29 If it is true that honour and passion are two 
different realities, it is only by acknowledging the West’s own cultural 
demons that we will be able to begin to understand the ways in which 
both passion and honour have been mixed and articulated in myriad 
ways across the East/West divide.
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Familiarity of the Other: perspectives from Jordan
Jordan, ‘the country most intensely under the international spotlight 
when issues of “honour” are discussed,’30 is a most relevant case study, 
seeing as it has, according to some accounts, the highest honour crime 
rate per capita in the world.31 Furthermore, it underlines the partly 
Western origins of honour crimes, despite the latter being recently 
attacked as ‘antithetical to fundamental Canadian values’ by Ontario 
Court of Appeal Justice Doherty.32 Article 340 of the Jordanian Penal 
Code reads:
1. He who surprises his wife or one of his [female] marhams (‘unlaw-
fuls’) in the act of committing unlawful sexual intercourse with some-
body and kills, wounds or injures one or both of them, shall benefit 
from the exonerating/exempting excuse (‘udhr muhill);
2. He who surprises his wife or one of his ascendants or descendants 
or siblings with another in an unlawful bed, and kills or wounds or 
injures one or both of them, shall benefit from the mitigating excuse 
(‘udhr mukhaffat).33
There is scholarly consensus that this legislation was directly inspired 
by the French Penal Code of 1810.34 As put by Janin and Kahlmeyer, this 
provision ‘springs from French, i.e., Napoleonic, penal law, not from 
shari῾a itself.’35 Article 340 of the Jordanian Penal Code received the 
influence of French Napoleonic law through various channels, notably 
through the regional influence of French Lebanese and Syrian penal 
codes’ honour crime excuses, from which article 340 ‘derived most 
of its language.’36 As a result, the similarities between French honour 
crimes law and the Jordanian provision were glaring. Article 324 of the 
French Penal Code of 1810 reads:
Whoever catches his spouse, female ascendant, descendant or his sis-
ter red-handed in the act of adultery or in an illegitimate sexual en-
counter with another person and commits homicide or causes injury 
can benefit from an excuse of exemption. The author of the homicide 
or injury can benefit from an excuse of reduction if he catches red-
handed his spouse, female ascendant, descendant, or his sister in an 
‘attitude equivoque.’37
This direct transfer of one legal institution from the West to the East 
can be analysed as a form of ‘legal transplant’ which has contributed to 
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the ‘globalizations of law and legal thought’ described by Duncan Ken-
nedy.38 Jordanian law also contains elements of ‘crimes of passion,’ such 
as article 98 of the Jordanian Penal Code, which excuses murders com-
mitted in a ‘fit of fury.’39 This provision is said to have been ‘much more 
useful’40 to the accused than article 340, though it has attracted less 
media attention than the latter provision. Jordanian courts ‘frequently 
apply article 98 of the Penal Code to honour killings,’41 effectively treat-
ing them as a form of ‘crime of passion.’ Thus, Jordan appears to have 
crafted its ‘appalling’ honour crimes legislation at the confluence of 
Western and Oriental traditions.
Fear and Marginalization of the ‘Other’ in Canadian Society
In this section, we attempt to illustrate how the combined unawareness 
of unstated norms within Canadian law and overstated otherness of 
shari῾a have given rise to differential treatment in Canadian courts 
based on the otherness of the accused, seen as foreign to Canadian val-
ues and law. It is important to note that this section in no way condones 
gender inequality and gendered violence, too often justified by a de-
fence of ‘honour,’ ‘passion’ or provocation. However, without consider-
ing the very unstated norms at the heart of Canadian law that inflate 
the perceived otherness of shari῾a, the discrimination caused by such a 
dichotic vision of law and culture will continue, and the internal flaws 
of Canadian law will remain occulted.
A study undertaken by Pascale Fournier, Pascal McDougal and Anna 
Dekker42 collected and analysed a series of Canadian cases, between 
1990 and 2010, of intimate femicide where the male accused (the vic-
tim’s husband,43 brother or father) raised the provocation defence.44 
Fifty-six cases were classified according to the ethnicity of the accused 
and the success or failure of the defence claim,45 so as to examine the 
sensitivity of Canadian courts to the legal hybridity heretofore discussed 
in this chapter.46 Disconcertingly, this study revealed that the success 
rate is differentiated and significantly higher for an accused identifiable 
as ‘Western’ (25 per cent); indeed, it is nearly twice as high as that of 
‘other’(sic!) accused (11 per cent). This study thus concurs with Côté, 
Sheehy and Majury that there seems to be among Canadian courts ‘a 
pattern of withholding “compassion” for a certain category of accused.’47
A differential treatment such as that seen above surely impacts Mus-
lim Canadians not only in the administration of justice in Canada, but 
also throughout society. Katherine Bullock and Gul Joya Jafri point at 
the potentially insidious influence of unstated norms upon society – 
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particularly as these norms are ignored by the very individuals and 
institutions that perpetuate them – observing that ‘non-Muslim Cana-
dians are often not conscious of the general media bias against Islam and 
Muslims, often having, in fact, their opinions of Muslim women shaped 
by the negative stereotypes [...].’48 The overstated otherness attributed 
to Islam, and specifically the notion of honour as it is perceived within 
Islam, can be seen to be a symptom of a broader, subtle denigration of 
Muslim identity within Canadian society, in turn furthering differential 
treatment within and beyond the administration of justice.49
One of the cases analysed in the above study, R v Humaid,50 offers 
interesting insight into the possible explanations for this differential 
treatment. Adi Humaid, an Emirati, killed his wife Aysar Abbas by stab-
bing her ‘at least 19 times’ after she had made a comment which he inter-
preted as meaning that she had committed adultery. Humaid assigned 
Dr Ayoub, an ‘an expert on the Islamic religion and culture,’51 to sup-
port his provocation claim. Dr Ayoub ‘testified that the Islamic culture 
was male dominated and placed great significance on the concept of 
family honour’52 and that this contributed to provoking Mr Humaid’s 
violent outburst. The Court of Appeal found that there was no air of 
reality to the defence and maintained the verdict of murder, refusing to 
grant consideration to the appellants’ ‘beliefs’ to reduce the verdict to 
manslaughter. As put by Ontario Court of Appeal Justice Doherty: ‘The 
difficult problem, as I see it, is that the alleged beliefs which give the 
insult added gravity are premised on the notion that women are infe-
rior to men and that violence against women is in some circumstances 
accepted, if not encouraged. These beliefs are antithetical to fundamen-
tal Canadian values, including gender equality.’53
The Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision to unequivocally condemn 
gendered violence is commendable; however, the way in which the 
message is conveyed, and particularly the reasoning behind this judge-
ment, contrasts discerningly with cases such as Thibert and Stone.54 Isa-
bel Grant, law professor at the University of British Colombia, makes a 
similar argument:
The Court of Appeal in Humaid is recognizing the importance of gen-
der equality in attributing qualities and characteristics to the ordinary 
person. One would be hard pressed to argue that the kind of stereo-
typical misogyny, depicted in Humaid’s evidence as ordinary in his 
culture, should be incorporated into an objective test in order to ex-
cuse spousal murder. What is not mentioned, however, is how courts 
assume the ordinariness of the values demonstrated in cases like Thi-
bert and Stone.55
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The unstated norm – that is, the ‘ordinary person’ so ambiguously 
referred to above – would therefore appear to be grounded in cultural 
notions of male dominion. Ironically, this same notion is what led the 
Ontario Court of Appeal to so vehemently dismiss Humaid’s defence 
plea, denouncing such a notion as ‘antithetical to fundamental Cana-
dian values.’56 Indeed, the objective ‘ordinary person’ component of the 
defence is nothing but an ‘anthropomorphic expression of the standard 
of conduct that our society expects of its members.’57 This ‘ordinary per-
son,’ the determination of which is inherently subjective, underscores 
the courts’ role as ‘cultural apparatus[es],’58 for the definition and deter-
mination of such a person presents courts with the imperative of giving 
substance to their legal conception of ‘ordinary.’
This is not to say that it is unfair to ‘punish a member of a minor-
ity culture under laws or norms reflecting those of the majority cul-
ture.’59 Such a defence in the context of honour/passion-related violence 
would not only endorse essentialist views on the barbarism supposedly 
inherent to ‘other’ cultures,60 it would equally condone acts of gendered 
violence. Rather, the argument made here is that courts should treat 
femicides committed by Westerners with the same scrutiny as those 
committed by foreigners of ‘Oriental’ origin (the imperfect category 
of ‘Other(ed)’ in our study) generally; this is why we very consciously 
abstain from entering into the debate on the consideration of a defend-
ant’s culture in the case of a provocation defence as part of the objective 
standard test.61
It remains necessary, however, to distinguish between condoning 
gendered violence and denigrating or alienating a culture as a whole. 
In the context of an inclusive and diverse Canada, respect and dialogue 
between disparate groups are fundamental principles. Yet to condemn 
the ‘other’(ed) as antithetical to Canadian values is to effectively ostra-
cize and silence this group, undermining the very values such a con-
demnation would seek to protect.62
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have attempted to illustrate that ‘culture’ and ‘hon-
our’ are not monolithic notions but rather historical hybrid constructs. 
Recent debates on legal transplantation have focused on whether the 
process leads to ‘a convergence of social orders and uniformisation of 
law’63 or, inversely, to a ‘double-fragmentation of world-society … and a 
multiplicity of global cultures.’64 In fact, law is becoming more homoge-
nous as well as more fragmented as a result of legal transplantation.65 A 
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form of exchange between legal regimes has led to the return of Western 
transplants, now ‘other’(ed) in a sense, ready to intertwine themselves 
subtly yet profoundly into Western societies. With this in view, Leti 
Volpp’s assertion that ‘monoculturalism of transcendent values with a 
“we” or “us” at an unwavering center of rationality [is] historically inac-
curate, relying upon distortions and marginalizations for its narrative 
coherence’66 proves very relevant; this very misperception would none-
theless seem to lie at the heart of Canadian courts’ reasoning relative 
to the notion of honour. Recently, in R. v. Tran, the Supreme Court of 
Canada indicated that the defence of provocation must be informed by 
‘contemporary norms of behaviour, including fundamental values such 
as the commitment to equality provided for in the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms.’67 The Court unanimously established a newfound 
stringency for the objective part of the provocation test:
[The] criminal law is concerned with setting standards of human be-
haviour. … It follows that the ordinary person standard must be in-
formed by contemporary norms of behaviour, including fundamental 
values such as the commitment to equality provided for in the Cana-
dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. ... [T]here can be no place in this 
objective standard for antiquated beliefs such as ‘adultery is the high-
est invasion of property’ nor indeed for any form of killing based on 
such inappropriate conceptualizations of ‘honour.’68
This development does not indicate a bright future for the provocation 
defence. Hopefully, this judgement echoes the paradigmatic shift of 
incorporating equality in the law of criminal responsibility advocated 
by scholars such as Rosemary Cairns Way. On a deeper level, perhaps it 
can also help us come to terms with the dark sides of ‘Western culture.’ 
Without perceiving the subtle yet inherent historical intertwining of 
honour and provocation, it is hard to imagine how those (mis)percep-
tions that result in differential treatment may be overcome. Less diffi-
cult to imagine is the normative impact that such differential treatment 
has on Canadian society as a whole. Whether such discrimination in 
the administration of justice is symptomatic of a more deeply rooted 
fear of the Other, or a catalyst of this, it likely remains indicative of a 
troubling ostracism of minority citizens in Canadian society, includ-
ing Muslims. Let us hope that the trend towards equality reinforced by 
the Tran ruling allows Canadian courts to better ‘turn the gaze back 
on itself ’ and to grasp the far-reaching implications that globalization, 
colonialism, and socio-legal métissage may have for the Western Self 
and its many ‘Others.’
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11 Accommodating Islamic Family Law(s)
A Critical Analysis of Some Recent Developments  
and Experiments in Europe1
Marie-Claire Foblets
Introduction
In this article, I will focus on the treatment of Islamic family law in the 
European legal order, in a context that is increasingly multicultural in 
nature. My analysis will proceed through three stages. First, I will briefly 
sketch the present situation, and explain why the status of Islamic fam-
ily law was for a long time – and still is – governed in most European 
countries by the rules of private international law. Second, I will con-
centrate on situations that touch upon Islamic family law and that raise 
a number of specific problems. In the third and final part, I will shift 
the focus to the future: what pathways could a forward-looking analysis 
envisage that combines pluralism in family matters – including Islamic 
family law in particular – with respect for human rights, as defined 
by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms? Three options can be identified, and my aim 
is to open these up to debate. As a result, the conclusions drawn will 
necessarily be fairly open-ended.
Limits to Private International Law in the Face of the Changing 
Demographic Profile of Europe
In Europe in recent years, the pluralism of family lifestyles has been 
increasingly linked to the migrations that took place in the post-war 
period. This growing diversity is quite clearly also the result of an ever 
more publicly supported sensitivity to the protection of individual au-
tonomy. It should nevertheless be acknowledged that this increasing 
pluralism, in the sense of a juxtaposition of cultural models of family 
life, is heterogeneous in nature. A not insignificant complication results 
from the fact that migrations have, for the most part, come from coun-
tries where religious law constitutes a major source of law, particularly 
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in matters of personal status. In practice, so far it is private interna-
tional law and its techniques that have for the most part been invoked 
to govern the lives of immigrant families.
Private international law is the branch of law that deals with private 
relationships that are characterized by one or another form of inter-
action between different national legal systems that apply in a given 
situation. This interaction may result from the mixed nature of a rela-
tionship between parties who do not share the same nationality. Alter-
natively, it may may arise from a situation of cross-border mobility: the 
parties (or one of them) are living in a country other than that of their 
nationality – whether temporarily or on a long-term basis – and reside 
there as foreign nationals. For many years, therefore, questions relat-
ing to the personal status of people from countries where that status 
is governed by religious law were treated as issues covered by private 
international law.2 The techniques of private international law continue 
to be important for all manner of questions relating to the reception, 
within the domestic law of the country of the parties’ habitual resi-
dence, of situations relating to personal status that have arisen in a for-
eign country: marriages celebrated abroad, divorces granted by foreign 
judges, and so forth.3 When dealing with personal status issues, the 
rules of private international law often refer to religious law, since these 
immigrants are often from countries where personal status is governed 
by shari῾a.
Over the years, however, the demographic profile of European com-
munities of immigrant origin has undergone profound change. The 
presence of these groups is no longer linked primarily to immigration, 
but represents a permanent settlement in the country of habitual resi-
dence, that is, in Europe. It is true that there are still many instances of 
family reunification that involve interaction between different national 
legal systems: on the one hand, that of the country of origin of the 
partner who is joining someone living in Europe, and, on the other 
hand, that of the country where the family intends to settle.4 Yet family 
reunification is now just one aspect of the reality of immigrant fami-
lies’ lives; increasingly, these family situations originate within Europe. 
Moreover, in most cases the parties hold the nationality of the country 
of residence, while also retaining the nationality of their country of 
origin.5
These developments are changing the status quo: questions involv-
ing the legal treatment of personal status become, in such cases, first 
and foremost matters governed by domestic law. The latter for the most 
part does not allow one to take into account the religious convictions 
of the persons involved, or, if it does, then only to a very limited degree. 
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If we were to agree on the principle that it ought to be possible for the 
religious dimension to maintain, in law, the importance that the parties 
concerned attach to it, then dealing with religious phenomena in terms 
of personal status would require devoting particular attention to the 
new profile of the large numbers of such families and individuals cur-
rently living throughout Europe. Certainly the debate is of a sensitive 
nature, as it raises the prospect of calling into question certain histori-
cal developments, such as the secularization of civil law. I will return 
to this question below. We are in a sense witnessing a relatively new 
type of duality as regards the legal position (and identity) of individuals 
who, on the one hand, have become full-fledged citizens of their coun-
try of residence and are thus bound by its legal system, while, on the 
other hand, placing that system alongside religious norms of foreign 
origin that defy its capacity to integrate them. The sociological litera-
ture describes the situation of such people as ‘transnational’.6
Today it seems that Muslims even more frequently – in various 
parts of Europe – are faced with the difficulty of combining respect for 
the laws enacted by the state in their country of residence with Islam. 
The values of the latter are often endowed, in their view, with particu-
lar legitimacy.7 Certain studies go so far as to warn that if this reality 
is not taken seriously, it could threaten the social cohesion of contem-
porary society. 
A highly revelatory source of information on this matter is the many 
websites, based not only in Europe but also in Canada and the United 
states, which for several years now have enabled Muslims to submit 
questions relating to various aspects of their personal status.8 The que-
ries centre on the question of how to ensure that the different compo-
nents of personal status that fall under the provisions of the (secular-
ized) civil law of the country of residence can nonetheless be reconciled 
with the requirements of Islam as regards family organization: religious 
marriage occupies a prominent place here.
In Europe today, the vast majority of states have chosen to secularize 
the laws governing the person and the family.9 This option gives priority 
to non-confessional laws. The difficulty this represents for persons who 
wish to combine the requirements of domestic civil law on personal 
status with the treatment of the latter in accordance with (their) reli-
gious law should not be underestimated. The situation is all the more 
complex for Muslims, since in Islam there is no unequivocal doctrinal 
position on the question of which law applies to a devout Muslim resid-
ing in a country governed by secular law.10 In principle, such a person 
is a legal subject bound by the rules of a non-confessional (state) legal 
order, but the various schools of shari῾a differ amongst themselves with 
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regard to the effects of this principle which they are willing to recog-
nize on a religious level. This complicates matters for those concerned, 
and in part explains the confusion on the part of certain people when 
it comes to respect for the law of the state of their habitual residence; 
this is the case even if very often, as we have seen, they are full-fledged 
citizens of that country.11
One could of course retort that the situation for new religious minor-
ities – and in particular Muslim communities – is not substantially dif-
ferent from that of adherents of other religions, since the secular civil 
law is in all cases the only one that is granted recognition by the state 
authorities. This response strikes us, however, as too categorical when 
it comes to Muslim communities. Not only because it circumvents a 
major difficulty, namely, the close connection which many Muslims 
continue to make between law and religion, but also because it fails to 
explore the alternative pathways that may be available.
The aim here is not to provide an inventory of the numerous works 
published in recent years on various aspects of personal status in coun-
tries where religious family law applies, or on the way questions of per-
sonal status are handled in the domestic law of European countries 
– seen through the prism of private international law – whether con-
cerning the application of these statuses by judges in the country of 
residence or the reception of situations created abroad and of personal 
statuses governed by religious law. Several authors have, in the past few 
years, analysed the various solutions offered by case law or legal theory 
to the most common problems encountered in practice. These studies 
for the most part present an admirable analysis of private international 
law on questions relating to Islam, in particular: filiation, naming, con-
ditions for a valid marriage, the rights and obligations of the spouses, 
the relations between parents and children, the dissolution of marriage 
through divorce and, finally, the status of property as well as its distri-
bution upon death. I will limit myself here to referring to only a few of 
these works.12
Instead, I take a different approach, focusing on future perspectives 
and going beyond the limits of private international law to raise ques-
tions as to other potential approaches. This approach is an exploratory 
one: the aim is first and foremost to remind us of a number of ques-
tions that at this point must remain open and that are linked to the 
treatment, in civil law, of personal statuses that are religious in nature. 
The approach unfolds in two stages: first, an examination of the rea-
sons why, in my view, we should not take comfort too readily in the 
argument that the new religious communities living in Europe today 
must necessarily behave like all others and accept the separation of law 
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and religion. In the second stage, I address the core of the problem and 
look at the future perspectives mentioned above. The approach draws 
in large part on the literature on the subject. The way in which reli-
gious status is handled in the context of secular state law has to date 
been studied principally in Canada, Germany and England.13 In what 
follows, I will look at the following three pathways toward a solution: 
the incorporation into domestic (civil law) of religious rules, taking 
the example of Islamic family law and in particular the marriage con-
tract; the autonomy of the will in private international law; and finally, 
recourse to religious arbitration for certain types of family dispute. All 
three of these will be addressed here in what is necessarily a summary 
fashion and, as already suggested, departing to some extent from the 
strict confines of the techniques of private international law.
The Close Connection Between Law and Religion in Islam
The historical response in Europe to the problem of a conflict between 
loyalty to state law, on the one hand, and religious or confessional com-
mitments, on the other hand, is well known: this problem is deemed to 
have been resolved by virtue of the separation of law and religion.14 In 
Europe today, with the exception of a few very specific regulations, state 
law is most often the only formal source that applies in matters regard-
ing personal status.
This solution, taking secularization for granted, does not completely 
evacuate or dissolve, in the specific case of Muslim communities, the 
close and indeed inseparable link that members of these communities 
often continue to make between law and religion: shari῾a or Islamic law 
is treated as the principal, and indeed the essential, source of law.15 One 
may obviously obscure this reality by giving a response from a strictly 
secularized legal perspective to any question regarding the personal 
status of Muslims. Evidently, in practice, not everyone’s perspective is 
the same, and the reference to religion will not be of equal importance 
to each person. But in general it may be said that the common reference 
to Islam as the source of law explains why Muslims often continue to 
seek a sort of compromise or reconciliation between the requirements 
of their religion and those of civil law.
To refuse to take into account this endeavour would be to risk elicit-
ing reticence on the part of these communities. In practice, such reti-
cence with regard to the requirements of civil law is indeed perceptible. 
It manifests itself in various forms, as several studies on the patterns of 
regulation of family relations within Muslim communities in Europe 
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have shown.16 At times this reticence can go so far as to simply displace 
civil law and set up a parallel legal regime within the religious com-
munity, without seeking recognition under civil law for the situation 
thus created: religious marriage, for example, is celebrated without any 
concern for first entering into a civil contract, even if the law requires 
that this be done. In other cases, individuals return to their country of 
origin to seek justice, availing themselves of the rules of conflict of laws 
which, in the private international law of most Islamic countries, allow 
them to have recourse to those countries’ domestic laws regardless of 
the number of years a person has lived abroad.17 In legal terms, and in 
particular from the perspective of legal security, both forms of behav-
iour raise serious questions: religious (informal) marriages will not 
be recognized by the authorities of the country of habitual residence, 
leaving the spouses without protection under domestic (state) law and 
hence vulnerable; as for the solutions reached in the country of origin, 
these create a legal privilege that is reserved for the nationals of coun-
tries which confer upon religious (Islamic) law the status of personal 
law. Such a privilege makes coordination among national legal systems 
in their case difficult: religious law prevails over secular law exclusively 
in the case of those who have retained the nationality of the country in 
question. The situation is all the more unjustifiable because often the 
factual connection to the law of the country of habitual residence has 
grown strong over the years, through, among other things, acquisition 
of citizenship and/or long-term residence; too strong for a person to be 
permitted recourse to the rules of private international law.
In light of these observations, a search for alternatives is warranted. 
Three types of legal solution may potentially be envisaged: (1) allowing 
rules based on religion to be granted effect under civil law. Notably, 
this could take the form of a (civil) contract, as in the case of mar-
riage; (2) applying the autonomy of the will in private international law; 
and finally (3) recourse to religious arbitration for certain disputes. In 
what follows, I will examine these three options in succession. As indi-
cated, these pathways draw inspiration from the doctrine and, in part, 
from case law. To date, the question of drawing on domestic civil law 
to find more suitable means of regulating the family life of Muslims has 
attracted the attention mainly of authors whose work focuses on the 
English-speaking world.
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Future Perspectives: Three Alternatives
Incorporating religious rules into civil law:  
the example of the marriage contract
At first glance, allowing the incorporation into domestic law of reli-
gious rules governing matters related to family law may be surprising, 
given that this approach runs the risk of restoring to religion a scope 
and an impact that secularized civil law has historically tried to limit.18 
The risk may seem all the more serious in the case of personal statuses 
which contravene fundamental principles of the equality of the sexes 
and of non-discrimination based on religion that are now mandated by 
the civil law in most European countries.19 Such principles, moreover, 
are almost systematically met with the invocation by courts and civil 
officials of a public order exception.
Yet, several equally important legal values may militate against such 
a refusal and argue instead in favour of greater openness on the part of 
state law in Europe to religious personal statuses of foreign origin. One 
such argument is the extension in recent years of the principle of the 
autonomy of the will – both in domestic civil law and in private interna-
tional law – which entails the possibility for adults (men and women) to 
shape their family life by combining elements of mandatory law, which 
do not suffer exemption, with elements of optional civil law.
The principle of the autonomy of the will supports the view that 
civil law ought to be more inclined to accept norms of religious and/
or cultural origin that may differ from its own. One may disagree as 
to the degree of openness that is desirable, and one may indeed disa-
gree profoundly with a thesis that would go so far as to attribute to 
the autonomy of the parties an impact that overrides fundamental 
civil rights such as the age of marriage, consent by the future spouses, 
impediments based on consanguinity or on the undissolved bond of 
a previous marriage.20 Nevertheless, the principle presents a number 
of advantages that should not be underestimated when it comes to the 
question of incorporating into civil law elements of family law based on 
Islam. Shari῾a notably grants the spouses a surprising liberty to define 
their relations, both in terms of personal and of patrimonial effects.21
In order to offer the wife, in particular, a maximum number of guar-
antees protecting couples against certain specific risks under shari῾a, 
several authors in Denmark,22 Germany23 and England,24 in particular, 
have been suggesting for several years that spouses should enter into a 
valid and enforceable contract under civil law that contains the stipu-
lations necessary to enable couples to frame their union according to 
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their particular needs, without, however, overstepping the limits and 
particularities of their religious law and without infringing on a funda-
mental right of either party.
This approach requires that each situation be subjected to careful 
prior analysis of the needs of both spouses and of their connection to 
the forum, both of their country of residence and of their country of ori-
gin: not only may the conditions for the formation of the contract vary, 
but also the regime under which it is implemented. Surprisingly how-
ever, in continental Europe, the application of this solution has hitherto 
been rare.25 It seems to us that, in view of protecting the spouses, pre-
nuptial agreements – well known to lawyers in North America – may 
serve as an inspiration to practitioners in continental Europe. There is 
indeed nothing to prevent them from providing more guidance to Mus-
lim couples – should they wish to avail themselves of it – in searching 
for contractual solutions to, for example, problems of the management 
and division of property that arise in their particular case. The matter 
deserves to be examined in greater depth, all the more so since it seems 
highly likely that, over the years, there will be increasing numbers of 
cases where women in particular who have been excluded or discrimi-
nated against will, on grounds of non-discrimination, demand that their 
interests be taken into account.
For stipulations that are mandatory under Islamic family law, the 
problem presents itself somewhat differently. Some of these stipula-
tions are alien to the nature of a civil marriage contract. This is true, 
for example, for the commitment by the future husband to pay a dower 
or mahr to his future wife.26 The way in which such a clause is handled 
differs according to the various approaches. The mandatory nature of 
this provision has been the subject of several contradictory decisions 
in case-law: certain judicial decisions refuse to sanction it, evoking the 
religious and inadequately defined nature of the obligation, whereas 
others, on the contrary, agree to sanction it. Within certain schools of 
Islamic law, the obligation to pay the mahr is an imperative condition 
for Islamic marriage, and is separate from the matrimonial regime. One 
of its functions is to protect the financial interests of the wife by oblig-
ing the husband to pay her a sum of money or transfer property to her, 
in order to guarantee her a degree of financial security and a certain 
degree of independence. The mahr takes effect at the latest upon the 
dissolution of the marriage. Nevertheless, for the mahr to be enforcea-
ble under secular civil law, certain authors suggest that couples residing 
in Europe should enshrine it in a (secular) contract.27 This will allow 
the civil courts to recognize it more easily, and if necessary the latter 
will be able to rule that a civil contractual obligation is enforceable even 
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if that obligation is founded on a rule that is religious in nature. From 
this perspective, a civil contract will be in a sense ‘added on’ to a mar-
riage agreement.
It is not clear, however, that a separate contract entered into in civil 
law constitutes, in and of itself, a sufficient means for achieving the most 
complete and comprehensive legal arrangement possible for protect-
ing a couple from the various risks to which their nuptial commitment 
exposes them either in domestic law or in private international law. It 
all depends on their specific situation. As I already mentioned above, 
the pros and cons of prenuptial arrangements in legal practice within 
the context of continental Europe would require further research.
Beyond the explicit designation of the matrimonial regime and cer-
tain provisions concerning the management and division of their prop-
erty, the spouses may also stand to gain from negotiating arrangements 
concerning the personal effects of marriage that will protect them from 
specific risks they may incur by virtue of provisions in force in Islamic 
countries and that may quite possibly apply to them.28 As a general rule, 
setting out the form of the obligations between spouses in terms of per-
sonal effects will mainly benefit the wife, since she is the one who incurs 
the greatest risks. Two well-known risks are that of her husband taking 
another wife, and the dissolution of the marriage on the initiative of 
the husband alone (unilateral repudiation). Polygyny and repudiation 
without the wife’s consent do not constitute a serious legal risk for a 
woman living in Europe.29 Yet, the insertion of clauses stipulating that 
the woman has the right to divorce her husband should he take another 
wife or, for even greater protection, the right to leave the marriage for 
reasons of discord, are likely to strengthen the woman’s position in the 
event of her husband’s remarriage abroad in an Islamic country where 
polygyny is authorized, or in case of unilateral repudiation. These 
clauses, which strengthen the position of the wife, are perfectly admis-
sible in Islam, which leaves it up to the parties to incorporate religious 
considerations into the contract in order to protect themselves.30
The question remains, however, as to the contract into which these 
clauses are to be inserted: is it the marriage contract itself, or a sepa-
rate one? Muslim couples who marry civilly usually also celebrate their 
marriage religiously. That is in fact the only way to validate the mar-
riage under Islam. The safest solution in such cases would be to include 
those clauses that are unknown in civil law in the religious marriage 
contract, for that way the risks incurred by virtue of their (religious) 
personal status are mitigated and thus covered by a religious contract.
Much more could be said about the role of the civil contract in the 
religious sphere.31 Certain provisions envisaged by the parties on the 
AUP_Berger_vierde.indd   215 19-4-2013   12:25:40
216 applying shari῾a in the west
grounds of their religion are not subject to legal definition under civil 
law. What meaning will the civil courts assign them in that case? Will 
the judge be disposed to enforce them as binding? The question may 
legitimately be raised, since just because an obligation is of a religious 
character does not mean that it cannot be recognized as valid under 
civil law.32 The monogamy clause, for instance, simply confirms the 
obligations undertaken by the spouses in civil law, and can therefore, in 
my view, be included in a civil contract. The will of the spouses is in that 
case to protect the wife, which in law is perfectly acceptable. As regards 
the right to divorce, one might ask whether it is licit to make a commit-
ment to divorce. In this regard, it should be noted that a country like 
Norway opted over twenty years ago now (1991) for a solution in which 
all citizens contracting marriage, including non-Muslims, had to grant 
the other spouse the right to divorce.33 That solution may seem surpris-
ing, as it applies to each person who engages in a marriage while such 
clause makes sense only in the case of a women who risks being unable 
to get out of the marriage if the law of a country where such a constraint 
(still) exists should apply to her.
Obviously, all this is not easily put into practice. On the one hand, 
because the contractual definition of certain aspects of religious mar-
riage cannot but raise difficulties: to what extent are certain obligations, 
rooted in religious law, ‘fit’ for being the subject of a civil contract? On 
the other hand, since the suggestions put forward here require several 
conditions to be met simultaneously – something that will rarely be the 
case in practice: the two spouses should be informed of the legal/con-
tractual options open to them, but above all, they should agree between 
them on the exact content of the additional protections they envisage 
for their own particular situation. They should also know how impor-
tant it is to them to protect themselves against certain risks that are 
characteristic of the law by which they are bound as a result of their 
marriage and which, in the case of Islam, leaves the wife particularly 
vulnerable. Furthermore, this approach is a proactive one. The spouses 
do not gain any immediate benefit from their agreement, but agree to 
consider a future risk. Is it not asking too much that they should do so 
at the time when they enter into their marriage? One could of course 
imagine that a civil contract might be signed later on, after a few years 
of marriage, or that the marriage contract might be amended after-
wards, but in that case it is necessary to do so before any serious disa-
greement should arise between them, for otherwise it will be too late to 
negotiate with due serenity.
The intention in this paper is to invite reflection: despite the numer-
ous obstacles, it could be advantageous for some couples to incorpo-
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rate clauses of a religious nature into their marriage contract in view 
of bringing norms imposed by their religious conviction into harmony 
with the requirements of civil law. It is true, however, that many ques-
tions remain and therefore professional and detailed guidance in these 
matters is necessary if one wishes, in practice, to offer spouses greater 
protection with regard to their rights and obligations which they take 
upon them.
The autonomy of the will in family matters
The second potentially relevant pathway toward accommodating Is-
lamic family law within the European legal order is the autonomy of 
the will in private international law. For the past few years, private 
international law has, in an increasing number of countries, and es-
pecially in Europe, offered another approach which, as regards family 
law, allows couples concerned by the interaction between secular civil 
law and a religiously-inspired law in their country of origin to agree, to 
a certain extent, on the way in which they envisage conflicts of law is-
sues that risk arising in their case. This approach relates to the exercise 
of the autonomy of the will with respect to personal status. In Belgium, 
for example, the 2004 Code of private international law34 allows for 
the law of the country of habitual residence to be tempered for certain 
matters, such as the dissolution of marriage by divorce and as regards 
the matrimonial regime, by granting the parties a right to opt for the 
national law.35 This approach is of interest only to the extent that the 
couple does indeed retain a connection with the country of origin by 
holding that country’s nationality, or that the spouses stand to benefit 
from recognition, in the other jurisdiction, of the matrimonial regime 
that they have chosen and any other future arrangements regarding 
the division of property. The same is true for the dissolution of their 
marriage by divorce, where applicable. In the 1980s, Jean-Yves Carlier 
did pioneering work in Belgium in which he scrupulously investigated 
the various advantages that persons who have kept a connection to a 
foreign law may gain from being granted autonomy in respect of per-
sonal status.36 Belgian federal legislation has since moved in this di-
rection, albeit cautiously. This solution has its limits, which have been 
identified in the first part of this paper. These include the fact that the 
solution applies only to couples who have maintained a connection to 
foreign law. It does not, therefore, offer a solution to persons who have 
converted to Islam and who have no legal connection to a foreign legal 
order that they would like to designate as the law that applies to their 
situation.
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The limitations do not stop there, however. There is lingering uncer-
tainty as to the question of whether autonomy plays a role in cases of 
multiple nationality as well, which, as noted above, is the situation in 
which immigrant couples increasingly find themselves. Where one or 
both partners also hold the nationality of the country of residence, it 
is not certain that the couple can still invoke the autonomy of the will, 
which in their case would be the equivalent of allowing them to opt for 
the application of the other national law. The question arises, notably, in 
Belgian private international law. On the one hand, the Belgian Code 
of private international law places persons with dual nationality under 
the protection of Belgian law: in cases of multiple nationalities of which 
Belgian nationality is one, Belgian law applies (Article 3, paragraph 2). 
The right to choose the applicable law would cease, in that case, to be 
seen as an alternative. But on the other hand, the Code does, in Arti-
cles 49, 50 and 55, grant couples a right to choose according to whether 
they feel more affinity with the society of their habitual residence or, on 
the contrary, with the country of the law of the nationality. The Belgian 
Code of private international law in a sense leaves open the question of 
couples with multiple nationalities. As a result, the answer will have to 
come from case law.
In terms of private international law, it would be best if situations 
of multiple nationalities were circumscribed by conventions – bilat-
eral and multilateral – that ensure that the legal order of the country 
of which one of the persons holds nationality recognizes the situations 
arising from the effects of the law in force in the country of the other 
nationality, and vice versa, without this having to depend on measur-
ing the intensity of the ties – always difficult to do – which the persons 
in question may or may not have with one or the other country. On the 
other hand, as has been emphasized since the introduction, it would 
be preferable not to continue to make ‘transnational’ family situations 
exclusively dependent on solutions devised in private international law. 
These solutions are intended primarily for situations that entail interac-
tion on an international level between different legal systems and that 
seek to guarantee harmony at that level. Priority must henceforth be 
granted, in my view, to offering sufficient legal protection to persons 
who cannot make use of the techniques of private international law but 
come, instead, under domestic law.
Recourse to religious arbitration for certain family disputes
The third and last option I will discuss here with regard to incorporat-
ing Islam into the domestic legal order of European countries is re-
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course to religious arbitration for certain types of family disputes. The 
quest for solutions, in domestic law, to questions raised by the need to 
take into account by people’s religious convictions may be situated at 
two different levels, although these are not mutually exclusive: either 
the individuals seek for themselves – for their own sake – to accommo-
date material law within the spectrum of commitments made among 
one another (for example, spouses), namely by enshrining those com-
mitments in a contract or in some other form of explicit initiative; or 
potential adjustments are sought in terms of procedure, in particular 
where a dispute has to be resolved. It is on this second type of adjust-
ment that I will focus here, in the last section of the forward-looking 
analysis. Two countries with an Anglo-Saxon legal tradition, Canada 
and Great Britain, offer contrasting illustrations of this issue. It would 
be risky on my part at this stage to suggest this route for other coun-
tries, but it deserves nonetheless to be mentioned. 
In Canada, the question arose in relation to religious arbitration in 
family law.37 That path was ultimately abandoned, with repercussions 
for other existing religious family law arbitration tribunals, which were 
to be abolished. There is no room here to go into the details of the (lively) 
debate – not only among jurists, but also in the media – provoked by 
the question, but simply to recall the stakes involved, since these were 
not without relevance to the situation of other religious communities 
established in countries with a secular civil law tradition.
The point of departure for the discussion in Canada was the right to 
freedom of religion. The question raised in Canada had to do with the 
approval given, in civil law, to legal proceedings of a religious nature: 
should the privatization of justice be accepted to the point where deci-
sions handed down by religious authorities are recognized in law? Sev-
eral modalities may be envisaged: (1) a privatization that is limited to 
religious mediation; (2) religious arbitration; or, finally, (3) full judi-
cial pluralism authorizing the settlement of family disputes by religious 
courts. In the third scenario, one may speak of a true judicial pluralism 
that recognizes the existence of particular institutions that administer 
justice on an equal footing with state courts. The latter form of regu-
lation exists in India, among other places, as well as in Lebanon, but 
seems to have little support in the West. In Canada, the second of the 
above options was the subject of much discussion after a group in the 
Province of Ontario known as the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice (iicj) 
announced, in 2003, its intention to create a Canadian Islamic body that 
would arbitrate in family matters. It should be recalled that arbitration 
is not mediation, but has legal force on condition that the decision com-
plies with state law and therefore does not infringe on the rights and lib-
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erties of persons. The communities concerned would thus be required 
to accept the primacy of domestic law as regards personal status, but 
they would be allowed to set up their own arbitration boards for cer-
tain matters. The state judge would ultimately retain the right to order 
a review of the decision and of the procedures followed in reaching it.
An Ontario law has, since 1991, allowed for arbitration by religious 
authorities. The iicj merely requested the right of Muslim communi-
ties to have their own arbitration board along the lines of other reli-
gious arbitration bodies already in place, it thus announced its inten-
tion to create a Canadian Muslim arbitration board for family matters 
that would be available to all Muslims in Canada. One remembers what 
happened: in the debate that followed the iicj’s announcement of its 
intentions, the Ontario legislature abolished the option of arbitration. 
The challenge came largely as a result of the fear that the religious arbi-
tration would, in practice, infringe on certain individual rights, in par-
ticular those of women, should they not be entirely free to consent to 
arbitration but compelled to avail themselves of it under pressure from 
the patriarchal rules that prevail in their community, in the name of the 
protection which that community affords them and of an inegalitarian 
conception of women’s identity in Islam. In sum, Islam was reproached 
for its treatment of women. The debate in Canada is now not only 
closed, but the path opened by the 1991 Act has been abandoned.
Strangely enough, in the meantime religious arbitration seems to 
be blazing a trail through Great Britain, where the Muslim Arbitration 
Tribunal (mat) has been authorized, pursuant to the Arbitration Act 
of 1996, to offer its services to Muslims who wish to use them to settle 
their conflicts.38 Islamic mediation bodies, such as the Islamic Sharia 
Councils, as well as Jewish, evangelical and Catholic ones, were already 
well established in their role of accompanying conflicts between believ-
ers, which were for the most part familial or sometimes commercial in 
nature. Their decisions had no legal force, however, in the eyes of state 
law. With the establishment of a true religious arbitration tribunal, the 
Muslims of Great Britain appear to have succeeded in opening up the 
path that had been blocked in Canada. They have obtained recognition 
for specific institutions allowing Muslims who wish to do so to settle 
their disputes by means of arbitration. The aim is to open up an alter-
native form of dispute resolution, while respecting certain limitations: 
the procedure must abide by the obligation to protect individual rights 
and thus fundamental freedoms. It should, however, be regarded as a 
form of weak legal pluralism, since it all remains within the confines of 
public policy and the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal cannot pronounce 
divorce, that is, a divorce that equals a civil divorce.39
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It is too soon to draw concrete lessons from the experiment being 
conducted at present in Great Britain with the mat, but it would be 
very instructive to follow this experience closely and read the evalua-
tions that will be conducted in Britain itself. The benefit to be gained 
from religious arbitration is not insignificant; it is very similar to the 
advantages of the traditional system of arbitration. In the case of Mus-
lim communities, it is undeniable that the question of accommodation 
of rules of conduct drawn from Islam and from the principles of shari῾a 
is a lively one. Shari῾a is indeed a complex normative framework of 
rules and principles that regulate family life, among other things, and 
offer a comprehensive vision of the life of the believer. Family law is 
a particularly sensitive domain of law, the more so when it is closely 
linked to a religion, since this makes the handling of related matters 
from a legal perspective all the more difficult. One would therefore 
expect that particular institutions, deeply rooted in the reality and lived 
religious experience of a community of believers and, above all, recog-
nized by that community, would handle the responsibility of arbitration 
entrusted to them with the requisite expertise and authority. Under the 
principle of arbitration, Muslims involved in disputes in Great Britain 
may henceforth turn to an alternative space for conflict resolution, one 
that is recognized by the state. This body is not free from the oversight 
of English law. Time will tell whether this experiment bears fruit, and 
thus whether it could serve as a useful path in the context of family law. 
The first studies devoted to the mat do not rule out this possibility.
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Critical Perspectives on Integration  
for Western Muslims
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Introduction
For well over three decades, Muslim scholars and legal experts residing 
in the West and elsewhere have been engaged in a concerted effort to 
employ classical legal frameworks and principles to formulate religious 
rulings appropriate to the Western sociopolitical and cultural milieu. 
These scholars, in seeking to develop jurisprudence for minorities (fiqh 
al-‘aqalliyyat), have generated a rich intellectual discourse on how re-
ligious laws can both reinforce civic belonging and adapt to meet the 
practical needs of Muslim-minority populations. For instance, there is 
broad consensus among such scholars that following the laws of the ter-
ritory within which one resides is incumbent upon Muslims and that a 
parallel system of law is unnecessary and undesirable. In general, civil 
laws attempt to safeguard persons, life, property, family, and human 
dignity; hence, it is understood that civil codes, Western and other-
wise, are roughly in line with the objectives of Muslim religious law.1 
Here, the underlying principle is that key aims of religious law, such as 
securing the rights of individuals within a family structure, can be se-
cured through civil legislation. This is not to say that the integration of 
religious and civil norms is not without its particular challenges, both 
practical and theoretical,2 but that integration is the most viable path 
forward.
Holding a collaborative conversation across identity borders on 
pressing social issues should engender a holistic and productive debate 
on the history and future of familial ethics and laws. Across Western 
jurisdictions, legislation related to the family cuts across many domains 
of the law, creating intricate webs of regulations and procedures span-
ning local, national, and transcontinental jurisdictions.3 While the com-
plexity is inherent, and while the current systems are roughly adequate, 
there is room for bureaucratic streamlining to improve expediency and 
efficacy. In particular, it should be a priority to close legal loopholes that 
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allow individuals with nefarious intentions to circumvent provisions 
that are otherwise aimed at securing the stability and financial support 
of dependant members of the family.4 It should be seen as part and 
parcel of Western Muslim civic responsibility to be actively engaged in 
working toward the betterment of such institutional frameworks for 
securing justice.5 Courts, community activists, religious authorities and 
community support networks must work in tandem to secure the inter-
ests of the disenfranchised and vulnerable;6 this is the ultimate, shared 
aim.
Debates on integration
The applicability of Muslim family law in Western contexts has been 
a subject of vigorous debate on the part of lawyers, policymakers, ac-
ademics, activists, and the general public for decades.7 For instance, 
in the early 1990s, a Leiden-based conference entitled ‘Religion and 
Emancipation of Ethnic Minorities in Western Europe’ explored the le-
gal rights of ethnic and religious minorities. Arguing for the strength-
ening of Muslim civic institutions and organizations, as well as for a 
greater understanding of the existing informal associations, scholars 
pointed out the various needs for institutional integration.8 Scholars 
at the forum also argued for devoting greater attention to how stereo-
types, anti-immigrant discrimination, prejudices and other structural 
dynamics hampers the vitality of ethnic minority and immigrant com-
munities,9 factors which remain relevant today. Within policy confer-
ences and workshops, religion often takes centre stage; yet, for Muslim 
populations singled out as problematic or nonconforming, often the 
most pressing causes of social disintegration are poverty, unemploy-
ment, linguistic deficiencies, educational and professional barriers, and 
in some cases, naturalization policies; at their core, these issues have 
little to do with religious identity.10
Some Western commentators go to great lengths to argue that West-
ern and Islamic values are at odds, for instance by citing gender vio-
lence in places such as post-revolutionary Iran and Afghanistan under 
the Taliban to illustrate misogynistic Muslim tendencies at large.11 
There is no doubt that such deliberate mischaracterizations and culti-
vated mistrust undermine genuine cooperation across ethnic and reli-
gious boundaries and represent an attempt to isolate individuals on the 
mere basis of their ethnic or religious identity. Indeed, public debates 
on the integration of religious and ethnic minorities are often charac-
terized by neo-Orientalism or laden with xenophobic sentiments.12 Yet, 
to be sure, debates on gender justice are rightfully an issue in terms of 
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the applicability of normative Muslim renditions of familial ethics, in 
Europe and beyond. Here, the broader socio-political context requires 
brief elaboration.
The rise of Islamism, which has led to Islamist governments in many 
Muslim-majority countries as well as fringe groups within some dias-
pora populations in Europe, has led to a chorus of resounding claims 
that religious law must be accommodated in the Western context.13 Such 
a demand for full-scale adaption of Islamic law typically provides little 
in the way of an operational framework for determining which reli-
gious prescriptions are normative, and which are purely idiosyncratic 
interpretations of a particular grouping of Muslims that should not be 
imposed on Muslims at large. Similar to the dynamics within other 
sizeable religious communities, the matter of defining what norms and 
practices in fact constitute Islam can readily give rise to acrimonious 
debate.
Within this context, the conceptual domains of gender and family 
have functioned as jockeying sites where more deeply-ingrained ideo-
logical and postcolonial conflicts are played out. Within intra-Muslim 
discourses, the familial sphere is often portrayed as the fortress wherein 
religious identity and so-called traditional values must be protected 
against the advances of licentious Western capitalist exploitation of 
women, and various other tribulations.14 Throughout the colonial era 
and beyond, the sphere of family and personal status law has been one 
arena in which classical Islamic legal thought has maintained consider-
able sway, a trend that is continuing today.15 Hence, for vocal factions of 
Muslims, the sphere of family law is regarded as a fundamental strong-
hold for religious values, and any concessions to perceived Western 
influence therein are met with particularly vociferous resistance.
Nonetheless, numerous Muslim intellectuals have long been advo-
cating for family law reforms with measurable successes.16 While sub-
stantive changes in family law in Muslim-majority societies have been 
occurring at a modest pace since the early twentieth century, the most 
politically and socially repressive Muslim-majority countries are often 
taken by Western commentators to be de facto examples of applied Mus-
lim family law. This overlooks the myriad of cases where indigenous 
women and men in majority-Muslim societies have been successful in 
instituting gender-egalitarian reforms;17 it ignores the vibrant devel-
opments in the West itself;18 and perhaps most strikingly, it neglects 
to account for how, in the not-so-distant past, women in Europe and 
beyond had to agitate for basic political and economic rights. Hence, 
arguing that Muslim women, as a homogeneous category, are some-
how uniquely repressed due to Islam itself is misguided; gender-based 
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bigotries and asymmetrical power dynamics are not only pertinent to 
Muslims, but are central concerns on the agendas of gender activists 
and queer movements transnationally. A vast literature exists on this 
subject, and it is not necessary to reproduce it here.
Rather, we proceed with specific theoretical and practical examples 
of how European Muslims can integrate Muslim familial norms and 
customs within the civil legal sphere. We aim to forward critical and 
collaborative conversations by drawing on intellectual debates on these 
subjects over the past two decades. What is the precedent for Muslims 
to follow the ‘law of the land’ when residing in a non-majority Muslim 
jurisdiction? What specific measures allow for a marriage to be deemed 
legitimate within both a religious and civil framework? How can reli-
giously-based conceptions of marriage adapt to present-day circum-
stances while retaining core moral values and ethical integrity?
In exploring such questions, we advance the following propositions: 
1) rather than attempting to develop a parallel system for recognizing 
marriages and divorces, Western Muslims should devote their energy to 
strengthening existing civil legislation, to developing community sup-
port programmes, and to continuing conversations on the roles, rights, 
and expectations of spouses within an Islamic framework of mutual 
caring; 2) policymakers, community leaders, and religious authorities 
must work together to forward policies and enact procedures that allow 
for integration between religious and civil requirements; and 3) activ-
ists, religious and civil together, must work together to ensure that fam-
ily support services can meet exigent demands without marginalizing 
the interests of women (or men). In this context, we argue that there are 
pressing needs to ensure that female community leadership opportuni-
ties are on par with those available to the male community, and that 
women’s purviews and areas of expertise must be sought out and repre-
sented in a much more concerted fashion.
Continuity and Change in Muslim Notions of Family Rights and 
Responsibilities
While grounded in more universal objectives, such as guarding human 
life and dignity, as well as protecting wealth, family, and property, Mus-
lim religious laws have adapted according to a matrix of socio-political, 
cultural, and economic factors. The sphere of religious law is polyvocal, 
not only due to intra-Muslim diversity on matters of religious inter-
pretation, but also due to the geographic expanse of Islamic empires, 
each with customary practices, administrative procedures, and other 
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idiosyncrasies influencing how law was developed and applied. The 
positive application of law was quite fluid, not only from one region 
to another, but also from one epoch to the next. Like legal systems the 
world over, methodology developed by formative scholars took into 
consideration factors such as prior precedents, exigent circumstances, 
and social welfare. Within this context, models for family relations de-
veloped by Muslim scholarly elites took account of a variety of sources, 
including scripture, prophetic dictates, dominant customs, perceptions 
of sexuality and gender, and so on. With all of the aforementioned vari-
ables at play, systems for the adjudication of family matters were not 
static; changing government structures, differing roles for religion in 
legal jurisdictions, shifting political ideologies, colonialism and its leg-
acy, and particularly in recent times, the greater involvement of women 
in aspects of political and professional affairs, all have affected the char-
acter and range of applications of Muslim family law.19
Notwithstanding this plurality, there are several defining character-
istics of Muslim family law, as originally worked out by the major inter-
pretive schools of law and now as reinforced by influential factions in 
the contemporary religious establishment. In this particular account, 
we take marriage as the primary example, due to its centrality in the 
system of family law. Marriage in classical Muslim family law is not 
regarded as a sacrament, but rather as a civil contract of unique impor-
tance, due to its centrality as a fundamental organizing principle of 
society. As a contract, both parties may stipulate their own legally bind-
ing expectations and conditions for the arrangement, which if violated 
can nullify the marriage or otherwise be grounds for divorce. There 
are numerous gender-based prescriptions that became mainstays of the 
religiously sanctioned Muslim marriage. By contemporary standards, 
certain of these prescriptions etched out by medieval legal authorities 
and defended by an overwhelmingly male-dominated religious estab-
lishment are overtly chauvinistic and appear geared to maintaining a 
patriarchal social order. These include unilateral divorce rights for hus-
bands, the presumption that men are de facto heads of households, and 
exclusively male rights to religiously sanctioned polyandry, within and 
beyond the framework of marriage.20
Yet, within this gender-based division of spousal rights and respon-
sibilities, there are some clear benefits for women. Even early medieval 
Muslim discussions of family law go to great lengths to consider certain 
rights of wives, mothers, and children, particularly from a socioeco-
nomic standpoint. For instance, wives entering into Islamic marriages 
retain independent finances and are not thought of as the property of 
husbands, and wives are owed a mutually agreed upon monetary or 
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symbolic marital gift to contribute toward their material security. The 
rights are not purely socioeconomic; wives possess notable legal rights 
to sexual and emotional satisfaction. There are even some provisions in 
classical law that could provide inspiration for contemporary women: a 
wife of a Muslim husband is not a priori religiously bound to perform 
domestic labour if this is not the social norm for her society or station. 
Under certain circumstances, it is legally possible that if she voluntar-
ily performs such tasks, the husband may be compelled to compensate 
her monetarily for her labour. From another aspect, Muslim courts in 
different regions have long recognized a variety of reasons for wife-ini-
tiated judicial divorce, some of which bear resemblance to contempo-
rary paradigms of ‘no-fault’ due to the irrevocable breakdown of the 
marriage. At the very least, wives had recourse to divorce in cases of a 
husband’s protracted absence or in unfortunate cases where the hus-
band caused marked physical harm to her person. Many other guide-
lines within family law can be argued to have the wellbeing of the wife 
as the underlying concern.
This is simply to argue that shari῾a law need not be seen as inher-
ently or utterly inimical to the interests of women. Guiding principles 
for Muslim marriage, and familial ethics more broadly speaking, are 
firmly vested in the promotion of families as cohesive social units that 
engender successful progeny and social stability. With this objective in 
mind, elites considered that the clear articulation of spousal rights and 
responsibilities would enable greater marital harmony. What contem-
porary perspectives sometimes interpret as gender inequality, classical 
authorities and their modern proponents read as a manifestation of jus-
tice. Perhaps both perspectives can coexist as a pragmatic compromise 
between ideological positions; while the institution of marriage has his-
torically upheld a gendered division of marital rights and responsibili-
ties, with a subtle adjustment of the distribution, the framework could 
be responsive to contemporary socioeconomic circumstances and cus-
tomary norms.
For instance, within the traditional model of a Muslim family, as 
endorsed by a consensus of Muslim legal scholars and authorities since 
the formative period, husbands and fathers are given the sole financial 
responsibility for the maintenance of the family, including the provi-
sion of food, clothing, shelter, and other necessities. A woman’s main-
tenance is theoretically provided for by her guardian until her marriage 
and her husband thereafter. Any belongings, earnings, and inheritance 
are entirely her own; she is not, in the theoretical formulation of the 
law, required to use her wealth or income for any of her basic needs or 
the needs of her children.
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While full financial support can be seen as a women’s perk within 
Islamic religious law, in times of increasing global financial insecu-
rity and widespread unemployment, particularly among young adult 
populations, this model for family finances is no longer practicable 
or sustainable. A husband should not have to shoulder the financial, 
physical, and emotional burdens of supporting a family unilaterally. 
This is particularly true if his wife has a secure job and earns more than 
he does, a trend that may very well be on the rise. Here, rather than 
maintaining outdated frameworks that posit the husband as the sole 
breadwinner and hence authority, a paradigm of reciprocity is more 
appropriate. After all, it is a well-recognized principle in Islamic law 
that changing times necessitate changing measures, and this princi-
ple applies here. Well intended though they may be, classical gendered 
models for family finances must be reconsidered in light of current 
economic and social realities. There is no compelling reason to con-
tinue to buttress a gendered division of marital finances. Furthermore, 
if marital finances are no longer gendered, the principle of the man as 
the de facto head of the household becomes an appendage that serves 
little purpose and can be reengineered, given the current custom and 
exigent needs.
This is one cursory example of how principles of family law may be 
adjusted from within the framework of religion itself. For religiously 
committed Muslims, the process will require a sustained commitment 
to reasoned debate and deliberation.21 As noted above, Muslim legal 
provisions have, in principle, strived to remain in touch with the par-
ticular characteristics, customs, and circumstances of local populations 
while also safeguarding more universal concerns for equity, security, 
and individual responsibility. The present is no exception. Yet, the scale 
and pace of this process of drawing from religious texts and traditions 
to inform contemporary realities have to keep pace with ever-growing 
populations and ever more sophisticated institutions and bureaucratic 
structures.
Getting Married: Recommendations for Western Muslims
While the previous example of how to preserve continuity while adapt-
ing to circumstantial changes was more theoretically oriented, the fol-
lowing example is more practically geared. The goal of our prescrip-
tions is to balance unity and uniformity with particularity; that is, we 
maintain the fundamental integrity of the civil framework for recog-
nizing marriage while at the same time legitimize, and in fact advocate 
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for, several uniquely Muslim considerations for marriage. It is to the 
aspects of uniformity that we first turn.
To better protect the rights of spouses and children, Muslim leaders 
in the Western context, and particularly imams, to whom the task of 
performing marriage ceremonies is commonly given, should require 
their constituencies to register marriage contracts with Western civil 
authorities before a religious marriage ceremony is conducted.22 The 
de facto authority for resolving disputes should be the civil jurisdic-
tion. This standard should serve to integrate families wholly within the 
Western legal system to avoid complicated and unreliable recourse to 
international private law for the purposes of securing state-endowed 
rights or for the purposes of settling any disputes that could arise in 
Western civil courts. For couples married outside of the West but cur-
rently holding legal status within Western states, we recommend that 
marriages also be registered with civil authorities in the West, where 
possible. Domicile should be the primary standard, only to be sup-
plemented with factors such as nationality and party autonomy when 
deemed necessary.23
At a basic level, registry could better ensure that adequate records 
are present in cases of dispute over marital finances, the paternity of 
children, or other such affairs. It would also ensure that Western civil 
courts recognize the marital union and can have the authority to dis-
solve the marriage if necessary. Furthermore, traditional religious 
frameworks for recognizing marriage are pluralistic, and at times the 
line between what counts as a valid marriage and what does not is 
ambiguous.24 Setting the clear expectation that marriages be registered 
with civil authorities is one step in resolving such ambiguity. The fact 
that judges sitting on such courts may not be Muslim does not consti-
tute a barrier. As long as the civil authority is known to be reliable and 
accurate in its records, and there is no evidence to the contrary, there 
is no compelling reason for Muslims not to rely on civil authorities. In 
this case, the purpose of having two upright witnesses is adequately ful-
filled by the bureaucratic institution.
It merits noting that the support of civil institutions is not to envi-
sion that Western laws pertaining to the family are unadulterated, or 
are otherwise capable of surpassing or escaping the confusion and even 
rancour that can characterize family disputes; rather, it is to affirm that 
civil registry of a marriage in no way conflicts with any religious prin-
ciple, and in fact, civil registry can effectively safeguard the rights of 
partners in the contract. It provides a more reliable and bureaucrati-
cally advanced framework than that which fledgling Western Muslim 
communities are able to offer at present. Muslim spouses could still 
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make recourse to religiously grounded family mediation and arbitra-
tion services to assist with the resolution of certain extrajudicial issues. 
We argue below that the availability, credibility, and resource-base of 
such services should be strengthened, but that they should not form a 
substitute for the civil registry of marriage and divorce, or the resolu-
tion of any disputes that require the involvement of civil authorities.
In the model that we are advocating, religious networks represent 
an important but auxiliary form of mediation. For the reasons stated 
above, the civil jurisdiction must have ultimate authority. There is no 
harm in having a religiously oriented commemoration of the marriage, 
but to avoid confusion and to protect the rights of all parties, as well as 
the rights of any potential children that could come from the union, 
such a ceremony should ideally be conducted only after the civil con-
tract is filed. While we encourage Muslims to register marriages and 
divorces with civil authorities, we maintain that the Muslim notion of a 
marriage contract is a useful tool for couples to articulate their expec-
tations for the marriage. The contract can specifically state that it is 
supplementary to the civil contract, and Muslim witnesses, two upright 
men or two upright women, can sign.25
For instance, traditional formulae for Muslim unions provide oppor-
tunities to recognize conditions and stipulations. While the stipulations 
and conditions specified may not have de facto legal value within the 
civil framework of the law, as they might within a purely religious court, 
civil courts may look into the conditions and stipulations of the religious 
contract to help discern the intent of the parties at the time of marriage, 
should a legal conflict arise. The contract offers an opportunity for the 
couple to develop and clearly document how they will approach the idi-
osyncrasies of their marriage: where will the couple reside? Will a spouse 
pursue higher education? There are a host of questions for considera-
tion, on which a new couple should have the opportunity to reflect in 
an environment that can reinforce religious values in marriage, such as 
kindness, reciprocity, patience, forgiveness, and mutual support. Mus-
lim communities should provide the framework for new and potential 
couples to consider such preliminaries. While polygamy is somewhat of 
a mute point for Muslims maintaining Western domicile, since Western 
laws clearly prohibit multiple marriage partners, nevertheless the mar-
riage contract is also a forum where a wife can reiterate, if relevant, her 
expectation of a monogamous marriage.
The marriage contract traditionally functions as documentation of 
the mahr, the gift bestowed upon the wife by the husband, or otherwise 
promised to her.26 In the Western context, if the gifts bestowed have a 
significant monetary value, documentation of the exchange with the 
AUP_Berger_vierde.indd   235 19-4-2013   12:25:42
236 applying shari῾a in the west
couple’s signatures can be notarized to avoid later disagreements on the 
value of the gifts bestowed. For devout Muslims, key financial aspects 
of the marriage, namely the nafaqa, the obligation of the husband to 
provide a wife with financial support for housing, food, clothing, and 
other necessities, as well as ῾ idda, the alimony paid by the husband dur-
ing the period of marital disillusionment, remain a religious obligation 
which may or may not be deemed relevant in a civil court. We recom-
mend that bank records be kept, if necessary, to prove that such sums 
were paid, should a legal need for proof arise. In short, financial settle-
ments between the spouses in the event of a divorce should fall under 
the ultimate authority of civil jurisdictions, which are better equipped 
to enforce decisions equitably. In order to secure justice in such cases 
involving mahr, nafaqa, and ῾idda, Western courts should employ a 
comparative legal method and gender justice approach, the theoretical 
underpinnings of which have already been articulated.27
As the number of devout Muslims residing in the West rises, so too 
does the need for individuals with the appropriate religious training 
and background to make legal guidance and pastoral care readily avail-
able, not to mention the need for other social services that together 
form a more cohesive support structure for families.28 As practitioners 
who have worked extensively at the community level on issues con-
cerning the family, we cannot emphasize this point enough. It is not 
merely in the domain of law at the national level where conversations 
on this topic need to be occurring, but perhaps even more so, it is at the 
local level where needs are most pressing and interventions would be 
felt most directly. For instance, Western Muslim organizations should 
build their capacities in order to offer wider marital counselling ser-
vices, led by teams of professionals with competence in religious mat-
ters, the behavioural sciences, and law.29
Providing such family support should not fall to the imam of a com-
munity, who is unlikely to have the professional training or resources 
necessary to meet the demand. Neither should such a task fall to an ad 
hoc tribunal, particularly not the kind that charges exorbitant fees for 
services. Finally, all-male councils risk marginalizing women’s interests 
and are no longer acceptable according to modern standards. If it is not 
possible to find female members to sit on such councils – which would 
be highly unlikely – then female-specific training programmes should 
be an upmost priority. The goal should be to make readily available 
locally tailored, affordable, gender-balanced, professionally competent, 
non-binding family dispute mediation and arbitration services, as well 
as other holistic programmes aimed at strengthening families.30 Draw-
ing on the expertise of social scientists and community-based profes-
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sionals with expertise working at the family level would be particularly 
valuable in this context.
Conclusion
Societies the world over have been actively deriving mechanisms and 
procedures for secular laws and religious values to coexist for centu-
ries, such that the case of contemporary Western Muslims is best un-
derstood as an unavoidable facet of cosmopolitan civic life, rather than 
a peculiar exception to it. That said, each society has its own politi-
cal philosophies, legal structures, and cultural dynamics. Hence, our 
argument is not directed toward providing a singular, comprehensive 
model for the integration of religious values within largely secular 
systems; rather, we have provided recommendations, guided by cur-
rent research and time-tested principles, for how Western Muslims 
and their partners can facilitate social and legal integration at the level 
of families. We firmly hold that advocating for norms drawn directly 
from pre-modern Muslim legal discourses, without a full consideration 
of their outcomes and effects in specific Western contexts, is entirely 
counterproductive.
Given the preceding discussions, the best path is to seek out continu-
ity in aims between religious and civil law, and to work within existing 
systems to enhance their efficiency. As many Muslim-majority locals 
move towards even greater reform of their family and personal status 
law codes to reflect current transnational standards, it would be reason-
able to expect that conversations engendered by Western Muslims and 
lawmakers would impact these wider deliberations. New models for 
Western Muslim familial ethics stand to add valuable insights to, and 
reap insights from, negotiations of this type that have long been taking 
place in Muslim-majority societies. Namely, strengthening organiza-
tions and community networks that cater to family support should be 
a high priority. Policy leaders need to continue to work across religious 
and national boundaries to establish best practices and forums for col-
laborative engagement. Western partners need to help craft systems of 
family dispute arbitration that are relevant to the needs and customs of 
local Muslim communities. Western Muslims and their partners can 
continue to work to forward a civic discourse that mitigates xenopho-
bia and Islamophobia. So, too, investments of time, resources, and crea-
tive energies are needed from all parties to help institute holistic solu-
tions for meeting the exigent needs of vulnerable populations.
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13 Reflections on the Development of the 
Discourse of Fiqh for Minorities and Some  
of the Challenges it Faces
Abdullah Saeed
This chapter examines the context of and debate surrounding fiqh al-
‘aqalliyyat (fiqh for Muslim minorities, hereafter named ‘fiqh for mi-
norities’). After defining and outlining the concept of fiqh for minori-
ties, the concept is then examined in relation to its historical develop-
ment in classical Islamic law. As there is a substantial amount of debate 
about fiqh for minorities, some of its assumed benefits are examined, 
along with the objections that various critics have made to it. Finally, 
some observations are made with regard to the nature of the challenges 
it faces today.
Defining Fiqh for Minorities
Fiqh for minorities has been defined as ‘a specific discipline which takes 
into account the relationship between the religious ruling and the con-
ditions of the community and the location where it exists.’1 This fiqh 
consists of a contextual application of the rules and principles of the 
primary sources of Islamic law, and is rooted in a recognition and ap-
preciation of the specific conditions facing Muslims who are living as 
minorities.2 In particular, this approach appears to reinterpret those el-
ements of classical Islamic law (fiqh) that, owing to historical changes 
in Muslims’ circumstances, have become largely obsolete.3
Fiqh for minorities aims to address the problems that arise every 
day for millions of Muslims living in the West or in similar minority 
situations, particularly where conflict arises between the culture and 
values of the host society and the rules and the framework provided 
by classical Islamic law.4 Shaykh Abdullah bin Bayyah, vice-president 
of the Qatar-based International Union of Muslim Scholars and a pro-
ponent of fiqh for minorities, has indicated that in situations that are 
defined as being of ‘a problematic nature’ or involving ‘hardship,’ fiqh 
for minorities outlines the minimum that is expected of a Muslim liv-
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ing in minority.5 According to another opinion, fiqh for minorities is 
shaped by the broader aims of shari῾a (maqasid al-shari῾a), in the sense 
that shari῾a ‘permits all that is good and wholesome and forbids what 
is harmful,’ and hence is ‘aimed at making life easier and more conveni-
ent.’6 In terms of its scope, fiqh for minorities addresses personal law 
related issues as well as matters of ritual and worship (ibadah). In this 
way, it covers a wide spectrum of issues relating to daily life.
The term fiqh al-aqalliyyat was only recently introduced into the 
discourse. It was first used in the 1990s by two prominent Muslim reli-
gious figures: Shaykh Taha Jabir al-Alwani (who was then based in the 
us) and Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi (who lives in Qatar).7 Al-Alwani 
appears to have used the term fiqh al-aqalliyyat for the first time in 1994 
when the Fiqh Council of North America, under his presidency, issued 
a legal opinion (fatwa) declaring that American Muslims are permitted 
to vote in American elections.8 Despite the many subsequent contribu-
tions to this area by a range of scholars, al-Alwani remains, in my view, 
its most important contemporary theoretician: he continues to contrib-
ute not only fatwas, but also a range of concepts and methodological 
tools. He is also at the forefront of those who are arguing for a more 
principled approach to fiqh for minorities.
Muslim Residence in Non-Muslim Territory in the Prophetic 
Period
While the status of Muslim minorities residing in non-Muslim terri-
tory has been the subject of Muslim juristic debate since at least the 
second century of Islam,9 it appears that the issue of Muslims living un-
der non-Muslim ‘rule’ arose among Muslims earlier, and initially dur-
ing the time of the Prophet Muhammad. The Qur’anic verses view the 
presence of Muslims among non-Muslims in Mecca during the time 
of the Prophet (610-622 ce) as normal. It was only after the Prophet 
Muhammad had established a ‘Muslim territory’ in Medina (following 
his migration from Mecca in 622 ce) that the Qur’an asked the Meccan 
Muslims to migrate to Medina10 as a way of consolidating and strength-
ening the Muslim community there. However, this instruction did not 
appear to be a general command for Muslims to migrate from a ‘non-
Muslim’ territory to Muslim lands as such.
On a number of occasions, the Qur’an appears to indicate that what 
matters is not whether Muslims live in predominantly non-Muslim ter-
ritories, but whether they are free from oppression and persecution and 
able to practise their religion in such places. The Prophet Muhammad 
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even encouraged his followers to flee persecution in Mecca and to seek 
refuge with a Christian ruler in Abyssinia where they had the freedom 
to practise their religion. When his teaching spread across Arabia, the 
Prophet seems to have accepted the fact that individual Muslims would 
live amongst predominantly non-Muslim communities, as was the case 
with Muslims who converted to Islam but preferred to live in their own 
non-Muslim tribes.
Muslim Residence in Non-Muslim Territory Under Classical 
Islamic law
Although Muslims lived in non-Muslim majority contexts from the 
earliest times of Islam, there was no systematic treatment by jurists of 
the issue of Muslims living under non-Muslim rule between the sev-
enth and eleventh centuries ce, probably because such presence on a 
large scale was not regarded as ‘normal’.11 However, some opinions were 
expressed by early jurists that were later taken up by other jurists in the 
development of their positions on the issue. Imam Malik (d. 769), who 
represented the most strict school of law with regard to Muslim resi-
dence under non-Muslim rule, believed that Muslims should not reside 
in non-Muslim territories. He disapproved of Muslims travelling to 
non-Muslim lands, even for business.12 Other scholars were more flex-
ible: Abu Hanifa (d. 767) permitted residence for Muslims in non-Mus-
lim territory as long as it was not permanent. Shafi῾i (d. 820) allowed 
Muslims to reside in non-Muslim territories if there was no danger of 
their being enticed away from their religion. The Hanafi jurist Shay-
bani (d. 805) argued that Muslims were not obliged to migrate from a 
non-Muslim territory to a Muslim one. Tabari (d. 923) held that a Mus-
lim’s ability to practise his religion was the key consideration in any dis-
cussion about the permissibility of residence. For the Ja’faris (Shi’a), it 
might even be better to reside in a non-Muslim territory in some cases, 
because that territory might be free from persecution and oppression.13
Dar al-Islam and Dar al-kufr
Related to the issue of residence is the question of the kind of ‘abode’ 
(dar) in which a Muslim may reside. While various ‘abodes’ are recog-
nized in juristic literature, much of the discussion surrounds dar al-
islam (abode of Islam) and dar al-kufr (abode of unbelief), the latter 
sometimes referred to as dar al-harb (the abode of war or enemy ter-
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ritory). While jurists distinguished between the two abodes and often 
believed that it was not acceptable to reside outside dar al-islam, there 
was no agreed upon conception of what could be considered the dar 
al-Islam or abode of Islam. For the Hanafi jurist al-Kasani (d. 1191), dar 
al-islam was where shari῾a was manifest and implemented. For Shafi’i 
scholars, ‘territorial control’ determined whether the place was dar al-
islam.14 Other scholars argued that in addition to territorial control, 
Muslims should be living in security for the territory to be considered 
the abode of Islam.15
While it was preferable for Muslims to live in dar al-islam (however 
defined), living in dar al-kufr or dar al-harb was often discouraged, if 
not outright prohibited. In the pre-modern context there was a pre-
dominant belief that it was only possible for a Muslim to live an iden-
tifiably ‘Islamic’ life under the rule of shari῾a. This, in turn, could only 
occur within the context of an Islamic polity dedicated to its applica-
tion.16 Thus, jurists saw a clear dichotomy between the abode of Islam, 
where shari῾a ruled, and the abode of unbelief, where shari῾a had no 
place.17 There were also other reasons for this discomfort. By residing 
in the abode of unbelief, a Muslim could be perceived as inadvertently 
strengthening the ‘enemy’ and they might acquire Islamically unac-
ceptable or undesirable values or norms from the predominantly non-
Muslim context.18
Equally, the notion of the ‘supremacy of Islam’ over other religions (a 
belief that was then widely held in Islamic theology and law) could not 
be maintained in such an environment. In addition, Muslims might not 
be able to practise their religion as they should, and there was a chance 
that Muslims might convert to the dominant religion, thus leading to 
the spread of apostasy (riddah). Moreover, at a social level, non-Muslim 
norms and customs in many contexts were considered somehow inap-
propriate for Muslims. Thus for most jurists, the idea of Muslims living 
outside the abode of Islam was problematic. It was therefore generally 
presumed that Muslims living in dar al-kufr would migrate back to the 
dar al-islam. In the meantime, it was understood that these ‘displaced’ 
Muslims would preserve their religious and cultural identity by isolat-
ing themselves from their host societies.19
Development of the Discourse on Fiqh for Minorities
While it was easy to hold and maintain such views up to the eleventh 
century ce or so, this began to change as the political and military 
dominance of Muslims began to be challenged and large areas formerly 
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under Muslim rule came under non-Muslim governance. Although the 
situation varied from place to place and from time to time, in Spain un-
der Christian rule, for example, as Christians reconquered parts of Is-
lamic Spain, the freedom to practise Islam gradually deteriorated, par-
ticularly from the thirteenth century ce. In many cases, Muslims had to 
live under severe restrictions or were forced to convert to Christianity. 
Muslims living under such conditions had to seek fatwas as to what 
they should do. At that time, some scholars argued that they should 
migrate to Muslim lands where they would have the freedom to prac-
tise their religion; while others argued they should stay in Spain and 
practise their religion as much as possible.
As large numbers of Muslims came under non-Muslim rule, not only 
in Spain, but also in Sicily, and even in predominantly Muslim majority 
lands, such as those that came under Mongol rule during the thirteenth 
century ce, Muslim jurists had to address the situation and deal with 
legal issues in a more systematic manner. A number of scholars today 
highlight this fundamental change to the jurisprudential discourse. For 
example, after the loss of Toledo in Spain in 1085 ce, while Muslims 
had previously experienced territorial losses,20 the resulting geopoliti-
cal changes were matched by a documented juridical response by Mus-
lim scholars. A rich body of fatwa literature related to these changing 
circumstances was gathered, for instance, by the North African Maliki 
scholar, Ahmad al-Wansharisi (d. 1508), among others.21
Such fatwas and other juristic views were issued to guide the Mus-
lims who were then living under such conditions. However, the need to 
develop jurisprudence to address the context of living in a minority has 
become even more crucial over the past two centuries. The second half 
of the twentieth century is particularly important in this regard, given 
the large number of Muslims who willingly migrated to non-Muslim 
lands, particularly in Europe and North America. It is this Muslim 
presence that has led to the current discourse of fiqh for minorities.
The Modern Discourse of Fiqh for Minorities
In the modern period, fiqh for minorities has identified that Muslim 
minorities, especially those residing in the West, require a specific 
legal discipline to address their unique religious needs, which differ 
from those of Muslims residing in Muslim majority countries.22 Ac-
cording to al-Alwani, the purpose of fiqh for minorities is not to rec-
reate Islam, but to provide a set of methodologies that govern how a 
jurist should work within the existing flexibility of the religion to best 
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apply it to particular circumstances.23 For al-Alwani, fiqh for minori-
ties is essentially derived from the general fiqh of Islam as a whole, but 
it focuses on issues that affect Muslim minorities living among non-
Muslim majorities who are endeavouring to preserve their identities 
under somewhat different customs, legislation and laws.24 As such, 
Muslim minorities are living under particular conditions and they 
have special needs that may not be appropriate for other communi-
ties.25 This therefore requires a discipline, with input from specialists 
from different social and religious disciplines, so that problems can 
be articulated accurately and solutions found based on a common ap-
proach, broadly based on the universally accepted fundamentals of the 
Qur’an and Sunna.26
In comparison to al-Alwani’s approach, most modern Muslim 
jurists still appear to treat the situation of Muslim minorities as a highly 
exceptional case that requires special consideration.27 They tend to 
approach the range of questions relating to laws about food, dress, mar-
riage, divorce, co-education and relations with non-Muslims in terms 
of expediency. Consequently, the interpretations are often varied.28 A 
wide range of concepts from Islamic jurisprudence, including the com-
mon good, the objective or spirit of law, convenience, common prac-
tice, necessity and prevention of harm have also gained significance in 
this discourse.29
Advantages of a Separate Branch of Fiqh for Minorities
Proponents of fiqh for minorities argue that developing a specific 
branch of jurisprudence for minorities has a number of advantages. 
They claim that the approach will help address the daily problems that 
arise for millions of Muslim individuals living in the West or in simi-
lar minority situations.30 One advantage claimed for fiqh for minorities 
is that it will ensure that the religious life of the Muslim minority is 
protected on both a personal and a collective level.31 In this regard, al-
Alwani has pointed out that the key challenge faced by Western Mus-
lims (and Muslim minorities elsewhere) today is how to ensure their 
integration into these societies without losing their religious identity.32 
Fiqh for minorities is believed to be of benefit to Muslims in majority 
contexts as well.
Although some of the problems addressed by this branch of juris-
prudence may appear to be urgent for Muslims in the West, ultimately, 
the whole of the Muslim world will have to respond to the issues that 
are being raised (such as gender equality, for instance)33 as the world 
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becomes more globalized and as Muslim-majority societies are increas-
ingly faced with the influence of modernity. Another advantage claimed 
for fiqh for minorities is that it may improve relations with non-Mus-
lims on a cultural and international level, by creating a clear framework 
for mutual understanding. Fiqh for minorities may also bring benefits 
for the discipline of fiqh itself, by allowing issues of law to be under-
stood from a new perspective.
Despite these potential benefits, this project has been heavily criti-
cized by a number of influential Muslim scholars. The American Shaykh 
Nuh Keller and the Syrian Shaykh Buti are among the best known crit-
ics of fiqh for minorities. Shaykh Nuh Keller’s objections are twofold. 
Firstly, he rejects the idea that ‘exceptions’ should be created for Mus-
lim minorities. He argues that exceptions have already been built into 
shari῾a, case-by-case, and that each situation should be decided based 
on its own merits,34 not by a wholesale generalization. In his view, the 
approach adopted by fiqh for minorities is a form of ‘sloppy thinking’ 
and it results in ‘bad fiqh.’35 Secondly, he argues that fiqh for minori-
ties creates two sets of standards: one for Muslims in Muslim-majority 
countries, and another for Muslims in Muslim-minority contexts. For 
Keller, this means that, ‘anybody who is in a minority… has an excuse 
to behave [differently] than [those in] countries where Muslims are 
a majority.’36 On the other hand, Shaykh Buti posits that there are no 
such things as minorities and majorities in Islamic legal thought. He 
argues that shari῾a, as a system of law, is only applied in dar al-Islam, 
not dar al-kufr.37
For these critics, there is nothing specific to the situation of minori-
ties that justifies a different treatment in law; they argue that the entire 
project of fiqh for minorities should be rejected on this basis. Although 
adherents to this view acknowledge that the application of Islamic law 
should take context into account to a certain extent, they emphasize 
that Islam is one religion and that there is no justifiable reason for a sep-
arate project of Islamic law for minorities. For them, fiqh for minorities 
is an unnecessary departure from the classical conception of Islamic 
law. They argue that personal juridical reasoning (ijtihad) should be 
used to solve these problems, bearing in mind specific circumstances, 
rather than adopting a whole new fiqh.38 For them, there is no need to 
develop a separate branch of jurisprudence for minorities.
There are other criticisms of fiqh for minorities as well. One is that 
fiqh for minorities is a form of innovation in religion (bid’ah) that 
must be rejected. Legal positions and views that came to be accepted 
as ‘standard’ in classical Islamic law are, from this perspective, to be 
respected and maintained. Proponents of fiqh for minorities may 
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respond by noting that there have been differences of opinion among 
the jurists on practically every single Islamic legal problem, and that 
the so-called standard views are frequently challenged by other jurists. 
In their view there is no ‘innovation’ in fiqh for minorities, as far as the 
substance and content are concerned. The only innovation is the new 
label that is being used.
Fiqh for minorities can also be criticized because it appears to be 
based on somewhat subjective considerations, rather than clear princi-
ples of jurisprudence and rules of interpretation. This arguably makes 
fiqh for minorities extremely subjective and therefore of questionable 
legitimacy. Fiqh for minorities can also be seen as a discourse that 
appears to adopt a somewhat paternalistic attitude towards Muslims 
living in minority contexts. By focusing on solutions that aim to make 
life more convenient or easier for Muslims in minority contexts,39 fiqh 
for minorities appears to present the view that Muslims in minority 
contexts are less able to fulfil the same obligations as Muslims who live 
in majority contexts. A related idea is that by permitting certain prac-
tices that are considered prohibited (haram) in Muslim-majority con-
texts (based on the legal maxim that necessity justifies such practices), 
fiqh for minorities promotes the perception that a diluted approach to 
Islam is generally acceptable in minority contexts.
Naturally, proponents of fiqh for minorities have responded directly 
to such criticisms, although despite the contributions of figures like al-
Alwani, many supporters of fiqh for minorities still appear to be unin-
terested in asking fundamental questions about Islamic law, principles 
of jurisprudence, or the interpretation of texts as they issue fatwas relat-
ing to Muslim minority concerns.
Towards a More Principled Approach?
Much of fiqh for minorities is based on the idea that the positions de-
veloped in classical Islamic law (and upon which there is broad agree-
ment among jurists) must be seen as the standard for Muslims today. 
However, in the case of minorities, where there is some flexibility in the 
legal tradition (for instance, in the form of differing opinions among 
the jurists or different interpretations of a particular text), this can be 
used to provide a more lenient view, opinion or a fatwa. The underlying 
position of the proponents of fiqh for minorities, with very few excep-
tions, seems to be that there is no need to rethink, in any fundamental 
way, principles of jurisprudence or rules of interpretation. Two exam-
ples are noted here.
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Example 1: a Muslim woman’s marriage to a non-Muslim
Classical Islamic law is reasonably clear that a Muslim woman may not 
remain married to a non-Muslim man. For Muslims living in the West, 
this classical legal position has become difficult to maintain, especially 
because of the circumstances in which some conversions take place. 
Some proponents of fiqh for minorities have therefore proposed, based 
on certain minority views in classical Islamic law, that it is acceptable 
for a non-Muslim man and woman to remain married, even if one of 
the spouses becomes a Muslim. In what follows, this famous fatwa on 
this issue, while recognizing the difficulties posed by the almost unani-
mous position in Islamic law that a Muslim woman may not marry or 
remain married to a non-Muslim man, accommodates the present situ-
ation (particularly in Western contexts):40
The Council also recognizes and acknowledges the conditions in 
which new Muslim sisters in the West find themselves when their 
husbands choose to retain their religion. The Council affirms and re-
peats that it is forbidden for a Muslim female to establish marriage to 
a non-Muslim male. This has been an issue of consensus throughout 
the history of this nation. However, in the case of marriage being es-
tablished prior to the female entering the fold of Islam, the Council 
has decided the following:
First: If both husband and wife revert to Islam and there is no shari῾ah 
objection to their marriage in the first place, such as blood or foster 
relations, which deem the very establishment of marriage unlawful, 
the marriage shall be deemed valid and correct.
Second: Assuming that the marriage is properly contracted in the be-
ginning, if the husband reverts to Islam alone, while his wife remains 
a Jew or a Christian, then the marriage shall maintain its validity, i.e. 
it will not be affected by the husband’s conversion to Islam.
Third: If the wife reverts to Islam while her husband remains on his 
religion, the Council sees the following:
1) If her reversion to Islam occurs before the consummation of mar-
riage, then they must immediately separate.
2) If her reversion to Islam occurs after the consummation of mar-
riage, and the husband also embraced Islam before the expiry of her 
period of waiting [῾iddah], then the marriage is deemed valid and 
correct.
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3) If her reversion to Islam occurs after the consummation of mar-
riage, and the period of waiting expires, she is allowed to wait for him 
to embrace Islam even if that period happens to be a lengthy one. Once 
he does so and reverts to Islam, then their marriage is deemed valid 
and correct [emphasis added].
4) If the wife chooses to marry another man after the expiration of 
the period of waiting, she must first request a dissolution of marriage 
through legal channels.
Fourth: According to the four main schools of jurisprudence, it is for-
bidden for the wife to remain with her husband, or indeed to allow 
him conjugal rights, once her period of waiting has expired. However, 
some scholars see that it is for her to remain with him, allowing him to 
enjoy full conjugal rights, if he does not prevent her from exercising her 
religion and she has hope in him to revert to Islam [emphasis added]. 
The reason for this is to consider the case of women who would find 
it difficult to embrace Islam with the condition of being separated 
from their husbands and deserting their families. Those scholars 
based their view upon the ruling of Umar b. al-Khattab, may Allah 
be pleased with him, in the case of the woman from al-Hira who re-
verted to Islam while her husband remained on his religion. Accord-
ing to the authentic narration of Yazid b. Abd Allah al-Khatmi, Umar 
b. al-Khattab made it optional for the woman to leave her husband or 
to stay with him. They also cite, in supporting their view, the opinion 
of Ali b. Abi Talib concerning the Christian woman who embraced 
Islam while still married to a Christian or a Jew. Ali said that her hus-
band’s conjugal right was still inalienable, as he had a contract. This is 
also an authentic narration. It is also known that Ibrahim al-Nakha῾i, 
al-Sha῾bi and Hammad b. Abi Sulayman had the same view.
Thus this fatwa is relying on a minority position in fiqh to provide some 
flexibility for women who embrace Islam while their husbands remain 
non-Muslim. The justification is based on the opinions of major figures 
like Umar b. al-Khattab and Ali b. Abi Talib, even though these views 
have not been adopted in classical Islamic law.
While this fatwa is addressing an important issue for contemporary 
Muslim women in particular, relying on certain minority views in fiqh, 
one wonders whether it would not be more appropriate to ask some 
fundamental questions regarding women and Islamic law, in particular 
in relation to what is often referred to as the ‘status of women’ and the 
interpretation of a range of texts in the Qur’an and Sunna in the light 
of that ‘status’ in the past. Such an approach will require rethinking the 
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role of women in society and coming to terms with the idea of equality 
of men and women before the law. There is a range of Qur’anic texts, as 
well as Hadith, that can be used to support this idea of equality. How-
ever, because of the perceived immutability of laws relating to women 
and family in classical Islamic law, most Muslim jurists today (includ-
ing most proponents of fiqh for minorities) are not prepared to adopt 
the approach suggested. Naturally, when examining fatwas related to 
women, proponents of fiqh for minorities still seem to maintain the 
same view of women that was maintained by classical Islamic law. The 
sustainability of this classical legal view today is questionable, and per-
haps should be open to challenge.
Example 2: interest-based mortgages
Another example that demonstrates the utilization of minority views 
to support practices that could otherwise be regarded as prohibited un-
der classical Islamic law can be found in the area of finance. Fiqh for 
minorities appears to permit interest-based mortgages on the basis of 
necessity (darura), despite the fact that classical Islamic law considers 
any form of increase over and above the principal in a loan to be riba 
and therefore prohibited. This fatwa issued by the European Council 
for Fatwa and Research41 on the permissibility of applying for a loan to 
buy a house typifies the reasoning on this issue. Having stated that riba 
is forbidden (and that bank interest is also riba), this fatwa goes on to 
encourage Muslims in Western countries to establish Islamic mecha-
nisms for lending or borrowing money without interest, and to work 
with existing financial institutions to develop such mechanisms. If all 
of this fails, the Council recommends the following:
If all the above suggestions are unavailable, the Council, in the light 
of evidence and juristic considerations, see no harm in buying mort-
gaged houses if the following restrictions are strictly observed: (a) the 
house to be bought must be for the buyer and his household; (b) the 
buyer must not have another house; (c) the buyer must not have any 
surplus of assets that can help him buy a house by means other than 
mortgage.
As the fatwa is built on the principles of extreme necessity (darura) 
or need (hajah, which is treated in a similar manner to darura), the 
Council stresses that there is another rule, which governs and com-
plements the rule of extreme necessity and need. This rule states that 
whatever has been made permissible due to extreme necessity must be 
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handled with great care; it should be restricted to the category of people 
who are in real need of a house. The fatwa, therefore, does not cover 
taking out a mortgage to buy a house for commercial reasons, or for 
purposes other than buying a house for someone who does not have 
one.
However, a fundamental question in this area is whether classical 
Muslim jurists and contemporary jurists were correct when they inter-
preted the Qur’anic notion of riba simply as interest in all of its forms, 
without looking at the ethical dimension of the prohibition, which is 
clearly spelt out in the Koran as injustice (zulm). Instead of creating 
one stratagem after another to circumvent the prohibition, why not ask 
the fundamental question: are all forms of interest riba? Much like their 
seeming reluctance to question how classical Islamic law views women, 
proponents of fiqh for minorities do not seem to be interested in asking 
this fundamental question about the interpretation of riba.
Concluding Remarks
Classical Islamic law faces many problems in the contemporary world, 
and the situation of minorities highlights the need for a rethinking of 
key areas of classical Islamic law. Solutions are not going to be found 
by making minor adjustments here and there or by declaring exception 
after exception to general rules (for example, by declaring that it is ac-
ceptable to borrow money on interest in one part of the world but not 
in another, or by giving women certain rights in minority contexts but 
not in majority contexts). Only by undertaking a rethinking of classical 
legal positions can authentic solutions be found to the issues that clas-
sical Islamic law is facing as it engages with the modern world.
For fiqh for minorities to move beyond its current limits, it must 
be repositioned within the broader debate on the reform of classi-
cal Islamic law. This requires that temporary and ad hoc solutions be 
replaced with a more principled discourse of reform, leading to real 
change and new understandings of how Muslims should practise Islam 
in today’s world, regardless of where they are located. I am not suggest-
ing that context is unimportant; rather, that fiqh should be reconsid-
ered to account for the specific social, political, cultural, and economic 
contexts in which Muslims live, regardless of their minority or majority 
status. To achieve this, proponents of fiqh for minorities are required to 
have the courage to ask deeper and more fundamental questions about 
the application of law, as well as principles of jurisprudence, ethics, and 
morality in the contemporary context. They should seek to develop a 
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methodological framework within which such questions can be asked 
and the responses evaluated. They should be prepared to ask hard ques-
tions about how Islamic law was constructed in the first three centuries 
of Islam (as a human construct based on divine guidance) and to con-
sider how its social, political, and historical contexts have impacted this 
process.
As a result, a whole range of concepts, including dar al-harb and dar 
al-Islam, Muslim and non-Muslim relations, the perceived inequality of 
men and women, the role of law in being Muslim, and the scope of what 
may be considered permissible (halal) and impermissible (haram), may 
need to be reconsidered. These new ideas are just as crucial for Mus-
lims living in majority contexts as they are for Muslim minorities. In 
short, this will involve a fundamental rethinking of the classical Islamic 
legal tradition and its foundations. Those ideas and practices that are 
no longer justifiable must be set aside, so that new ideas can be devel-
oped in relation to what it means to be Muslim today.
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